tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19056865684727473052024-03-19T08:48:20.217+00:00Stephen LawStephen Law is a philosopher and author. Currently Director of Philosophy and Cert HE at Oxford University Department of Continuing Education. Stephen has also published many popular books including The Philosophy Gym, The Complete Philosophy Files, and Believing Bullshit.
For school talks/ media: stephenlaw4schools.blogspot.co.uk
Email: think-AT-royalinstitutephilosophy.orgStephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comBlogger1306125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-31211353998912546522024-03-04T17:52:00.000+00:002024-03-04T17:52:06.556+00:00Cult of MAGA: The Crisis, The System, and The Enemy<p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><i></i></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><i><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmsVq7IJ_iedfemkqX7w4gfAKaB3om9fF98jpdwe95an0CBfpCsA14smkv_L2uUGuxO3RKvj25HQhgYJq8n9kBGyMrArxpSUd5MNecHca9qyr78cl0Ru61V4Fs_IDd-HR1thUHZ_qqwrvN7eoPKLllbr0CvmAE74EJL8JzGyzhDHDuemp6LZlcZKsPeSc/s1528/Screenshot%202024-03-04%20at%2017.50.55.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1010" data-original-width="1528" height="265" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmsVq7IJ_iedfemkqX7w4gfAKaB3om9fF98jpdwe95an0CBfpCsA14smkv_L2uUGuxO3RKvj25HQhgYJq8n9kBGyMrArxpSUd5MNecHca9qyr78cl0Ru61V4Fs_IDd-HR1thUHZ_qqwrvN7eoPKLllbr0CvmAE74EJL8JzGyzhDHDuemp6LZlcZKsPeSc/w400-h265/Screenshot%202024-03-04%20at%2017.50.55.png" width="400" /></a></i></span></div><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><i><br />This is a pre-publication draft of a piece that appeared under a lightly different title in a recent Byline Times supplement on Trump, available <a href="https://www.bylinesupplement.com/p/cult-of-maga-the-crisis-the-system?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2" target="_blank">here</a>. </i></span><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">In <i>The Art of The Deal</i>, Trump claimed that the decorative tiles in the children's room at his Mar-a-Lago resort were made by Walt Disney personally. When Trump's butler asked him if that was really true, Trump replied, “Who cares?”</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Trump is a bullshitter. Harry Frankfurt’s little classic <i>On Bullshit </i>points out that the liar and the honest person have at least something positive in common: a focus on the truth. The honest person says what they believe is true; the liar what they believe isn’t true. But bullshitter, says Frankfurt,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><i>…is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false. His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and of the liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.</i></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">It's said we live in a ‘post-truth’ culture, and bullshit, in Frankfurt’s sense, is a part of that culture. Many accuse Trump of being a master of bullshit, casually firing off statements to self-aggrandise or manipulate uninterested in whether or not they’re true.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">While Frankfurt’s characterisation of bullshit is intriguing, I think it’s too narrow. A lot of what rightly gets called bullshit is propagated by folk who do care about truth. For the most part, believers in astrology, demons, guardian angels, or spiritualist communication aim to aim to believe what’s true. To suggest that anti-vaxxer or Christian Science parents (who forego orthodox medical treatment in favour of prayer) don’t <i>care</i> about whether their belief is true seems absurd given they’re prepared to bet their child’s life on it.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">So what about the Make America Great Again movement backing Trump? While Trump often seems uninterested in what’s true, I think his followers, for the most part, do care about truth. Yet I still consider the MAGA movement a kind of bullshit movement, alongside wacky conspiracy theories and religious cults. In order to understand why it’s a bullshit movement, we’ll need a more encompassing conception of bullshit than Frankfurt’s.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">In my book <i>Believing Bullshit, How Not To Get Sucked Into an Intellectual Black Hole</i>, I outline eight key warning signs that we’re imprisoned in a bullshit belief system. There’s no single common denominator when it comes to bullshit: different belief systems tick different boxes. But before get into why MAGA is a bullshit movement, I want briefly to explore why our current political landscape provides such fertile soil for bullshit political movements to take root. I’ll focus on two key reasons, which I call <i>The Crisis</i> and <i>The System</i>.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">A crisis makes us more susceptible to bullshit. Medical crises, for example, make many of us vulnerable to quacks and charlatans offering miracle cures. Bereavement can have the same effect. Parents who have lost a child may be drawn to spiritualists who reassure them that not only is their child not gone, they can even be communicated with.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">MAGA also exploits a crisis. In both the US and UK, there is a growing sense of deepening economic crisis. Many feel it personally and acutely. The cost of rent and food is spiralling, wages are stagnating, job insecurity is increasing, and many neighbourhoods are in visible decline. Owning your own is becoming impossible for most. This, too, is a crisis that can make us easy prey for charlatans. The more desperate we feel, the more vulnerable we become.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Alongside <i>The Crisis </i>is what I might call <i>The System</i>. Many bullshit belief systems exploit individuals’ sense and fear that a secretive elite controls everything. Conspiracy theorists foster and feed off these feelings, encouraging us to believe the Illuminati or the Jews control everything, or that 9/11 was an inside job, or that Area 51 holds dead aliens, or the Moon landings were faked.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">MAGA also invokes The System. Many ordinary citizens, both inside and outside MAGA, feel increasingly powerless and “left behind”. “They’re all the same”, is a common refrain. There is a suspicion that while those in control might pretend that we all have a choice and can exert influence through the ballot box, the truth is that real power has been stitched up. Behind the façade of democracy, a corrupt and entirely self-interested political and economic oligarchy, is really in control. Some call it the ‘deep state’.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">The Crisis and The System combine to suggest that our economic woes are a result of a rather secretive and corrupt elite who act always in the own narrow interests at the expense of everyone else. This creates particularly fertile soil for a bullshit political movement to take root. If The Crisis is a product of The System, then solving The Crisis requires we take a sledgehammer to The System. And that is exactly what Trump and the MAGA movement promises to do. They promise to ‘drain the swamp’.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">MAGA feeds on the widespread perception of The Crisis and The System. But is that what makes it a bullshit movement? Actually, no. There really is a severe economic crisis hurting increasing numbers of ordinary Americans. And it’s at least arguable that this crisis is in large part a product of a political system that really is increasingly corrupt, offering less and less real choice, and presided over by an economic and corporate elite. So perhaps the MAGA movement is right about something: the Crisis is real, and the cure really will require taking a sledgehammer to The System. In order significantly to improve the lives of ordinary Americans, we need to step outside of the fairly narrow parameters of the Overton window of ‘acceptable’ political opinion and do something comparatively radical.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">So if the MAGA movement might actually be correct about both The Crisis and The System, what makes it a bullshit movement? I think the answer lies in its identification of what I’ll call <i>The Enemy</i>: those who supposedly control The System and are responsible for The Crisis.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Who is The Enemy, according to MAGA? It comprises the ‘woke mob’, cancel culture, immigrants, Hispanics, Black Lives Matter, the left, and those who wish to rob Americans of their freedom to own automatic weapons and refuse to bake a gay couple a wedding cake. The truth, of course, is that none of these groups are responsible for the economic crisis hurting ordinary Americans. Those chanting “Build the Wall!” and yelling slogans about BLM, Muslims, or the Woke are calling for things that will do little if anything to bring back jobs or reduce the cost of living.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">If there is a veiled elite responsible for their declining living standards and decimated high streets, it’s not comprised of these folk.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Of course, MAGA does also focus on Washington, promising to ‘drain the swamp’. But ‘crooked Hillary’, the Democrats, and others with power and influence targeted by Trump are targeted, not because they’re part of self-serving financial and political elite, but just because they are an obstacle to Trump and MAGA gaining power. For notice that at the same time as Trump identifies “crooked Hillary” <i>et al</i> as The Enemy, he supports and enacts huge tax cuts that primarily benefit the very wealthiest and corporations. He’s a friend to any politician, no matter how flaky, who will support him. And he’s a friend to economic oligarchs, just so long as they don’t threaten him. The perception that Trump is champion of the common man and women against a self-serving financial and political elite, is, on closer examination, ridiculous.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">It’s here that the bullshit nature of the MAGA movement becomes apparent. Trump is no friend to ordinary Americans. In fact, he appears to have little interest in their concerns, other than how they might be hijacked to further his own selfish aims. Trump and his supporters psychologically manipulate, constantly making highly emotive (often dubious and regularly downright false) claims about violent immigrants, rapist Mexicans, stolen elections, BLM ‘terrorists’, Democrat paedophile rings, Obama’s fake citizenship, and ‘shithole countries’ to whip up fears, hatreds, and anxieties. It is in the ways in which people have become convinced that Trump is a hero who will end their economic pain by smashing The System responsible for it that the bullshit character of the MAGA movement resides.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"> </span></p></div><p><br /></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-6197230556369159772024-01-18T10:14:00.003+00:002024-01-20T12:06:26.961+00:00Clarity in Philosophy - And A Terrible Post Modern Argument Against It<p><span style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue";"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-size: 13px; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtjcdAX8uth0eaFZddexDpefmn1ovoXzRK_-8flq9pkyiMNMlx-enOO0JzyExodUil7YNhRUXgLz6sON5O8zleWCA6dM4BaSV0v_OkOE_kRcWPDaLdm43zgTrF5smBUfi9_ZTap56EObsHGkdMktH1TkDJgFxARjfkVwt3jIDahbq3hHRRRRurN2d_YRY/s1798/Screenshot%202024-01-18%20at%2010.06.03.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1400" data-original-width="1798" height="498" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtjcdAX8uth0eaFZddexDpefmn1ovoXzRK_-8flq9pkyiMNMlx-enOO0JzyExodUil7YNhRUXgLz6sON5O8zleWCA6dM4BaSV0v_OkOE_kRcWPDaLdm43zgTrF5smBUfi9_ZTap56EObsHGkdMktH1TkDJgFxARjfkVwt3jIDahbq3hHRRRRurN2d_YRY/w640-h498/Screenshot%202024-01-18%20at%2010.06.03.png" width="640" /></a></div><br /><p></p><div style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: large;">A common Post Modern defence of unclarity in philosophy is that e.g. some boundaries are vague/unclear. 'If reality is vague and unclear, then we must be vague and unclear in talking about reality. Otherwise we are not being true to reality.'</span></div><div style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span><span style="font-size: large;">The analogy here is, perhaps, painting a picture. If a storm is something vague and fuzzy, then to be accurate your painting of it must be vague and fuzzy, like a Turner. Being clear is a mistake - it involves crudely pixelating what is in reality highly subtle.</span></div><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiU0q-797lrmW20XKOuX6KjvRHtW-LtAm6bATGNQy-DsivzVeLY2kAgs2kFDe9bELHTb18j6zVqeKtLr1S8mywpSF54715ke3mU42Pa4VQmPDRyb1RyVl3I11opWqnUzVWju7pUzGrIMAGiwxveh81OCHXD8qTAVA_uduzAYqc3vS2SRbLXPB0MVcrnwX4/s1854/Screenshot%202024-01-18%20at%2010.06.16.