tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post2709556142855140996..comments2024-03-22T06:22:08.010+00:00Comments on Stephen Law: The Mirror PuzzleStephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-42345031835344875612015-04-26T10:46:58.250+00:002015-04-26T10:46:58.250+00:00According to Geert Arys (above) and others, our id...According to Geert Arys (above) and others, our idea of reflections in mirrors comes from the fact that they represent a reversal from back to front in some objectively true sense. But how is this supposedly privileged reversal realized?<br /> <br />Surely the answer is obtained by inverting and thereby contradicting Geert's own point: it happens because "back-front" is defined relative to left-right (AND top/bottom). This is the whole point of the term "relative" after all.<br /><br />Broadly I agree with Stephen's discussion, although I also think that the contingencies associated with psychological aspects of the question tend to obscure a more interesting philosophical point. In particular, there is evidently no means of distinguishing mathematically between the world and its reflection except by imagining a direct comparison - a point which significantly concerned Immanuel Kant. eg. see http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/713/1/parity.pdf. <br /><br />As far as I can see, science plays little or no part in posing, let alone in solving this abstract question, and excepting the comparison of real-world examples, such as molecular enantiomers, the (abstract) concept that there is indeed a distinction between chiral counterparts seems to be foundational. <br /><br />In this context, it is worth remarking that no two scientists will ever be able to establish whether or not they both perceive the same "handedness" in the world, (will they?). However, if there is no scientific fact of the matter, this indicates in turn that the apparent breaking of mirror-symmetry in certain sub-atomic processes must be illusory. (Who will still pretend that philosophical arguments have no part to play in scientific decision-making?)<br /><br />Thank you, Philolinguist, also, especially for your suggestions and links regarding causality. I have found these extremely interesting (especially since the arguments there tend to corroborate my own views!)Stunoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-38464554063899833662014-09-01T05:56:18.018+00:002014-09-01T05:56:18.018+00:00Part 2:
A major problem with philosophy is, if yo...Part 2:<br /><br />A major problem with philosophy is, if you're attempting to formulate a substantial thesis that is purely discursive or theoretical, you're almost certainly going to drift into semantic indeterminacy. More on this here:<br />http://whyphilosophyfails.com/ <br /><br />Ways to avoid this include anchoring your arguments to empirical data (e.g. from psychology or physics), and/or relying on negative arguments that show other theses to be internally logically inconsistent or unsupported by the 'facts' they claim to be supported by. <br /><br />In that last approach, a viable strategy is to propose alternative interpretations of those 'facts', that do not support the thesis but which are hitherto unfalsifiable (this was a strategy favoured by the later Wittgenstein, in the famously bizarre thought-experiments he used to undercut the theories of meaning that underpinned certain philosophical 'problems' like the Sorites Paradox). So, yes, much of philosophy is almost certainly semantically indeterminate (a less charitable critic would say 'non-sensical'). Once you're immersed in a purely discursive enquiry, you tend to quickly lose sight of the boundary between sense and nonsense. <br /><br />It's a psychological problem, so more philosophy isn't the solution. The only solution I know is to stick closely to the methods and standards of empirical science and logic, and be mindful of alternative interpretations of 'data', while being open to theoretical possibilities. Arguably, that's not really a 'philosophical' approach. So the problems are 'philosophical', in the sense that they feature in the literature called 'philosophy', but viable solutions would probably involve a fair bit of science and logic. <br /><br />I think the critics have a point, it is inadvisable to try and do 'pure philosophy' (or any purely discursive or theoretical enquiry) if you're looking to make sense. A more promising approach is what is now called 'experimental philosophy', which combines theoretical speculation with scientific data, mainly from psychology.Philolinguisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622819518795177507noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-13756916997412026302014-09-01T05:56:01.756+00:002014-09-01T05:56:01.756+00:00Part 1:
Ron Murphy has a point about much of phil...Part 1:<br /><br />Ron Murphy has a point about much of philosophy. However, there are genuine problems studied by philosophers (such as the problem of 'the external world', which is a question that concerns scientists as well as philosophers. The question can be stated briefly as "If our knowledge of the world is mediated through our senses and cognitive apparatus, then how do we know what the world is 'really' like, independently of how observers experience it?"). This is actually a tricky dilemma. <br /><br />Approaches to it partly involve science, such as the study of human cognitive limitations that shape sense data in specific ways (for example, humans can only see limited wavelengths of light). There's also an element of psychology, such as the finding that humans are extremely good at selective attention (for a funny demonstration, watch this 5-minute clip http://youtu.be/UtKt8YF7dgQ).<br /><br />This psychological finding then raises a speculative question: What if our experience of the world is a collective exercise in selective attention? What if we're all preoccupied with pretending there isn't a 500-pound gorilla in the room? What kind of strategies could we most easily and successfully employ to pull that off, and how would those strategies help to explain why we experience the world the way we do (of course, much depends on what we're trying to avoid noticing)? BTW, Herbert Fingarette discusses the relationship between self-deception and selective attention in his article "Self-Deception Needs No Explaining", as well as his book 'Self-Deception'. His writing is non-technical, so is an easy way to get into the topic. <br /><br />Of course, there are many proposed solutions to the problem of 'the external world'. It is always helpful to pay careful attention to shifts in meaning between different contexts, for words like 'external' and related terms. It has been argued that failure to do so with regard to the concept of 'causation' plays a central role in the problem of the 'external world' and related issues, more about that here: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol15/iss2/5/Philolinguisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622819518795177507noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-86133431999685114312014-08-29T10:59:01.004+00:002014-08-29T10:59:01.004+00:00I'd go further than Geert.
