On another blog, FideCogitActio, some theists of a "classical" stripe (that's to say, like Brian Davies, Edward Feser) are criticisng the Evil God Challenge (or I suppose, trying to show how it can be met, or sidestepped). The main post includes this: In book I, chapter 39 , Aquinas argues that “there cannot be evil in God” (in Deo non potest esse malum). Atheists like Law must face the fact that, if the words are to retain any sense, “God” simply cannot be “evil”. As my comments in the thread at Feser’s blog aimed to show, despite how much he mocks “the privation theory of evil,” Law himself cannot escape its logic: his entire argument requires that the world ought to appear less evil if it is to be taken as evidence of a good God. Even though he spurns the idea that evil is a privation of good, his account of an evil world is parasitic on a good ideal; this is no surprise, though, since all evil is parasitic on good ( SCG I, 11 ). Based on the conclusions of se...
Stephen Law is a philosopher and author. Currently Director of Philosophy and Cert HE at Oxford University Department of Continuing Education. Stephen has also published many popular books including The Philosophy Gym, The Complete Philosophy Files, and Believing Bullshit. For school talks/ media: stephenlaw4schools.blogspot.co.uk Email: think-AT-royalinstitutephilosophy.org
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I don’t really empathise with the culture wars that are so apparent in the northern hemisphere. It reinforces John Lanman’s thesis (lecturer at the School of Anthropology and Keble College, Oxford) that there’s a negative correlation between what he calls ‘strong atheism’ and ‘non-theism’. In countries where religion is not so overt or political, no one deems it necessary that a moral landscape can only exist if we rid the world of religion.
Humanist moral philosophy in the form of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, even Confucius, predates Christianity by centuries, so what’s the argument? Narrow mindedness and broad mindedness are relative, and, to some extent, dependent on knowledge and ignorance, as Harris intimates, yet moral philosophy, whether ancient or modern, has always hinged on empathy. All of which makes religion irrelevant to the argument.
I was caned when I was at school, along with many others, but it had absolutely nothing to do with religion. Harris and Dawkins love to equate every bad or morally dubious behaviour with religion, but it isn’t always the case, whether it’s in education or politics.
By the way, there’s no one more condescending than Dawkins.
Regards, Paul.