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1392" data-original-width="1854" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiU0q-797lrmW20XKOuX6KjvRHtW-LtAm6bATGNQy-DsivzVeLY2kAgs2kFDe9bELHTb18j6zVqeKtLr1S8mywpSF54715ke3mU42Pa4VQmPDRyb1RyVl3I11opWqnUzVWju7pUzGrIMAGiwxveh81OCHXD8qTAVA_uduzAYqc3vS2SRbLXPB0MVcrnwX4/w640-h480/Screenshot%202024-01-18%20at%2010.06.16.png" width="640" /></a></div><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><div style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 15px; text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: large;">But this is to muddle clarification with simplification. A crude pixelated image is a simplification of what we see, not a clarification. Analytic philosophers do not recommend simplification. They value perspicuity, so we can see/understand clearly how things are. </span></div><div style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 15px; text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />Being opaque is no aid to seeing/understanding how things really are, irrespective of whether how they are is simple, or infinitely subtle and complex. The subtlety and complexity of the subject matter is *no justification at all* for being unclear.</span></div><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwGvG5AT7y3YDVv-hs4uzOBvu9Px4lBwTkyVkeYF8uUYtUGjDy9Att-Pup2Ci0zzrGOKah5EYn3m_HvxjT-nLBrr3I0RwRinkJFn1nnLa3rjC0b3yz-I44p8xvzAxHPVtNtWwkxmhAW1v9naFP_EeWaYXH5sQ_8yG9Q62wyzGnL2b90LDI2ydJAx1mutQ/s1958/Screenshot%202024-01-18%20at%2010.06.26.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1388" data-original-width="1958" height="454" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwGvG5AT7y3YDVv-hs4uzOBvu9Px4lBwTkyVkeYF8uUYtUGjDy9Att-Pup2Ci0zzrGOKah5EYn3m_HvxjT-nLBrr3I0RwRinkJFn1nnLa3rjC0b3yz-I44p8xvzAxHPVtNtWwkxmhAW1v9naFP_EeWaYXH5sQ_8yG9Q62wyzGnL2b90LDI2ydJAx1mutQ/w640-h454/Screenshot%202024-01-18%20at%2010.06.26.png" width="640" /></a></div><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: large;">POST SCRIPT. This post was prompted by this tweet.<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEipwy7l4nPaFEgXndg-4dZ2M6LovnYbNj_5cwwrj7C3Mzq8pSUjIZWt6fcq6Ii_WJbUTb_8mTuKE5XCJ6b3SQbrC5cVHO-9wBBpZ2hmH3-8_soPfXCScxAEgdsdObmjhvEVOMD5ZX8ueyd9phT5Hq7xT3lQ5PuTgsZLA5AtHY-yZEENyl0WEh7BFR6H4ew/s2538/Screenshot%202024-01-20%20at%2012.00.47.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1370" data-original-width="2538" height="346" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEipwy7l4nPaFEgXndg-4dZ2M6LovnYbNj_5cwwrj7C3Mzq8pSUjIZWt6fcq6Ii_WJbUTb_8mTuKE5XCJ6b3SQbrC5cVHO-9wBBpZ2hmH3-8_soPfXCScxAEgdsdObmjhvEVOMD5ZX8ueyd9phT5Hq7xT3lQ5PuTgsZLA5AtHY-yZEENyl0WEh7BFR6H4ew/w640-h346/Screenshot%202024-01-20%20at%2012.00.47.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />Here seems to be another example of someone running the argument I criticise here (Mette Hoeg in THINK).<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivKOHv3t1wGCreeR9ID6yEGJmEm6If38pJeoTpfffdt_sWd00Ar5M9maGH-QJEhc1UMDlSrZrRqAkec3CQOfT1OzPbyOzYaP0VrCMuAuL-wfV4SyftN5xlZmt45Dax_nRGzynI7JryegG9iRdBRkuLWNwfpQL8Ky3JFOEn_-Re9yU-yKXUwjM8X8sRjMY/s2402/Screenshot%202024-01-20%20at%2012.01.03.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="332" data-original-width="2402" height="88" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivKOHv3t1wGCreeR9ID6yEGJmEm6If38pJeoTpfffdt_sWd00Ar5M9maGH-QJEhc1UMDlSrZrRqAkec3CQOfT1OzPbyOzYaP0VrCMuAuL-wfV4SyftN5xlZmt45Dax_nRGzynI7JryegG9iRdBRkuLWNwfpQL8Ky3JFOEn_-Re9yU-yKXUwjM8X8sRjMY/w640-h88/Screenshot%202024-01-20%20at%2012.01.03.png" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /></span><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-47252892536118523212023-11-10T10:32:00.001+00:002023-11-10T10:32:02.392+00:00The Left’s “Antisemitism Problem” And Their Focus On Israel<p><i></i></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><i><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiCxAo0Bn8wOu_G-LWVqm00OhkTEA6XNp4jY_VqD8DeGOvm8GHN5t1KEUFVjY2jBoR9TzDGRSuh0OIf_vmzubE6xBdtuNC6eHWGacrISX2A-2fy6bs1ZgLB_jF0yBxjuQze3z5rhtnS5LUHuw6k_NZ1SyqM1mR-pdH6sg9xgqOMf_0o7NweM-ymyDbVzuE/s1228/Screenshot%202023-11-10%20at%2010.30.57.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="734" data-original-width="1228" height="382" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiCxAo0Bn8wOu_G-LWVqm00OhkTEA6XNp4jY_VqD8DeGOvm8GHN5t1KEUFVjY2jBoR9TzDGRSuh0OIf_vmzubE6xBdtuNC6eHWGacrISX2A-2fy6bs1ZgLB_jF0yBxjuQze3z5rhtnS5LUHuw6k_NZ1SyqM1mR-pdH6sg9xgqOMf_0o7NweM-ymyDbVzuE/w640-h382/Screenshot%202023-11-10%20at%2010.30.57.png" width="640" /></a></i></div><i><br />(reposting of my 2017 article)</i><p></p><p>I have recently been engaged in a very interesting discussion on Facebook about the Left's supposed antisemitism and Israel problem. It's widely supposed Labour has a major antisemitism problem that needs to be dealt with. Of course, there is antisemitism everywhere, but is there significantly more among Leftists? That's the suggestion.</p><p>I don't see that the evidence supports the view that Labour has a major antisemitism problem. Labour has around half a million members. I noted that:</p><p>(i) As of last summer, after various accusations were made in the Press and social media examples had been cited, a total of around 20 suspensions of Party members had been made. Out of half a million members.</p><p>(ii) Press reports of alleged examples of Leftist antisemitism are anecdotal evidence - notoriously poor evidence. Finding 20, 50, 200, or even 2,000 examples of antisemitism in Labour would not establish that Labour had a particular problem with antisemitism. I would add that many of the alleged examples cited in the press in any case look pretty suspect.</p><p>(iii) The Chakrabarti inquiry looked into the accusations of significant antisemitism in Labour and found no significant problem. Chakrabarti is a woman who was very widely respected, though after her report came out many centrists accused her of corruption.</p><p>(iv) Channel 4 did an undercover investigation of Momentum, looking for dirt, including antisemitism. They found none.</p><p>(v) A recent study into antisemitism by the Jewish Research Policy found that levels of antisemitism were no higher among the left or far left than amongst the general population.</p><p>So, I concluded, the evidence for Labour having a major antisemitism problem is just not there.</p><p><b>The Left's critical focus on Israel</b></p><p>In response to my scepticism regarding 'Labour's antisemitism problem', it was then suggested by several commentators that what justifiably condemns the Left of antisemitism is the way they tend to focus on Israel when it comes to criticising abuses of human rights, etc. What about Cuba, China, and other Leftist states? Why don't they get criticised to the same extent? And what about Saudi Arabia, which also engages in violent oppression, discriminates against non-Arabs, and so on? These other States are not criticised nearly as much by the Left. This, it's supposed, establishes, or is at least pretty good evidence, that the Left do have a major antisemitism problem.</p><p>Again, I am highly skeptical. True, antisemitism would explain the particular focus on Israel. But there is an obvious alternative explanation that also accounts for the particular focus on Israel. Here is a sketch (more could be added):</p><p>Many Westerners believe, I think justifiably, that Western governments operate with a double standard when it comes to Israel. Israel is allowed nuclear weapons, was aided by the West in acquiring them. Israel abducts people from Western countries illegally. Israel occupies territories that do no belong to them, and so on. When other countries do these things, they tend to be severely criticised and even have sanctions imposed. Israel largely gets a free pass.</p><p>Western Governments have enormous potential influence over Israel given that some actually fund it (e.g. they don't merely have business ties with Israel, they pump US tax-payers money into it). Yet those Governments do not exercise much control over Israel at all. They just stand idly by while Israel entrenches its grip on the occupied territories, etc.</p><p>Leftists are often biased to the Left. Hence they are likely to be more critical of non-Left regimes than Left regimes due to their pro-Left bias. This would obviously explain their differing attitudes to the oppression carried out by Israel vs. that carried out by Cuba or China, say.</p><p>Westerners are far more aware of the actions of Israel re the Palestinians given the extensive Western media reporting of it, than they are the oppression that goes on in Cuba, Saudi, China, etc. over which Western Governments in any case have far less potential control. Again this would obviously explain a Western focus on criticising Israel other than in terms of antisemitism.</p><p>Israel has a huge influence over Western governments through lobbying, etc. e.g. For example, no US Congressperson dare criticise Israel because they fear they will be targeted and removed. President Jimmy Carter notes that 'It would be almost politically suicidal for members of Congress to espouse a balanced position between Israel and Palestine, to suggest that Israel comply with International law or to speaking defence of justice or human rights in Palestine.' No other state has such influence over Western governments. True Saudi has also had considerable influence that has largely gone unnoticed till now, influence that has also corrupted our relations with that country, resulting in oppression and injustice being ignored. But now that Saudi's injustice is becoming better known, many Westerners, including many Leftists, are criticising Saudi too.</p><p>So, put these five points together and they collectively provide a highly plausible explanation for why a Westerner might focus particularly on criticising Israel for human rights abuses, etc. Individuals may feel under an obligation, given their own Governments' exceptional support of Israel, to themselves take an exceptional stance regarding Israel - to say 'No, not in my name'.</p><p>They may also, with some justification, feel they have a better chance, by influencing their own governments, of changing things for the better in Israel than of changing things for the better in Cuba, or Venezuela, or someone else where the West is, in any case, already taking serious action.</p><p>Note that it won't do, in order to undermine the explanation I outlined above, to point out regarding 4. above that it does not explain why Leftists tend to focus more on injustice in Israel than in Saudi. It's true, 4. does not explain that, for Saudi is not a Leftist regime. But of course such a critic is overlooking the fact that my claim is not that each of these explanations is individually sufficient to account for the difference in attitudes re Israel and other oppressive regimes. My claim is that they are collectively sufficient. Which I think they are.</p><p><b>Where the onus of proof lies</b></p><p>Also note that the onus is on those making the accusation of anti-semitism to establish antisemitism, not on those accused to prove their innocence. The mere fact that someone's being a bigot would explain their actions (i) does not justify accusing them of being a bigot, and (ii) does not mean the onus is on them to prove their innocence.</p><p>To illustrate: I am serving in a shop and someone buys short length of heavy rubber hose. I cry out: "This man is probably a wife beater!" I justify my accusation by pointing out that his being a wife beater would explain why he bought that length of hose (which it would, notice). I insist he must now prove his innocence. OR: I meet a scout leader at a party. On discovering he is a scout leader, I exclaim: "I strongly suspect this man is a paedophile!" After all, his being a paedophile would fully explain why he chose that particular occupation. I insist he must now prove his innocence.</p><p>Clearly, in these cases, the person is accused unjustly. The onus is not on them to prove their innocence but on me to establish their guilt, which I have not done.</p><p>In fact, in these examples, my accusation likely reveals a great deal about me - that probably either (i) I am ridiculously, obsessively keen to make such accusations, and/or (ii) I have some other personal grudge against the person accused.</p><p>Accusations of antisemitism should be taken seriously. There is a problem. I am obviously not denying that. But is there a particularly serious problem when it comes to the Left? I remain unconvinced. The fact that some folks are antisemtic would explain their being particularly critical of Israel is not good grounds for thinking that such people are, then, antisemitic. Just as there are many obvious alternative reasons (other than wife beating and paedophilia) why someone might buy that length of rubber hose or become a scout leader, so there are obvious alternative reasons (other than antisemitism) why folk on the Left might tend to be particularly critical of Israel (assuming they are).</p><p><b>Suppose my explanation fails? What follows?</b></p><p>So, the fact that some Westerners are particularly critical of Israel is entirely reasonable given, and well-explained by, the fact that their own Western governments are particularly in thrall to Israel.</p><p>But suppose, for the sake of argument, that I am mistaken about this. Suppose we establish this is not the explanation of why Leftists tend to focus their criticisms particularly on Israel. Would we then be justified in accusing such Leftists of antisemitism?</p><p>If I join and campaign for an anti-racist organisation, but don't take similar action re sexism and able-ism, does that give others grounds for accusing me of bigotry - of being sexist and ableist? No. Maybe my choice is down to some arbitrary factor, like fashion, or convenience. Maybe it's just more fashionable at that point to join an anti-racist campaign rather than an anti-ableist campaign, say. Or maybe it's easier for me to join an anti-racist campaign. Or the anti-racist campaign is just much better advertised.