It's terrible ...I'd go further than Geert.<br /><br />It's terrible philosophy that passes off a simple science/math-problem as some philosophical mistery. All the mistery is only apparent, from ignorance and illusory perceptions.<br /><br />"You know, in a sense, a mirror doesn’t reverse anything at all."<br /><br />Not merely in some sense, but in actuality. It's in a 'sense' that it is reversed, in the human brain's perceptual sense. See Feynman: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6tuxLY94LXw: "It's a psychological problem." And it's gross equivication on the terms left and right, equating what is the refelection of a left arm for the actual right arm.<br /><br />"Some of the world’s greatest minds – including that of the Ancient Greek philosopher Plato – have struggled with and been defeated by this infernal mystery."<br /><br />Which ones were defeated by it?<br /><br />Some ancient minds might be excused. Anyone following Pythagoras and other mathematicians shouldn't have been confused by this. A simple clarity of thought dismisses the problem immediately. Anyone with a spot of a scratch or any distinguishing mark on one hand and not the other realises that nothing is actually reversed. Anyone following Newton has no excude whatsoever.<br /><br />Incidentally, a concave mirror will reverse images. If you stand at the right point your head will be down, and you left hand and its wrist watch will move to the right. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wvYduTBpbuA. Science class! Yeah!<br /><br />This is science, and the scientific use of maths. It takes empirical science to explain this, not philosophy. Philosophy has no solution to this apparent problem. Philosophers can call on the science of course, but they shouldn't be passing off the science they are explaining as if it's philosophy; and much less should they be passing it off as philosophy and claiming it isn't science. That amounts to interdisciplinary plagiarism.<br /><br />But that's philosophers for you. Trust philosophers to make not merely a mountain out of mole hill but a whole career, a whole discipline, out of an endless series of trivial mole hills.<br />Ron Murphyhttp://ronmurp.netnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-49444607166238189982014-08-26T23:12:03.546+00:002014-08-26T23:12:03.546+00:00why do people in the anglosphere foreignise the le...why do people in the anglosphere foreignise the letter 'i' as if it's 'e'?<br /> and why do arabs and persians think that the 'o' is the sound in 'put' and the 'e' the sound in 'pit'.<br /><br />and why do northern english regional speakers seem insensible to <i>'one' </i> rhyming with 'fun' and not 'gone'.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-15543929829431061752014-08-14T09:23:43.909+00:002014-08-14T09:23:43.909+00:00"[The mirror puzzle] can’t be solved by doing..."[The mirror puzzle] can’t be solved by doing science"<br /><br />I disagree. Math/science can solve it. A mirror only reverses (transforms) everything on the perpendicular axis of the mirror surface. If the mirror is positoned to the north of the subject, the subject front will be pointing south (reversed) but the subject's left hand will be pointing west in both cases (not reversed).<br /><br />However, 'left' and 'right' itself is defined relative to front and back (AND top/bottom), which is reversed by the mirror. This means your mirror image will switch left and right as well, just because of the transformation of front and back.<br /><br />If your mirror is placed above you, the top/bottom axis is reversed and your mirror image is standing upside down (front and back remaining the same this time). Because left-right is also relative to top/bottom, they are reversed for your mirror image.<br /><br />To me, that's pure math, not philosophy.<br /><br />regards,<br />Geert ArysAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09029579076606013384noreply@blogger.com