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Justin Vacula and John Murray

Very interesting conversation. Provides some nice insights into Murray's thinking and how his world view makes sense to him. Go here.

Comments

M. Stevenson said…
Murray doesn't really do much justice to the theist's position on your Evil God Challenge. My favourite part, at around 09:44:

Vacula: Why would the creator be all good, instead of all evil, or morally neutral? How can you get to that conclusion?
Murray: Well, because God is God. There is no evil in God. God is moral perfection.
Vacula: How do you know that?
Murray: How do I know that? If you want to see God, look at Jesus. Jesus is the express image of his person, the exact brightness of his...
...So I look at Jesus. Is there anything in evil, anything evil at all about Jesus?
*silence*
Can you find anything evil about Jesus?
*silence*
Vacula: Well no, I think you're missing the objection here.

Classic stuff, well played Justin!
Paul P. Mealing said…
I’m always amazed at people who claim they know the mind of God.

“The first marriage was performed by God”. “I am a personal witness to the resurrection of Jesus Christ…”

“If man had never chosen to sin…” there would be no natural disasters.

Our ignorance is based on what God “keeps secret from us”. “The big bang is ridiculous.”

“The more I read [the Bible] the more I believe its perfection.”

This is someone who reads a text to the effective exclusion of all others and has convinced himself that was is obviously mythology to others is fact to himself.

I thought Justin Vacula did a very good job.

Regards, Paul.

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