</p><p>Fashion would not really be a justification for my choice of activism. Still, the fact that I followed fashion in joining the anti-racist campaign rather than another wouldn't make me a bigot/able-ist/sexist. Ditto then someone who takes a particular interest in campaigning against the abuses committed by one country despite other countries being equally guilty. The mere fact that they're not justified in taking that line does not suffice to make them bigots.</p><p>In short, there remain on the table all sorts of other explanations for the Left's particular focus on Israel, such as fashion, convenience, publicity, etc. etc. These other explanations must be removed, or shown to be pretty unlikely, before the charge of antisemitism is substantiated. Those leveling the charge of antisemitism against the Left typically make no attempt to do this.</p><p>But in any case, as I say, I think the explanation I sketched out above does explains well why Leftists might tend to focus more criticism on Israel.</p><p><b>The ad hominem fallacy</b></p><p>But suppose we could establish that the Left does have a major antisemitism problem. Would that mean we could safely ignore their criticisms of Israel? Obviously not. Their criticisms of Israel might be sound even if, as a matter of fact, the critics are antisemitic. Yet, in response to criticisms of Israel - of the criticism that Israel is an apartheid state, for example - the actual criticism is rarely if ever discussed. Instead, the focus is almost exclusively switched to the character of the person making the criticism. They are immediately accused or at least suspected of being antisemitic, and thus they are thrown on to the defensive. As a response to such criticisms of Israel, this is a classic example of the ad hominem fallacy.</p><p><b>Moral scumbags</b></p><p>One last thought. We have a moral duty not to make false or dodgy (not well-established) accusations of antisemitism. Those who casually make such accusations (i) are crying wolf, thereby actually increasing the risk to Jewish people, (ii) abusing the memory of six million dead people, (iii) unjustly smearing people who are likely innocent. Let me be frank: anyone who makes such accusations knowingly, for partisan political purposes, is a moral scumbag.</p><p>By the way, I elsewhere make exactly the same points re false or dodgy accusations of Islamophobia, able-ism, racism, and so on.</p><div><br /></div><p><br /><br /></p><p><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><p></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-30350935664059741962023-04-03T17:26:00.022+00:002023-06-09T10:12:42.426+00:00Why I won't be voting Labour at the next General Election, not even to 'keep the Tories out'.<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 9pt; text-align: left;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6aGCZyNrKucvD5ZOdazjDXRC_juxgHclOuPnpHowr-c-vCTlg8JN43Vfm9lamRm6JYblRni-0Z7fcqbAL74ZohhyP_2FQ643p0pxrCexKAkKc_X_yfwmcB4WTUhq1hlmIdzchtlpxx2LsOUi_bvW_AWdHL44Zuh3FsXQIhnf4xAzPyVTWZskR-kRQ/s1246/Screenshot%202023-04-03%20at%2018.01.21.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="540" data-original-width="1246" height="278" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6aGCZyNrKucvD5ZOdazjDXRC_juxgHclOuPnpHowr-c-vCTlg8JN43Vfm9lamRm6JYblRni-0Z7fcqbAL74ZohhyP_2FQ643p0pxrCexKAkKc_X_yfwmcB4WTUhq1hlmIdzchtlpxx2LsOUi_bvW_AWdHL44Zuh3FsXQIhnf4xAzPyVTWZskR-kRQ/w640-h278/Screenshot%202023-04-03%20at%2018.01.21.png" width="640" /></a></div></span><div style="margin: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica; text-align: left;"><br /></span><p style="text-align: left;"></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span><span style="font-family: Helvetica; text-align: left;">I have always voted Labour, and have often been a member of the Party, campaigning and canvassing for them. For what it’s worth, here’s my feeling about voting Labour next General Election:</span></span></p><span style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"> </div></span><div style="text-align: left;">1. When the left vote Labour after they move rightwards, they are encouraged to just move further right, to the point where they are now probably right of where e.g. John Major’s Tory party was. And each time the Tories go further right still. At some point we have got to stop fuelling this toxic drift to the right by making the Labour Party realise that it’s going to start costing them votes. I can’t think of anything politically more important than halting this increasingly frightening rightward slide. So I am no longer voting Labour.</div><p></p><p style="text-align: left;"><br />2. If a new socialist party starts up, it could easily hoover up many of the 200k former LP members who have left in disgust (I’d join), and perhaps also pick up union affiliations. They could become the second biggest party by membership quite quickly. Our voting for that could rapidly change the political landscape in a way that would make it more reflective of public opinion (see below). I strongly support that.</p><p style="text-align: left;"><br />3. Our voting for an alternative party that’s to the left will cost Labour votes in key marginals, and that prospect will scare them. Just as the Brexit Party was hugely influential in shaping Tory policy without winning seats, a socialist alternative party could be equally effective, forcing the Labour Party to move left.</p><p style="text-align: left;"><br />4. The Labour Party is now run by people many of whom <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/forde-report-labour-jeremy-corbyn-2017-election-b2126500.html">worked against a Labour victory under Corbyn</a>, celebrated the fact that he lost, endlessly smear thousands of decent people (like, I think, myself) as trots, thugs, antisemites (see <a href="http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2019/02/my-intro-to-battle-of-ideas-debate-on.html" target="_blank">this</a>), homophobes, terrorist sympathisers, etc. and who would rather burn the house down than allow someone with my sort of mild leftwing (<a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/jeremy-corbyn-mainstream-scandinavian-social-democrat/" target="_blank">by European standards</a>) politics get anywhere near power. Why would I vote for people who despise me, want people like me out their party, and are so hostile to the kind of policies I favour?</p><p style="text-align: left;"><br />5. If Labour win next time, it will cement forever the narrative that the left can never win (when in fact they achieved a hung parliament in 2017 and probably would have won with another week of campaigning given their upward trajectory under the press moratorium (see image),</p><p style="text-align: left;"><span><br /></span><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgqHQxm0ellZ_np07HgGDfOy4zYpg9OJPS03PRqOMfnWgu5-YjJySM1sdu4-thdPnAT4XAvuL5HenTLsMwdhGSOq5jYb-1QNWMCAWjmtCqvBekz7GMnsvCCxxjidOkvrrGtD9ujDreBndPustByR00-KEKAsFJU2HnODROyApThkjxyRJj2-E_CDHyN/s1264/Screenshot%202023-04-03%20at%2018.05.51.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-size: large;"><img border="0" data-original-height="654" data-original-width="1264" height="333" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgqHQxm0ellZ_np07HgGDfOy4zYpg9OJPS03PRqOMfnWgu5-YjJySM1sdu4-thdPnAT4XAvuL5HenTLsMwdhGSOq5jYb-1QNWMCAWjmtCqvBekz7GMnsvCCxxjidOkvrrGtD9ujDreBndPustByR00-KEKAsFJU2HnODROyApThkjxyRJj2-E_CDHyN/w640-h333/Screenshot%202023-04-03%20at%2018.05.51.png" width="640" /></span></a><br /><br /></p><p style="text-align: left;">or if their own MPs hadn’t been constantly sabotaging their party from the moment Labour pulled ahead in the polls (see image below on polling before and after the infamous 'Chicken Coup' that Labour MPs staged just after Corbyn went ahead), <br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjiAKVQpxQHJSBQ9UmHToXIPhr38b4GZf6y-f0A77cwvvfvWmCzH9xwc7RLroy_mk0GTfKE1P5fj4wOonGAi0U0Go7emwomoVs4vDh8cPzCIvjz-uDEJ5tPa4k-CLsKvWUDzs3M6zY9vNCfK0zxS-QNvwe2ef40lCeWhZnygJSTTdbmXpzwneR0wyoX/s1252/Screenshot%202023-04-03%20at%2018.06.35.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="632" data-original-width="1252" height="325" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjiAKVQpxQHJSBQ9UmHToXIPhr38b4GZf6y-f0A77cwvvfvWmCzH9xwc7RLroy_mk0GTfKE1P5fj4wOonGAi0U0Go7emwomoVs4vDh8cPzCIvjz-uDEJ5tPa4k-CLsKvWUDzs3M6zY9vNCfK0zxS-QNvwe2ef40lCeWhZnygJSTTdbmXpzwneR0wyoX/w640-h325/Screenshot%202023-04-03%20at%2018.06.35.png" width="640" /><br /></a><br /></p><p style="text-align: left;">despite the party having policies that the public actually liked, as this short video illustrates:</p><p style="text-align: left;"><span color="windowtext"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7lsRbDKOXg">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7lsRbDKOXg</a></span></p><p style="text-align: left;">6. Kier Starmer is a habitual liar and, frankly, a backstabber who betrayed the Party membership. I don't want people like that in power. </p><p style="text-align: left;">True, not voting Labour could conceivably let the Tories in again. However, that's <i>highly</i> unlikely. Realistically, the most that socialists not voting for Starmer's Labour is likely to achieve is denying Labour an outright majority, forcing them into coalition with the (far more socialist) Greens, etc. If you give a high priority to getting PR, and even many centrists do, then that is actually the best possible outcome. The alternative to not voting Labour is almost certainly not 'letting the Tories back in', and in fact may be even better than an outright Labour victory.</p><p style="text-align: left;">In any case, even if it were just a matter of 'keeping the Tories out', I think we now need to play the longer game. Currently, neither main party is likely to do anything to reverse growing inequality and privatisation, despite the fact that the public favour that. Inequality increased even under New Labour:</p><p style="text-align: left;"><a href="https://journals.openedition.org/osb/1174">https://journals.openedition.org/osb/1174</a></p><p style="text-align: left;"><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2dHsW2uYap6WkEjgvQ4VrnfnewpCGlc6I_UPNVK-9zhnE04zjUbYqWBKsGIaiaR9bVmFwhlYN-_Fdm8RPdeRgInoQqeNauwHDy1gEsQnXy2GXO1b4c-eg-T14kz02FKURSvUJm9HIqAO92QGpVy63Jq_Vx0bn3ERsUwSwfyn8Mw_I0S88i-mbnt8u/s1100/Screenshot%202023-04-03%20at%2018.16.03.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="306" data-original-width="1100" height="178" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2dHsW2uYap6WkEjgvQ4VrnfnewpCGlc6I_UPNVK-9zhnE04zjUbYqWBKsGIaiaR9bVmFwhlYN-_Fdm8RPdeRgInoQqeNauwHDy1gEsQnXy2GXO1b4c-eg-T14kz02FKURSvUJm9HIqAO92QGpVy63Jq_Vx0bn3ERsUwSwfyn8Mw_I0S88i-mbnt8u/w640-h178/Screenshot%202023-04-03%20at%2018.16.03.png" width="640" /></a><br /><br /></p><p style="text-align: left;">For decades, realistically, our choice has been between two options: to put into Government a party that allows inequality to increase more quickly or else a party that will slow that growth in inequality down a bit. But the direction of travel is always the same: growing inequality. Somehow, we need to get a party in to power that will <i>reverse the direction of travel</i>. Voting for Labour next time makes it significantly less likely we will <i>ever</i> be able to do that.</p></div></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; margin: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm;"></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-89983388349940051842022-12-09T10:48:00.002+00:002022-12-09T10:53:25.680+00:00Prejudice Blindness vs Prejudice Goggles<p><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbHiHo3bolol4ISCX_ESDeVrBC6cFFPiZ6m5JaZqJSDArf8_3ktM-FZ3oe5NlS7Rh4OBxlF0FFvpfw7bPpr-j8jbqGnwVrtfocAxC7LE1bd4hSowEh8TkcxZg2BudQBPou45--VN_WLKliiXMfypEDm_67hk7G7BECjACeK20Zl2rlhZ36ifhEoBUg/s898/Screenshot%202022-12-09%20at%2010.42.59.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"></a></span><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbHiHo3bolol4ISCX_ESDeVrBC6cFFPiZ6m5JaZqJSDArf8_3ktM-FZ3oe5NlS7Rh4OBxlF0FFvpfw7bPpr-j8jbqGnwVrtfocAxC7LE1bd4hSowEh8TkcxZg2BudQBPou45--VN_WLKliiXMfypEDm_67hk7G7BECjACeK20Zl2rlhZ36ifhEoBUg/s898/Screenshot%202022-12-09%20at%2010.42.59.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"></a><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOYM8uArmCYvICkEd9gDNpmnqdDEbQcwc9khn1kaXRY7KzvVo-IhG-hp6QecP23MDgICPADLn7mjrJ8SmqrTmopzhlMEUCGCMHKRsjD5Dl4wgTaZmXToQU23AgETakhks_WGorA1QuTbEGh8lDjx2hlkkWMFHiLYPZfDFFQBLynuvYeWo7kfL3pwnY/s1264/Screenshot%202022-12-09%20at%2010.42.11.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="516" data-original-width="1264" height="164" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOYM8uArmCYvICkEd9gDNpmnqdDEbQcwc9khn1kaXRY7KzvVo-IhG-hp6QecP23MDgICPADLn7mjrJ8SmqrTmopzhlMEUCGCMHKRsjD5Dl4wgTaZmXToQU23AgETakhks_WGorA1QuTbEGh8lDjx2hlkkWMFHiLYPZfDFFQBLynuvYeWo7kfL3pwnY/w400-h164/Screenshot%202022-12-09%20at%2010.42.11.png" width="400" /></a></span></div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />Both these things *can* be true:</span><p></p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>1. Prejudice blindness. </b>Not being the target of prejudice ourselves, we can easily miss it (so we should always listen).<br /><br /><b>2. Prejudice goggles. </b>Considering ourselves or a minority a target, paranoia kicks in and we start 'seeing' prejudice where it isn't (and supposing those who can't see it must blind, or worse).</span><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br />E.g. some say anti-black racism against Meghan Markle is a figment of the woke imagination (and her own). Others say it's real, and we should listen and take seriously: those who can't see it are ignorant or worse.