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Discussion Tuesday 21 Feb, Magdalen College, Oxford - Swinburne, Atkins, Louis and myself


Tuesday, Feb 21st: Think About Knowledge

7:30pm: Life, the Universe, and Everything - The Quest for Truth


Magdalen College, Grove Auditorium, OX1 4AU

Science is credited as the most effective approach to answering questions. Scientifically derived facts are viewed as truths. But there are also truths to be found in mythology, in historical accounts, in philosophy. As we try to make sense of our world, to answer the big questions, how do we know what ‘truths’ to believe? Which, if any, of these is preeminent? Is there ultimately only one truth, or are there categories of truths? And in our quest for the truth, what sorts of questions should we be asking? Who is best placed to ask them?

Join us as we engage with a panel of distinguished thinkers from science, philosophy and theology as they try to assert that their domain is, in fact, best placed to answer the biggest questions.

Dr. Stephen Law, philosopher, http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/
Prof. Peter Atkins, chemist, http://www.humanism.org.uk/about/people/distinguished-supporters/peter-atkins
Prof. Richard Swinburn, religious philosopher, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~orie0087/framesetpdfs.shtml
Dr. Ard Louis, theoretical physicist, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ard_Louis

Comments

Oliver said…
Looking forward to it. Particularly as it's being held at Oxford's finest college!
Anonymous said…
Why are you listed as a philosopher, but Swinburne as a religious philosopher?
crabsallover said…
Hi Stephen,
coming from Ringwood, Hampshire. I greatly enjoyed your debate with Peter Atkins this time last year. I trust both of you will have new / further ideas on the subject (not just a repeat)!

Chris Street
Humanists4Science / HASSNERS
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
Mina said…
Is there a text for this talk rather than the video?

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