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TRICK OR TREATMENT: ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE ON TRIAL

CFIUK/SPES PRESENT

TRICK OR TREATMENT: ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE ON TRIAL

A day discussing alternative medicine, with speakers:

SIMON SINGH, author of Trick or Treatment, currently being sued by British Chiropractic Association
ANDY LEWIS, runs Quackometer on the web
PROFESSOR JOHN GARROW, founder member of the charity "HealthWatch" which promotes proper testing of the health claims of all therapies, alternative or orthodox.

Saturday, 30th January 2010
10.45am-3pm

Venue: Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, Holborn, London WC1R 4RL – Main Hall.

£10 on the door. Free to Friends of CFI UK, PLUS GLHA, SPES, BHA, NEW HUMANIST SUBSCRIBERS.

To book go to www.cfiuk.org and hit button "support cfiuk" and follow instructions. Credit and debit cards welcome. Alternatively send a cheque payable to ‘Center for Inquiry London” to: Executive Director Suresh Lalvani, Center for Inquiry London, PO Box 49097 Centre for Inquiry London N11 9AX, and include names of those coming, phone number, return address, etc.
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Comments

Anonymous said…
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chiropractors conway
March 21, 2010 at 2:48 PM
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