<br /><br />So which way do you lean on the following, and why?</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Allegations of Islamophobia</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Racism in the Metropolitan Police</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Daily Mail coverage of immigration</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Sarah Vine's suggestions that Meghan Markle is herself being racist against 'our culture' (by mocking curtsying to The Queen)</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">David Baddiel on treatment of Jewish people</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Sexism in the workplace</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">Trans rights</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">I guess most of us lean in different directions on different issues. Melanie Philips thinks Islamophobia doesn't even exist. Some claim almost all accusations of prejudice are unfounded and indeed 'political correctness gone mad'. Others say that anyone who even questions whether self-identifying trans athletes in all sports is a good idea, or who thinks immigration is a problem, has already revealed themselves to be a bigot.</span></div>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-73331120707787751302022-11-01T12:06:00.001+00:002022-11-01T12:06:06.954+00:00Why are we drifting dangerously rightwards as a Nation?<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh619EW70H4U5ELKNRgS-YdgGDC_92iNZzhuAzkSoJjhl62jmeVGjHtg81Amgj9-6w7Q1NG7bnq-b6leZzj2s3bZLPcZffLchk40PoMZvvaJvTe8nQ7nYo9TO58jvSnbjpwiAeqf4FWjhOZYsx8LxPAmh6ty9hNT2GUtSLZiJETGqj3JvcoFYzzV3te/s1292/Screenshot%202022-11-01%20at%2011.38.52.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="524" data-original-width="1292" height="260" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh619EW70H4U5ELKNRgS-YdgGDC_92iNZzhuAzkSoJjhl62jmeVGjHtg81Amgj9-6w7Q1NG7bnq-b6leZzj2s3bZLPcZffLchk40PoMZvvaJvTe8nQ7nYo9TO58jvSnbjpwiAeqf4FWjhOZYsx8LxPAmh6ty9hNT2GUtSLZiJETGqj3JvcoFYzzV3te/w640-h260/Screenshot%202022-11-01%20at%2011.38.52.png" width="640" /></a></div><span style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px;">Tony Benn: is he stopped clock here (correct by lucky accident), or right on the money? If you are scratching your head wondering why we seem to be drifting scarily ever more rightwards, this is as plausible explanation as any I have come across.</span><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">When I was last out canvassing for Labour, the message I got from a lot of voters was: 'I won't vote - they're all the same'. And they had a point: even under New Labour, inequality actually increased. They engaged in some positive tinkering around the edges, but there was no substantive change to the status quo.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">When the only real mechanism for significantly improving working people's lives has been airbrushed out, then all they're left with is simplistic, blame it on the so-and-sos (i.e. anyone but the real beneficiaries of the system) propaganda. It's the so-and-sos (Europeans, immigrants, benefits claimants, black people, jews, socialists, Russians, etc.) that are to blame for their increasingly shitty lives.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><i>IF</i> Benn is right (but is he?) and you keep voting Labour no matter how far right they go (btw. Starmer <i>literally</i> just said there's now no significant difference between Labour and the Tories on immigration policy), you are contributing to this<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>rightwards drift.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">The answer to the anguished question 'Why is this happening?!' would be '<i>You</i> are making it happen'.</p></div><br /><p></p><br /><p></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-78530544845145307902022-10-21T10:05:00.000+00:002022-10-21T10:05:05.456+00:00If you believe inequality reduced under Labour, you've fallen for a myth.<p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigqqLS06I8eup8Hg8swsk4l56w1BPD8Jr7ejZS0NcX5shkDPfXCQXJKn8HUvNsoEg3uBdf8WWYUV8wgtVCiuSGYmYwU1WDftB3V3T8iYlF4fNOcE81WeXv5cFKA2nbfSMuWjkIq1VC88MWELfht_xTrVk4jiTVsgCZCeA7Ocx5zbPlKiBEFZN8DJk5/s824/Screenshot%202022-10-21%20at%2011.03.43.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="236" data-original-width="824" height="184" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigqqLS06I8eup8Hg8swsk4l56w1BPD8Jr7ejZS0NcX5shkDPfXCQXJKn8HUvNsoEg3uBdf8WWYUV8wgtVCiuSGYmYwU1WDftB3V3T8iYlF4fNOcE81WeXv5cFKA2nbfSMuWjkIq1VC88MWELfht_xTrVk4jiTVsgCZCeA7Ocx5zbPlKiBEFZN8DJk5/w640-h184/Screenshot%202022-10-21%20at%2011.03.43.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />If you believe inequality reduced under Labour, you've fallen for a myth.<p></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Sure, Labour redistributed, as the IFS confirm. But not nearly enough to reverse growing inequality. We're heading back to Victorian Britain under both parties, just at different speeds. See <span class="s1" style="color: #dca10d;"><a href="https://journals.openedition.org/osb/1174" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">There was, recently, a once-in-a-generation opportunity to actually reverse this trend. It was destroyed by a coalition of forces that included most of the Parliamentary Labour Party (Labour MPs), using some of the most disgusting tactics ever seen in British politics (though, thanks to our MSM, most folk are largely ignorant about what went on).</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Those Labour MPs are, even now, making it very clear that nothing significantly threatening our economic inequality-driving status quo will ever be allowed again on their watch.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">And yet, bizarrely, polls show the general public favour the much more radical democratic socialist policies that were on offer under Corbyn & 1940's NHS-creating Labour. (see e.g. <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/11/12/labour-economic-policies-are-popular-so-why-arent-" target="_blank">here</a>) Those baffled why many on the left now say they won't vote Labour again should probably reflect on this.</p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-41139684208054304072022-09-24T10:17:00.008+00:002022-09-24T11:41:13.407+00:00Al Jazeera's investigation into Labour dirty tricks and smears against the left. Part 1.<p><span style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px;">After Part 1 of Al Jazeera's three part investigation 'The Labour Files'</span><span class="Apple-converted-space" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px;">into Labour Party dirty tricks and smears against the Left, Michael Crick Comments.</span><span class="Apple-converted-space" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px;"> </span></p><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAXCkrbK7dTR5JubMDmQuJYSyccq8oEk5gpxBD-Tust3zy5k7OC1Iib8iikseUYYzstBKS34bizAVaM7TfQqGW6I5r4LW52DP0XlGmzfDRIUCWNNNNp6gt_Q5rz9f6LbnacEJU1tW614EEcRPSLU5EuXLijfsxekHKZJQ8OdBcNMsE1fgAmQHOXesB/s1016/Screenshot%202022-09-24%20at%2010.33.31.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1016" data-original-width="976" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAXCkrbK7dTR5JubMDmQuJYSyccq8oEk5gpxBD-Tust3zy5k7OC1Iib8iikseUYYzstBKS34bizAVaM7TfQqGW6I5r4LW52DP0XlGmzfDRIUCWNNNNp6gt_Q5rz9f6LbnacEJU1tW614EEcRPSLU5EuXLijfsxekHKZJQ8OdBcNMsE1fgAmQHOXesB/s320/Screenshot%202022-09-24%20at%2010.33.31.png" width="307" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1bV9Zv5qms4tcNll8qQjBWIyE-eBqXQzOKiQhNo87pvZYdD32zikz8Gwnn1eYXPs0Qt9dxFbcxeqOveefCGWMMY6LED7u3BxS1zrNwTySPLh90ZdhqXLOCxmd7sWJw-3a_7j4qBle0tmyYVDWkSSuUScudqkQvtgEY5iNT6Sm5N2hPOjOl8AK4wKp/s990/Screenshot%202022-09-24%20at%2010.34.07.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="718" data-original-width="990" height="232" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1bV9Zv5qms4tcNll8qQjBWIyE-eBqXQzOKiQhNo87pvZYdD32zikz8Gwnn1eYXPs0Qt9dxFbcxeqOveefCGWMMY6LED7u3BxS1zrNwTySPLh90ZdhqXLOCxmd7sWJw-3a_7j4qBle0tmyYVDWkSSuUScudqkQvtgEY5iNT6Sm5N2hPOjOl8AK4wKp/s320/Screenshot%202022-09-24%20at%2010.34.07.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /><span class="Apple-converted-space"><br /></span><p></p><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Crick is the only mainstream journalist who has even acknowledged the programme, to my knowledge. Part 2 is out Saturday. It is absolutely shocking what went on, but also absolutely shocking that the 'thugs, trots, and antisemites' narrative went pretty much entirely unchallenged by all mainstream media.</p><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Typically, there was no pushback at all from journalists when allegations were made. Not even from the Guardian and BBC, who mostly just uncritically and repeatedly recycled the poisonous allegations.</p><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">You can watch 'The Labour Files' on Al Jazeera's youtube channel and here: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elp18OvnNV0&fbclid=IwAR3QHoor5rkpyI6g0-NplYOnFypXI0A5S7wfC-wFRtLKhTUUWdhOHvP_pxM"><span class="s1" style="color: #dca10d;">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elp18OvnNV0</span></a></p><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p2" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Crick says it was 'hard to nail down the truth'. In many cases, it really wasn't. For example, the famous Angela Eagle brickgate story (not mentioned in this programme: it was alleged leftist thugs had thrown a brick through her office window) falls apart after 5 mins of investigation (it wasn't her office window; it was a window in the same building facing a public alley with a reputation for dodginess; there was no evidence *at all* that any leftist was involved; acc. to police there wasn't even any evidence a brick was thrown) etc.. Story after story would turn out to be BS, and this was pointed out again and again, but mainstream journalists weren't interested.</p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-54907145891162762632022-09-15T10:07:00.007+00:002022-09-15T10:30:08.817+00:00Ayer on Religious Language<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj5l-xWRT42APVKragSgKH3P79mKKBXB2AzR5gZd08OsJFnyIhOt4nuC5fvcdaOGRjmnuDyrIIojR_6Fai8KA3m9YZ1itkAMoyLZV0Qo2RK1sqFBxlJ9R3erO86YPBujr0gDI2QwYw9tpZX7XIm28xJs3AV_6uBXR_Ho7i3LWgHY8HoykY7gbNLTQ8Q/s968/Screenshot%202022-09-15%20at%2011.07.20.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="968" data-original-width="654" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj5l-xWRT42APVKragSgKH3P79mKKBXB2AzR5gZd08OsJFnyIhOt4nuC5fvcdaOGRjmnuDyrIIojR_6Fai8KA3m9YZ1itkAMoyLZV0Qo2RK1sqFBxlJ9R3erO86YPBujr0gDI2QwYw9tpZX7XIm28xJs3AV_6uBXR_Ho7i3LWgHY8HoykY7gbNLTQ8Q/w432-h640/Screenshot%202022-09-15%20at%2011.07.20.png" width="432" /></a></div><p><i>Here's a first draft article for THINK. Any errors, do let me know....</i><b style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </b></p><p><b style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Ayer on Religious Language</b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><b>Stephen Law<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i>ABSTRACT: Here is a brief introduction to Ayer’s radical criticism of religious belief. According to Ayer, a sentence like ‘God exists’ doesn’t assert something false, rather, it fails to assert anything at all.<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Religious belief is of course criticised on a variety of fronts. Critics often focus on the truth-claims of religions, such as that a God or gods exist, that Jesus rose from the dead, or that there is an afterlife. They insist these claims are unjustified. Some go further still, arguing not only is it not reasonable to believe these claims are true, it’s reasonable to believe they are all false.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">However, there is another much more radical kind of criticism to consider. This more radical sort of critics agrees with the religious naysayer that religious claims are not true. However, they also insist that neither are they false. In fact, according to the more radical critic, a sentence such as ‘God exists’ fails to make any claim at all<i><o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i><o:p> </o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Of course, if someone says ‘God exists’, it looks like they’re asserting something capable of being true or false. The theist thinks they assert something true, the strong atheist (who denies that God exists) something false. But, according to the more radical critic, this appearance is deceptive. Someone who says ‘God exists’ doesn’t even get as far as asserting something, let alone something true or false. This more radical sort of atheist doesn’t say 'God exists’ makes an unjustified claim, or even a false claim; they say that ‘God exists’ fails to make any claim at all.<i><o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i><o:p> </o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">The philosopher A.J. Ayer is perhaps the best-known critic of this more radical sort. According to Ayer, ‘God exists’ fails to assert anything at all. But why?<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i><o:p> </o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">The key to understanding Ayer’s criticism is a principle called the Verification Principle:<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i><o:p> </o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm; text-indent: 36pt;"><i>A statement is meaningful if, and only if, it is verifiable.