Skip to main content

Teflon-coating religion


In previous post below [Is religious dangerous? (II)] William Hawthorne defends the view that religion has no power to get people to hold wacky beliefs; rather it's "people who have the power to assent" to wacky beliefs.

This tendency to teflon-coat religion so that no responsibility for any bad stuff sticks (religion is not bad/stupid/dangerous, people are) is reminiscent of the U.S. gun lobby's insistence that guns don't kill people, people do.

I just want to note, however, that there's a form of dodgy teflon-coating that atheists also apply. Christopher Hitchens, in God is not Great, refuses to give religion any credit for anything good, period. When a religious person does good, it's the person that gets the credit, not the religion.

This is just as silly, of course. Religious people have got v. upset about it. Rightly so. But then I think we're equally justified in getting upset when the teflon-coating is applied, not so the credit for good stuff doesn't stick, but so the credit for bad stuff doesn't stick.

William defends the view that religion has no power to get people to believe wacky things, only people do. I wonder what William's reaction would be to the suggestion that religion has no "power to do good", only people do. My guess is he'll say -"Oh religion does have that power!"

Comments

Unknown said…
Guns don't kill, people do. Yes, but:
- guns allow those intent on killing to kill more people and make the killing easier,
- guns make accidental death by gunshot more likely than accidental death by gunshot without guns (examples: when kids get hold of parents' guns, when a robber doesn't intend to kill, but things get out of hand),
- etc.

Religion isn't dangerous, people are. Yes, but:
- Religion allows those intent on misguiding to misguide more people and make the misguiding easier,
- Religion makes the gullible more susceptible to persuasion into the acceptance of dangerous beliefs.

It's the bullet in the gun, and the gun in the hands of a person that makes a gun dangerous. Without the bullet the gun is no different than any other blunt instrument.

Faith is religion's bullet. Without faith, religion is no different than any other blunt instrument of a poor argument.
Post-Islamist said…
Yes, people use religion texts as a pretext for actions that would not be countenanced by alternative readers of those texts.

Is this unique to religious texts? In the absence of religious pretexts, liberal enlightenment texts seem to be just as handy.

See:


http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article18807.htm
Post-Islamist said…
Sorry the url didn't print in full. It's article18807 I wanted to point you to. Basically, the American government seems to speak about what they are doing in Iraq and AFghanisatan in exactly the same way as the Russians used to about their own Afghan adventure. Coincidence?

what is done in the name of 'freedom and democracy' should not necessarily turn us against those ideals. And I think the same argument generally applies to religion. However, I think that religious texts can be misleading and may lend themselves to abuse more easily.

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article18807
Will Hawthorne said…
This comment has been removed by the author.
Will Hawthorne said…
Stephen,

I wonder what William's reaction would be to the suggestion that religion has no "power to do good", only people do.

I would say that, strictly speaking, religious people (or some religious beliefs) can bring about good things, not "religion" per se.

Cheers,
Will
teflon coating said…
Teflon coating is magical element which carries a very special properties increases the durability of the product

Popular posts from this blog

EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS

(Published in Faith and Philosophy 2011. Volume 28, Issue 2, April 2011. Stephen Law. Pages 129-151) EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS Stephen Law Abstract The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of indepen

Aquinas on homosexuality

Thought I would try a bit of a draft out on the blog, for feedback. All comments gratefully received. No doubt I've got at least some details wrong re the Catholic Church's position... AQUINAS AND SEXUAL ETHICS Aquinas’s thinking remains hugely influential within the Catholic Church. In particular, his ideas concerning sexual ethics still heavily shape Church teaching. It is on these ideas that we focus here. In particular, I will look at Aquinas’s justification for morally condemning homosexual acts. When homosexuality is judged to be morally wrong, the justification offered is often that homosexuality is, in some sense, “unnatural”. Aquinas develops a sophisticated version of this sort of argument. The roots of the argument lie in thinking of Aristotle, whom Aquinas believes to be scientifically authoritative. Indeed, one of Aquinas’s over-arching aims was to show how Aristotle’s philosophical system is broadly compatible with Christian thought. I begin with a sketch of Arist

The Evil God Challenge and the "classical" theist's response

On another blog, FideCogitActio, some theists of a "classical" stripe (that's to say, like Brian Davies, Edward Feser) are criticisng the Evil God Challenge (or I suppose, trying to show how it can be met, or sidestepped). The main post includes this: In book I, chapter 39 , Aquinas argues that “there cannot be evil in God” (in Deo non potest esse malum). Atheists like Law must face the fact that, if the words are to retain any sense, “God” simply cannot be “evil”. As my comments in the thread at Feser’s blog aimed to show, despite how much he mocks “the privation theory of evil,” Law himself cannot escape its logic: his entire argument requires that the world ought to appear less evil if it is to be taken as evidence of a good God. Even though he spurns the idea that evil is a privation of good, his account of an evil world is parasitic on a good ideal; this is no surprise, though, since all evil is parasitic on good ( SCG I, 11 ). Based on the conclusions of se