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Graham Taylor appointed manager of Monty Python philosophers' football team

From the Telegraph.

Graham Taylor, the former England football manager, may still be reeling from his 0-1 loss to Germany at Wembley in 1991.

But his latest appointment could give him an opportunity to set the record straight as he leads a team of the nation’s sharpest minds into battle in a recreation of the Monty Python Philosophers’ Football Match sketch.

The 65-year-old will have to summon all his mental strength as he pits his Socrates Wanderers team of comedians, including Tony Hawks and Mark Steel, against “German” rivals Nietzsche Albion, whose ranks include British philosophers Dr Stephen Law and Julian Baggini. More...


Official website here.
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Paul P. Mealing said…
Stephen,

Something totally off-topic that you might be interested in: an interview with Philip Cam, who, apparently, was instrumental in introducing 'philosophy for kids' into Australian schools.

If you download the mp3 file onto your computer you avoid all the musical interludes, which reduces the programme from 55 to about 40 minutes.

Interestingly, he's careful to say that philosophy shouldn't replace religion, even though, in NSW, he's trialling a pilot course for kids who don't attend scripture classes in their school, because so many of the kids don't attend scripture. That was how he sold the idea there.

Another interesting point is the constant connection he seems to find between philosophy and culture in general: music, arts and humanities.

Regards, Paul.
February 27, 2010 at 5:08 AM
Unknown said…
It's really very interesting stuff

Employment Law
February 27, 2010 at 6:45 AM
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