<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i><o:p> </o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">A statement is verifiable just in case there are either grounds for supposing it is true, or grounds for supposing it is false.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">So, for example, the statement:<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm; text-indent: 36pt;">The Eiffel Tower is in France<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i><o:p> </o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">is verifiable. There are obviously, plenty of grounds for thinking the statement is true. I have myself verified that the statement is true on a trip to France: I saw it with my own eyes. But even if you have not been to Paris, you can still verify the statement in many other ways, by listening to other reliable people who have been to Paris and seen the tower, by checking other reliable resources such as geography books, maps of Paris, Google Earth, and so on.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">We can also verify that some statements are false. Take for example:<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm; text-indent: 36pt;">The Eiffel tower is in New York.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">That this is false this is pretty easily confirmed by various observations.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Notice that in order to verify a statement, you only need <i>some</i> grounds for thinking it’s true. You don’t need proof beyond all possible doubt or even beyond reasonable doubt. Even just <i>some</i> evidence – evidence that falls far short of establishing that it is true – is still enough to <i>verify</i> it.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Also notice that the Verification Principle says that in order to be meaningful, and statement must be verifiABLE. It doesn’t <i>actually have to be verified. </i>If there <i>could</i> be an observation that confirms that it’s true, or that it’s false, then it’s verifiable, whether or not any such observation has been or will be made.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Ayer signs up to the Verification Principle. And he goes on to clarify two ways in which a statement can be verified:<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">First, a statement can be verified by <i>observation</i>. If there are observations ‘relevant to determining a statements truth or falsehood’, then it’s verifiable. For example, I can verify that the Eiffel tower is in Paris by going and directly looking at it. Or I can verify that my dog is in the garden if I can hear barking coming from there.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">However, there is another way a statement can be verified, according to Ayer - if the statement is <i>true in virtue of meaning</i>. So, for example, the sentence ‘All triangles have three sides’ is <i>true by definition</i>. We need only grasp the meaning of that sentence in order to know that it is true. We don’t need to go and observe any triangles. Similarly we can know ‘Not all triangles have three sides’ is false just by understanding what it says. We don’t need to go and check any actual triangles. That all triangles have just three sides is something we can know by reflection, from the comfort of our armchairs. Statements that are similarly true in virtue of meaning are called <i>analytic</i> statements.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">What about scientific statements such as that electrons exist, or that the Earth goes round the sun, or that the Earth is many millions of years old? Can these statements be verified?<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Yes, they can. Of course that electrons exist is not an analytic statement. It could turn out to be false. But we can verify that electrons exist by observation. Of course, we can't directly observe electrons: they are far too small. But we can observe certain experimental results – results that do confirm that electrons exist. Remember, in order to verify that electrons exist, these experiments don’t need to prove that electrons exist. They just need to provide us with <i>some</i> grounds for thinking electrons exist. Similarly, while we can’t directly observe that the earth existed millions of years ago, we can observe many things that confirm that the Earth is at least that old, such as sedimentary layers in the rocks beneath our feet and evidence of slow tectonic plate movement taking place over millions of years.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">At least some religious statements also appear to be verifiable. For example, that a certain miracle occurred might be confirmed by direct or indirect observation. That God created the entire universe around 6,000 years ago is also a verifiable statement - observation has established it's false. But what about the statement ‘God exists’? It is at this point that Ayer applies his Verification Principle to try to show that ‘God exists’ is meaningless. For according to Ayer, ‘God exists’ is not verifiable. The statement is not analytic. And there is no conceivable observational evidence that could count for or against it. Therefore, says Ayer, ‘God exists’ is meaningless.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Notice that, actually, this is a rather unusual way of using the term ‘meaningless’. After all, we would ordinarily say that plenty of sentences that fail to make a claim are nevertheless ‘meaningful’. ‘The door is shut’ clearly asserts something. But the questions ‘Is the door shut?’ and the command ‘Shut the door!’ do not make claims. They don’t assert that something is the case. For that reason, they are unverifiable. But we wouldn’t ordinarily say they are meaningless. Other expressions, such as ‘Congratulations on becoming a father!’ and ‘Down with the monarchy!’ also fail to make claims, but we would not ordinarily say that these sentences are meaningless. So it’s worth remembering that <i>Ayer is using the term ‘meaningless’ in a special way,</i> to mean ‘does not assert anything’ or ‘does not make any claim’.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">So, on Ayer’s view, ‘God exists’ is not false. Rather, it’s meaningless. It looks like a claim is being made, but on closer examination, once we realise the statement is unverifiable, it turns out <i>not to claim anything at all. </i>Of course, religious people who say ‘God exists’ think they are making a hugely important claim, but the truth, according to Ayer, is that ‘God exists’ asserts nothing at all. So Ayer is an atheist of the radical sort.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">We have now set out Ayer’s criticism of religious claims such as ‘God exists’. Ayer uses the Verification principle to try to show that they fail to make any claim at all. They are, in that sense, ‘meaningless’.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">But is Ayer correct?<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">I don’t think so. I am an atheist, but not of Ayer’s radical sort. I think that, certainly in most cases, people use the sentence ;’God exists’ to make a claim. I just happen to think that claim is false.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">There are two ways in which you might criticise Ayer’s argument. First, you might attack his principle – the Verification Principle. If you can show that the Principle is false, or at least unjustified, then his conclusion – that ‘God exists’ fails to make a claim, is unjustified too. Second, you might argue that, whether or not the Verification principle is a reasonable principle, ‘God exists’ is, in fact verifiable. Let’s look at each of these criticisms in turn.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">The criticism of the Verification principle that is probably best-known is – it’s not itself verifiable. Therefore, by it’s own light, it’s meaningless. This is one of the criticisms you are expected to wheel out if you are answering an exam question on Ayer on religious language, for example.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">However, is it true that the Verification Principle is unverifiable? Couldn’t there be observations that support, or undermine it? Think about this argument: we start to learn language through observation. That that is how language gets started is something we can observe. In particular, as youngsters, we learn to associate words with things we can observe in our environment, We hear the word ‘car’ said while our parent points at a car, for example. But this suggests that <i>the foundations of language are rooted in observation</i>. So perhaps we can, after all, make a case for saying that, when language is <i>entirely</i> detached from <i>any possible</i> observation, it fails to have any meaning? I’m not at all sure that this is good argument. But it’s not an absurd argument. In which case, perhaps we can make a good observation-based case in favour of the Verification principle? Perhaps we shouldn’t just <i>assume</i> that the Verfication Principle is unverifiable?<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Even if the Verification Principle is not self-condemning in the way it’s widely supposed to be, that doesn’t mean it’s true, or even reasonable. In fact, In his book <i>Language Truth and Knowledge, </i>Ayer uses the Verification Principle to try to show that ‘God exists’ fails to assert anything while never actually providing any reason to think that the Principle is true. So, in that book, Ayer’s argument depends on a highly contentious and unjustified Principle. But then his conclusion is unjustified too.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Setting aside whether the Verification Principle is true, is it the case that ‘God exists’ is unverifiable?<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Some suggest that we can know that God exists just be reflection on what ‘God’ means. If God means ‘greatest conceivable being’ and that in turn requires that that being exist, then it’s analytic that God exists! In which case, that God exists is verifiable. Alternatively, perhaps the very idea of God involves some sort of logical contradiction (a bit like the idea of a four-sided triangle, say, or a non-spatial mountain). If we can show that, then we can verify ‘God exists’ is false. So it is a verifiable statement.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">What about verifying ‘God exists’ by observation – can that be done. Many people believe that there’s good observational evidence that God does not exist – evidence provided by e.g. the depth of suffering we see in the world. Ig by God we mean a being that is maximally powerful, knowledgeable, and good, then there should be no pointless suffering in the universe. Yet there appears to be an extraordinary amount. Isn’t this good evidence that that there is no God.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Others argue that belief in God, if not established conclusively by observation, is at least supported by observation. The fine-tuned character of the universe, for example, is supposed by some to provide us with at least some evidence that it was designed by such a divine architect. In which case not only could there be evidence for God, there <i>is</i> evidence for God.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Ayer’s argument is also ambiguous. What, exactly counts as an observation? The theologian John Hick suggests that ‘God exists’ can be confirmed after we die, potentially - for we may get to meet God (This is what Hick calls an ‘eschatalogical’ verification). Does Ayer’s Verification Principle allow for that sort of ‘verification? Would this count as an ‘observation’? That’s not entirely clear.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Ayer’s argument for the radical kind of atheism that says that ‘God exists’ is not false but fails to assert anything at all looks, on closer examination, to be a rather miserable failure.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i>Stephen Law is the Editor of THINK.<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-49980722484595039922022-09-10T14:21:00.019+00:002022-09-11T12:28:12.728+00:00Tim O'Neill's Blogpost on my paper 'Evidence, Miracles, and The Existence of Jesus'.<p> <a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq7BbX3icPwrWl1NXlHjReoxJ_klg_MUlR06sBwWBu45NiKXcKfX3JLUqsl_y47Ae24tUDhgPW4KO4d9DPj-8uBc-cJj27yFukdVbRr7uTPja5CsXj2jgyh6uxFZPpBC07LHMaPYgpkdldB5CMpMu604v5eBGGT5g5tJ_YhO86hib4fAw7QYddOO6U/s1572/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2014.30.37.png" style="font-family: helvetica; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1208" data-original-width="1572" height="308" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq7BbX3icPwrWl1NXlHjReoxJ_klg_MUlR06sBwWBu45NiKXcKfX3JLUqsl_y47Ae24tUDhgPW4KO4d9DPj-8uBc-cJj27yFukdVbRr7uTPja5CsXj2jgyh6uxFZPpBC07LHMaPYgpkdldB5CMpMu604v5eBGGT5g5tJ_YhO86hib4fAw7QYddOO6U/w400-h308/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2014.30.37.png" width="400" /></a></p><div style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 15px;"><span style="font-size: 13pt;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">A while back I wrote a paper on the existence of Jesus. It is available <a href="https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/1905686568472747305/2531638087848904419#"><span class="s1" style="color: #dca10d;">here</span></a>. I wrote the paper because I was struck by the vehemence with which many Biblical experts insisted that anyone who doubted whether the New Testament documents alone establish the existence of Jesus beyond <i>any</i> reasonable doubt was a crank, or at least horribly ignorant. </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">In my paper I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of independent evidence for an historical Jesus, remain sceptical about his existence.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Here is the contamination principle:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><b> </b></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>P2 Where testimony/documents weave together a narrative that combines mundane claims with a significant proportion of extraordinary claims, and there is good reason to be sceptical about those extraordinary claims, then there is good reason to be sceptical about the mundane claims, at least until we possess good independent evidence of their truth.</i><br /><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Notice that my paper does <i>not</i> claim P2 is true. Rather I suggest P2 is <i>prima facie</i> plausible. I explain why a number of objections to it fail. I also attempt to justify the principle using two thought experiments: The Ted and Sarah Case and the Case of The Sixth Islander.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Also notice that I do not argue for <i>mythicism</i> - the view that there probably was no historical Jesus. In fact I am clear that I am sceptical about mythicism. I say, early on:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZ8rNUsc9gp0_D8_BgJPHvSKjEBqdODezdeBZi_zGURldowt3Nn01P2xBKT7hGNzKFAm9auIvFpsU0zs8cMtHVgtrE7UIlz5vDTbSlTwwXSVeQ48j3I0o7f6faTn0jEKr83NtoBSXjHoP8t1Q5JqO_LkA-5SQCMDvghm0rApe7DNm9FfjVF2EcI5ci/s1690/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2014.55.51.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="398" data-original-width="1690" height="150" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZ8rNUsc9gp0_D8_BgJPHvSKjEBqdODezdeBZi_zGURldowt3Nn01P2xBKT7hGNzKFAm9auIvFpsU0zs8cMtHVgtrE7UIlz5vDTbSlTwwXSVeQ48j3I0o7f6faTn0jEKr83NtoBSXjHoP8t1Q5JqO_LkA-5SQCMDvghm0rApe7DNm9FfjVF2EcI5ci/w640-h150/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2014.55.51.png" width="640" /></a></div><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">I even say, at the end of the paper, that the NT documents may make Jesus' existence more probable than not: </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWaKOY1LuUaxwBZKUsNkhyFZSz3j1aV0ZczApLvYUYtX5o64yG7B0f2fX6fQ9F1SitAh1PzTlYRFqVwQvKacWTHmsPAwStd63C_6n32rurBvz5WQdA8KhdrZyvMe8-mOm_vYefZ-rdk38YitP8hQBwSiX4pnLMpvI48-KxiNijOykXulDzohlS3yn8/s1566/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2015.00.49.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="662" data-original-width="1566" height="270" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWaKOY1LuUaxwBZKUsNkhyFZSz3j1aV0ZczApLvYUYtX5o64yG7B0f2fX6fQ9F1SitAh1PzTlYRFqVwQvKacWTHmsPAwStd63C_6n32rurBvz5WQdA8KhdrZyvMe8-mOm_vYefZ-rdk38YitP8hQBwSiX4pnLMpvI48-KxiNijOykXulDzohlS3yn8/w640-h270/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2015.00.49.png" width="640" /></a></div><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">All I question in this paper is whether the NT documents alone establish Jesus's existence beyond all reasonable doubt.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Notice I don't even claim that the NT documents <i>don't</i> establish Jesus's existence beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, I present, for discussion, what I suggest is a <i>prima facie</i> plausible argument for thinking that they fail to do that.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Please notice the <i>care and attention with which I spell out my position, repeatedly, </i>in this paper.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><b>Tim O'Neill's Piece on My Paper</b></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">In a blog post on his site <a href="https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/1905686568472747305/2531638087848904419#"><span class="s1" style="color: #dca10d;">History for Atheists</span></a>, published in March 2022, Tim O'Neill takes me task. He has also more recently criticised my paper on twitter.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">I promised a response, and here it is. However it will have to be in instalments.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O'Neill's blog post attacking my paper is almost 9,000 words in length. There are some more meaty bits towards the end that are genuinely interesting and do deserve discussion. However, much of O'Neill's post is an extended <a href="https://effectiviology.com/gish-gallop/" target="_blank">Gish Gallop</a> of misrepresentations and irrelevancies. So I am only going to address the opening sections here. I'll come back to later parts as and when I get time.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><b> </b></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Incidentally, O'Neill is not, and does not claim to be a historian.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O’Neill begins by devoting 1,600 words to Jesus Mythicists and their arguments. Of course, I am not a mythicist, so let’s put those first 1,600 words to one side.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">However O’Neill concludes those 1,600 words on mythicism like so:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>The more simplistic version of the argument against the historicity of Jesus by reference to the miraculous elements in the gospel narratives does not carry much weight...</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i><br /></i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>But in 2011 the British philosopher </i><a href="https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/1905686568472747305/2531638087848904419#"><span class="s1" style="color: #dca10d;"><i>Stephen Law</i></span></a><i> decided to venture out of his field and into history and presented what he clearly felt was a much more comprehensive and persuasive version of the argument.</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i><br /></i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">That's right: O'Neill paints me as a mythicist, as presenting a version of the argument for mythicism. A position I very clearly, and repeatedly, reject.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">He does it again at the end of his tirade, suggesting I think we have evidence Jesus is not an historical character.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiYBlNA_4nU3f158Fs3g8lM05u9XHtFLNQoca9xXay2zliewuYIJTGyBiL_-ttyYZOozfLujG8O3rwFDfUUfbBo4ju85JXJR8x1gz2FAmL92enP2xZoxJrI9mCr_cOR7HKKUrCppm15Wsyt50-zj3aN3GTiytuxW8f3SmOnVWDm_U17rVRHCKlGaC76/s1552/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2016.41.40.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="556" data-original-width="1552" height="230" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiYBlNA_4nU3f158Fs3g8lM05u9XHtFLNQoca9xXay2zliewuYIJTGyBiL_-ttyYZOozfLujG8O3rwFDfUUfbBo4ju85JXJR8x1gz2FAmL92enP2xZoxJrI9mCr_cOR7HKKUrCppm15Wsyt50-zj3aN3GTiytuxW8f3SmOnVWDm_U17rVRHCKlGaC76/w640-h230/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2016.41.40.png" width="640" /></a></div><br /><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Also notice, incidentally, that O'Neill's selective quote here misses out the context that makes it clear that not only I do I explicitly reject mythicism, <i>I don't even claim that we should be sceptical about existence of Jesus.</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">This is <i>such</i> a blatant misreading of my paper that it really doesn't bode well for the remaining seven and a half thousand words<i> </i>of O'Neill's blogpost. It has certainly led people to think that I am a mythicist.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Next up, O'Neill spends 1,000 words attacking a passing reference I make to St. Paul's writing in the Old Testament. I say:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>Paul may have known some of t</i><i>hose who knew Jesus personally. Paul claims to have received the Gospel not from any human source or teaching but by revelation from the miraculously risen Christ (Galatians 1:11–12, 15–16).</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i><br /></i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O'Neill spends his 1,000 words focussed entirely on the second sentence, which he quotes. He ignores the first sentence. For context, here is <i>Galatians 1:11-12</i>:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>For I want you to know, brothers and sisters, that the gospel that was proclaimed by me is not of human origin; for I did not receive it from a human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation of Jesus Christ.</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>(Gal. 1:11-12)</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i><br /></i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">I also reference Galations 11:15-16.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O'Neill goes on to suggest that Paul doesn't mean in the above passage that he got everything he knows about Jesus' life from Jesus himself, only the very specific 'good news' that non-Jews can also be saved if they believe.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O'Neill also adds that in other places (e.g. Gal 1: 15-16) where Paul<i> </i>does say he got information about Jesus's life from Jesus himself, this should not be taken to imply Paul didn't <i>also</i> get it from other, human sources.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">My response:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">1. I was very careful to use the word 'Gospel' when I said Paul claims to have received 'the Gospel' not from any human source. That's because I was myself unsure what Paul meant by 'Gospel' in this context. For that reason, I <i>was careful not to provide any interpretation of 'Gospel'</i>.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Notice I don't claim Paul says he got <i>everything</i> he knows about Jesus solely and exclusively from Jesus alone - in fact I rather doubt Paul is claiming that.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">And you can even see above that <i>I myself </i>point out<i> </i>that Paul may have known people who knew Jesus personally, (and so also received information from them as well). Why did O'Neill cut that line from his quote of me, I wonder? Here is how O'Neill sums up my position:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><img border="0" data-original-height="246" data-original-width="1490" height="106" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNsQIQTQyjgGXmabMLx88aeNY-evdnFzI5TWMTAYApTbszHKoRor_wiucw1vZ1rWBhCdM8dj1sMZhSh_fWKZhV81sIrtt8_Lr4MxTXG9d2SQNWU6WncFP0VN32PFoKrihCZ21oaapFEE0dmW-xaX2muITX4glNxLSETgc9pgSw1u9nm-weUBKk-2b7/w640-h106/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2015.45.11.png" width="640" /></span> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Again, this is just wrong. I don't think, and I don't say, that Paul says everything he knows about Jesus comes from Jesus himself and not from anyone else. And in fact I am clear he may have got information from other sources. So O'Neill is misrepresenting me.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">I guess you might fairly pick me up on using 'Gospel' unclearly. But what I meant to suggest was that Paul said that some of the information he had about Jesus he got from Jesus himself. Which is kind of interesting, and true. So I mentioned it in passing.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">2. However, and much more importantly, whether or not Paul got his information about the life of Jesus from Jesus or from human sources is <i>completely irrelevant to my argument. </i>And of course, I <i>do</i> think Paul got his information from human sources! </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">In short this 1,000 word passage from O'Neill on my single sentence on St. Paul not only misrepresents me, it's an irrelevant side-show so far as the argument of my paper is concerned.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">I'll stop here for now... But you can already see that, to say the least, O'Neill is not a careful or charitable reader. In his haste to rubbish me as an incompetent novice he completely misreads me.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">He is also, incidentally, a bit of an arrogant prick.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiiIBpFb08lh_kdOB-JfUIj3I5ffJk9m5K-cb8x4IIC8dbI5Qysy95vEKZqfGJdRQrrXb0oo6rJdihL32mSidS_wpQoAYn8na9hzGbSSGtd2d-l433Z37z4sovD0rsSau5c44so18tjteUecWPOTwVaq4ZNCFZl4_2T19-8JFT_OBhlgOp5gXQS-x2R/s1182/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2016.25.28.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="870" data-original-width="1182" height="295" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiiIBpFb08lh_kdOB-JfUIj3I5ffJk9m5K-cb8x4IIC8dbI5Qysy95vEKZqfGJdRQrrXb0oo6rJdihL32mSidS_wpQoAYn8na9hzGbSSGtd2d-l433Z37z4sovD0rsSau5c44so18tjteUecWPOTwVaq4ZNCFZl4_2T19-8JFT_OBhlgOp5gXQS-x2R/w400-h295/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2016.25.28.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p></p></span></span></div><div style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 15px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><p></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-25316380878489044192022-09-10T14:19:00.005+00:002022-09-10T15:21:25.866+00:00Evidence, Miracles, and The Existence of Jesus<p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: 13pt;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"></span></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq7BbX3icPwrWl1NXlHjReoxJ_klg_MUlR06sBwWBu45NiKXcKfX3JLUqsl_y47Ae24tUDhgPW4KO4d9DPj-8uBc-cJj27yFukdVbRr7uTPja5CsXj2jgyh6uxFZPpBC07LHMaPYgpkdldB5CMpMu604v5eBGGT5g5tJ_YhO86hib4fAw7QYddOO6U/s1572/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2014.30.37.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1208" data-original-width="1572" height="246" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq7BbX3icPwrWl1NXlHjReoxJ_klg_MUlR06sBwWBu45NiKXcKfX3JLUqsl_y47Ae24tUDhgPW4KO4d9DPj-8uBc-cJj27yFukdVbRr7uTPja5CsXj2jgyh6uxFZPpBC07LHMaPYgpkdldB5CMpMu604v5eBGGT5g5tJ_YhO86hib4fAw7QYddOO6U/s320/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2014.30.37.png" width="320" /></a></span></div><div style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 15px;"><span style="font-size: 13pt;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">A while back I wrote a paper on the existence of Jesus. It is available <a href="http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2022/09/evidence-miracles-and-existence-of-jesus.html"><span class="s1" style="color: #dca10d;">here</span></a>. I wrote the paper because I was struck by the vehemence with which many Biblical experts insisted that anyone who doubted whether the New Testament documents alone establish the existence of Jesus beyond <i>any</i> reasonable doubt was a crank, or at least horribly ignorant. </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">In my paper I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of independent evidence for an historical Jesus, remain sceptical about his existence.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Here is the contamination principle:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><b> </b></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>P2 Where testimony/documents weave together a narrative that combines mundane claims with a significant proportion of extraordinary claims, and there is good reason to be sceptical about those extraordinary claims, then there is good reason to be sceptical about the mundane claims, at least until we possess good independent evidence of their truth.</i><br /><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Notice that my paper does <i>not</i> claim P2 is true. Rather I suggest P2 is <i>prima facie</i> plausible. I explain why a number of objections to it fail. I also attempt to justify the principle using two thought experiments: The Ted and Sarah Case and the Case of The Sixth Islander.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Also notice that I do not argue for <i>mythicism</i> - the view that there probably was no historical Jesus. In fact I am clear that I am sceptical about mythicism. I say, early on:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZ8rNUsc9gp0_D8_BgJPHvSKjEBqdODezdeBZi_zGURldowt3Nn01P2xBKT7hGNzKFAm9auIvFpsU0zs8cMtHVgtrE7UIlz5vDTbSlTwwXSVeQ48j3I0o7f6faTn0jEKr83NtoBSXjHoP8t1Q5JqO_LkA-5SQCMDvghm0rApe7DNm9FfjVF2EcI5ci/s1690/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2014.55.51.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="398" data-original-width="1690" height="150" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZ8rNUsc9gp0_D8_BgJPHvSKjEBqdODezdeBZi_zGURldowt3Nn01P2xBKT7hGNzKFAm9auIvFpsU0zs8cMtHVgtrE7UIlz5vDTbSlTwwXSVeQ48j3I0o7f6faTn0jEKr83NtoBSXjHoP8t1Q5JqO_LkA-5SQCMDvghm0rApe7DNm9FfjVF2EcI5ci/w640-h150/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2014.55.51.png" width="640" /></a></div><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">I even say, at the end of the paper, that the NT documents may make Jesus' existence more probable than not: </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWaKOY1LuUaxwBZKUsNkhyFZSz3j1aV0ZczApLvYUYtX5o64yG7B0f2fX6fQ9F1SitAh1PzTlYRFqVwQvKacWTHmsPAwStd63C_6n32rurBvz5WQdA8KhdrZyvMe8-mOm_vYefZ-rdk38YitP8hQBwSiX4pnLMpvI48-KxiNijOykXulDzohlS3yn8/s1566/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2015.00.49.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="662" data-original-width="1566" height="270" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWaKOY1LuUaxwBZKUsNkhyFZSz3j1aV0ZczApLvYUYtX5o64yG7B0f2fX6fQ9F1SitAh1PzTlYRFqVwQvKacWTHmsPAwStd63C_6n32rurBvz5WQdA8KhdrZyvMe8-mOm_vYefZ-rdk38YitP8hQBwSiX4pnLMpvI48-KxiNijOykXulDzohlS3yn8/w640-h270/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2015.00.49.png" width="640" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">All I question in this paper is whether the NT documents alone establish Jesus's existence beyond any reasonable doubt.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Notice I don't even claim that the NT documents <i>don't</i> establish Jesus's existence beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, I present, for discussion, what I suggest is a <i>prima facie</i> plausible argument for thinking that they fail to do that.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Please notice the <i>care and attention with which I spell out my position, repeatedly, </i>in this paper.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><b>Tim O'Neill's Piece on My Paper</b></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">In a blog post on his site <a href="https://historyforatheists.com/2022/03/jesus-mythicism-8-jesus-history-and-miracles/"><span class="s1" style="color: #dca10d;">History for Atheists</span></a>, published in March 2022, Tim O'Neill takes me task. He has also more recently criticised my paper on twitter.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">I promised a response, and here it is. However it will have to be in instalments.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O'Neill's blog post attacking my paper is almost 9,000 words in length. There are some more meaty bits towards the end that are genuinely interesting and do deserve discussion. However, much of O'Neill's post is an extended <a href="https://effectiviology.com/gish-gallop/" target="_blank">Gish Gallop</a> of misrepresentations, irrelevancies and non-sequiturs. So I am only going to address the opening sections here. I'll come back to later parts as and when I get time.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><b> </b></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Incidentally, O'Neill is not, and does not claim to be a historian.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O’Neill begins by devoting 1,600 words to Jesus Mythicists and their arguments. Of course, I am not a mythicist, so let’s put those first1,600 words to one side.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">However O’Neill concludes these 1,600 words:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>The more simplistic version of the argument against the historicity of Jesus by reference to the miraculous elements in the gospel narratives does not carry much weight...</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i><br /></i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>But in 2011 the British philosopher </i><a href="https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/1905686568472747305/2531638087848904419#"><span class="s1" style="color: #dca10d;"><i>Stephen Law</i></span></a><i> decided to venture out of his field and into history and presented what he clearly felt was a much more comprehensive and persuasive version of the argument.</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i><br /></i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">That's right: O'Neill paints me as a mythicist, as presenting a version of the argument for mythicism. A position I very clearly, and repeatedly, reject.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">This is <i>such</i> a blatant misreading of my paper that it really doesn't bode well for the remaining seven and a half thousand words<i> </i>of O'Neill's blogpost.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Next up, O'Neill spends 1,000 words attacking a passing reference I make to St. Paul's writing in the Old Testament. I say:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>Paul may have known some of t</i><i>hose who knew Jesus personally. Paul claims to have received the Gospel not from any human source or teaching but by revelation from the miraculously risen Christ (Galatians 1:11–12, 15–16).</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i><br /></i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Here is one of the things Paul says that I am referring to:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>For I want you to know, brothers and sisters, that the gospel that was proclaimed by me is not of human origin; for I did not receive it from a human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation of Jesus Christ.</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i>(Gal. 1:11-12)</i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><i><br /></i></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O'Neill goes on to suggest that Paul doesn't mean in this passage that he got everything he knows about Jesus' life from Jesus himself, only the very specific 'good news' that non-Jews can also be saved if they believe.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">O'Neill also adds that in other places (e.g. Gal 1: 15-16) where Paul <i>also</i> says he got information from Jesus himself, this should not be taken to imply Paul didn't <i>also</i> get it from other, human sources.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">My response:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">1. I was very careful to use the word 'Gospel' when I said Paul claims to have received 'the Gospel' not from any human source. That's because I was myself unsure what Paul meant by 'Gospel' in this context. For that reason, I <i>was careful not to provide any interpretation of 'Gospel'</i>.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Notice I don't claim Paul says he got <i>everything</i> he knows about Jesus solely and exclusively from Jesus alone - in fact rather doubt Paul is claiming that.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">And you can even see above that <i>I myself </i>point out<i> </i>that Paul may have known people who knew Jesus personally (and so also received information about Jesus from them as well). Why did O'Neill cut that line from his quote of me? Here is how O'Neill sums up my position:</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><img border="0" data-original-height="246" data-original-width="1490" height="106" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNsQIQTQyjgGXmabMLx88aeNY-evdnFzI5TWMTAYApTbszHKoRor_wiucw1vZ1rWBhCdM8dj1sMZhSh_fWKZhV81sIrtt8_Lr4MxTXG9d2SQNWU6WncFP0VN32PFoKrihCZ21oaapFEE0dmW-xaX2muITX4glNxLSETgc9pgSw1u9nm-weUBKk-2b7/w640-h106/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2015.45.11.png" width="640" /></span> </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">Again, this is just wrong. O'Neill is misrepresenting me.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">2. More importantly, whether or not Paul got his information about the life of Jesus from Jesus or from human sources is <i>completely irrelevant to my argument. O</i>bviously, I <i>do</i> think Paul got his information from human sources! </p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">In short this 1,000 word passage from O'Neill on St. Paul not only misrepresents me, it's an irrelevant side-show so far as the argument of my paper is concerned.</p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;">I'll stop here for now... But you can already see that, to say the least, O'Neill is not a careful or charitable reader. In his haste to rubbish me he completely misreads me. </p></span></span></div><div style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 15px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></div><p></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm; text-align: left;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm; text-align: left;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTKgAb_i3t6OaRh18S5CpcPu1NZJlV0DhJ6tu7wZp_g46fqJAPZM7Lk-sB0yD1FsyRD9xc0QIA0R0KyR9xGSfL5BjDjbA4ZHtsvvStiH8UCf8FU53xePl-Op4A8Tnnu-GRfO6fFz9fQZ23we0M7uUSf1HOa7YtcGSivumkQxZyfPsuu2oawe2JYZFW/s1566/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2015.00.49.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"></a></div><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNsQIQTQyjgGXmabMLx88aeNY-evdnFzI5TWMTAYApTbszHKoRor_wiucw1vZ1rWBhCdM8dj1sMZhSh_fWKZhV81sIrtt8_Lr4MxTXG9d2SQNWU6WncFP0VN32PFoKrihCZ21oaapFEE0dmW-xaX2muITX4glNxLSETgc9pgSw1u9nm-weUBKk-2b7/s1490/Screenshot%202022-09-10%20at%2015.45.11.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"></a></div><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 15px; text-align: left;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></div><br /><p></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-70460086839059858122022-05-20T18:54:00.008+00:002022-05-20T19:16:16.994+00:00Why do atheists think Christians believe unreasonably, if they don't?<p><span face="Lato, sans-serif"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQAgw1UGdnxKQ9qJbkNhCcm2y5ALMmXLxnYqao_ETqzpwmGHTHxj7a5xwu-BkK8ljKNTo7xlZG8fxpFUx7cQT2k0e-saLm9ILqLry8dFZ5cteZxZtGF26gOrDOyNlT8XrvZX8Gj6metx6SzX8K86EplPZiEkgXTIwyTdQWCrsZX7UJ4XqOdCSvVJP8/s1368/Screenshot%202022-05-20%20at%2019.53.58.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="636" data-original-width="1368" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQAgw1UGdnxKQ9qJbkNhCcm2y5ALMmXLxnYqao_ETqzpwmGHTHxj7a5xwu-BkK8ljKNTo7xlZG8fxpFUx7cQT2k0e-saLm9ILqLry8dFZ5cteZxZtGF26gOrDOyNlT8XrvZX8Gj6metx6SzX8K86EplPZiEkgXTIwyTdQWCrsZX7UJ4XqOdCSvVJP8/w572-h266/Screenshot%202022-05-20%20at%2019.53.58.png" width="572" /></a></div><br />How reasonable is it for the religious to believe the central tenets of their respective religions? According to many atheists: not very. Many atheists suppose it is in each case unreasonable for Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Bahá’ís, Quakers, Mormons, Scientologists, and so on to believe what they do.<p></p><div class="entry-content" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Lato, sans-serif;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The religious person usually takes a different view of at least their own religious belief. They suppose science and reason do not significantly undermine, and may indeed support, the core tenets of their own faith. The same is true of non-religious theists. They consider their brand of theism is reasonably, or at least not unreasonably, held even if no particular religion is. Indeed, many theists consider atheism unreasonable.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Even when participants in discussions between atheists on the one hand and defenders of some variety of religious or theistic belief on the other include intelligent, philosophically sophisticated and well-informed people striving to think carefully and objectively, they still often arrive at strikingly different conclusions regarding the reasonableness of their respective positions.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Consider this hypothetical discussion between Peter and Ada, which I take to represent fairly standard views on either side.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Peter is an intelligent, educated, contemporary Christian. Central to Peter’s faith is his belief that the Judeo-Christian God exists and that Jesus was resurrected. Ada is an intelligent, educated contemporary atheist. Ada believes there is no God, and that there was no resurrection. Peter and Ada engage in lengthy and detailed discussion of my central question: how reasonable is it for Peter to hold the Christian beliefs he does? Together they carefully consider Peter’s Christian beliefs, the various arguments he offers in their support and Ada’s also arguments against them. In addition, they carefully examine their respective cases for and against supposing that Peter’s belief in God and/or Christianity might be reasonable, or not unreasonable, not necessarily because it is well supported by evidence and/or argument, but rather by virtue of its being, as the reformed epistemologists put it, properly basic<a name="_ednref1" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref1"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn1" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref1"></a>, or because that belief constitutes a good Pascal-type wager. Peter and Ada do their level best to come to a fair and impartial assessment of the reasonableness of Peter’s Christian belief. Nevertheless, they arrive at very different conclusions. Peter concludes, on the basis of the considerations he explores with Ada, that his Christian belief is reasonable, or at least not unreasonable. Indeed, let’s suppose that Peter, like many Christians <a name="_ednref2" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref2"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn2" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref2">[ii]</a>[ii], believes both that (i) a cumulative case based on publicly available data can be made for Christianity that is strong enough to render Christian belief reasonable, or at least not unreasonable, and also that (ii) Peter can in any case rightly consider his Christian belief reasonable, or at least not unreasonable, given only that he enjoys certain religious experiences. Ada, on the basis of the same considerations they have jointly discussed, concludes that Peter believes unreasonably notwithstanding both the arguments at Peter’s command and also his claimed religious experiences. Ada’s assessment is shared by many atheists, including myself.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Let’s also suppose what is quite likely to be true: that Peter and Ada disagree about how reasonable it is for Ada to believe atheism is true. Ada maintains it is reasonable for her to embrace atheism. Peter concludes that Ada’s atheism is unreasonable.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Of course, we should acknowledge that someone who, like Peter, considers his Christianity to be reasonably (or not unreasonably) held need not consider Ada’s atheism unreasonable. They might believe, for example, that the reasonableness of their own Christian belief derives from its being grounded in religious experiences that Ada lacks. That person might suppose that, given Ada’s relatively impoverished epistemic situation, her rejection of theism and religious faith is reasonable, even while it remains reasonable for those who enjoy such revelatory experiences to believe.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">However, even if Peter’s view were that Ada’s atheism is not unreasonable, a significant disagreement would remain. For, like many atheists, Ada believes Peter believes unreasonably. Peter obviously disagrees with Ada about that. Indeed, he would likely consider that assessment of hers to unreasonable, even if not her atheism.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">I begin by focusing on some of the explanations Peter might offer for (as Peter sees it) Ada’s error in judging that it’s unreasonable for Peter to believe. Why does Ada believe Peter believes unreasonably if, in reality, he doesn’t? Were it recognizably the case that Peter does indeed believe unreasonably, that would neatly account for Ada’s judgement to that effect. But if, as Peter supposes, Ada has been presented with a clear and cogent case for supposing his Christian belief is not unreasonably held, why does Ada fail to recognise that fact?</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Though I focus here specifically on Christian belief, the points made below in many cases carry over to many other varieties of religious belief</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">I’ll now sketch four answers to the question: If atheists like Ada are mistaken in supposing Christians like Peter believe unreasonably, what explains their error?</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><b>(1) Wishful thinking. Atheists like Ada reject Christianity and condemn it as unreasonable not because it is unreasonable, but because they don’t want it, or theism more generally, to be true.</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Those who attempt to explain mistaken assessments of the reasonableness of Christianity as a product of wishful thinking sometimes quote atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel, who in his book The Last Word, says:</p><blockquote style="background-color: #eeeeee; border: none; box-sizing: border-box; clear: both; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God, and naturally, hope there is no God. I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.<a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn1" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref1"></a></p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">This may be the view of some atheists, but is it the view of many? Surely the Christian message is one of hope? It provides numerous attractive reassurances, especially about death and justice. In particular, it promises we can be reunited with our loved ones beyond the grave, that people will ultimately get their just deserts, and so on. These are appealing beliefs for most of us.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Indeed, that Christianity is not, as a rule, the sort of thing people want to be true is fairly obviously contradicted by the manner in which Christians tend to promote it. They often place at least as much emphasis on how wonderful it would be if Christianity were true as on any intellectual case that might be made in its support.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">But perhaps we’ve overlooked some of the less attractive aspects of Christian belief, aspects that might yet motivate someone like Ada to condemn it is unreasonable when in reality it is not? Consider the following variant of the wishful-thinking explanation.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><b>(1.1) Atheists don’t want to believe in eternal damnation</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">In his book The Last Superstition, the philosopher Edward Feser quotes Nagel in support of the view that many secular intellectuals reject religion because they don’t want it to be true. Feser then adds:</p><blockquote style="background-color: #eeeeee; border: none; box-sizing: border-box; clear: both; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Atheism, like religion, can often rest more on a will to believe than on dispassionate rational arguments. Indeed, as the philosopher C.F.J. Martin has pointed out, the element of divine punishment – traditionally understood in the monotheistic religions as a sentence of eternal damnation in Hell – shows that atheism is hardly less plausibly motivated by wishful thinking than theism is. For while it is hard to understand why someone would want to believe that he is in danger of everlasting hellfire, it is not at all hard to see why one would desperately want not to believe this. <a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn2" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref2">[ii]</a></p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">On Feser’s view, the presence of this unappealing thought in Christianity – that divine punishment awaits unbelievers – shows that people are just as likely to disbelieve Christianity as a result of wishful thinking as they are to believe.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Feser is fairly obviously mistaken, I think. It may be true, as a general rule, that the unappealing character of a thought makes it less likely to be believed. However, there’s an obvious exception. An exception is when the unappealing thought takes the form of a threat: believe or else.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">I once received an email chain message claiming that if I forwarded the message to two friends I would receive good fortune, but if I failed to forward the message I would be cursed with bad luck. The appealing thought that I would receive good luck if I did as I was instructed was obviously intended to incentivize me to pass the message on. But then so too was the unappealing threat of bad luck if I didn’t. The email waved both a carrot and a stick at me, the stick providing me with at least as much incentive to act as the carrot.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">A recipient of Feser’s traditional Christian message is presented with a vastly more impressive carrot and stick combination. The carrot includes the promise of everlasting life for those who truly believe; the stick includes the threat of eternal damnation for those who don’t.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Feser is correct that an atheist like Nagel won’t want it to be true that hell awaits those who fail to believe. But then neither do I want it to be true that, as a result of my failing to forward that email message, I will receive bad luck. It does not follow, in either case, that the unpleasant character of the threat functions, on balance, as a disincentive – making it less likely that recipients of the message will do as they are instructed. On the contrary, the inclusion of such a threat typically makes it more likely the recipient will do as instructed, not less. I discarded that email message not because of the unappealing threat it contained, but despite the threat.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">There is a second weakness to this particular diagnosis of why it is that atheists fail to recognize the reasonableness of theism or Christianity. Many Christians, including theologically sophisticated Christians, reject the doctrine of eternal damnation. So, even if the thought of eternal damnation did have the off-putting effect Feser supposes, it would only put people off those varieties of theistic belief thought to involve the doctrine. It needn’t put them off theism and Christianity per se.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Here’s another variant of the wishful-thinking explanation.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><b>(I.2) Atheists don’t want to submit themselves to God’s moral authority.</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Some Christians suggest that those who reject Christian belief as unreasonable do so because they do not want to submit themselves to any external, objective moral authority. They want to be able to pursue their own selfish agendas unfettered by the thought that what they are doing is against God’s will.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">This explanation is also implausible, I suggest. Most atheists believe that they have objective moral duties. They believe it is an objective fact that they ought not to steal, lie, and so on<a name="_ednref3" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref3"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn3" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref3">[iii]</a>. So it is false that atheists, as a rule, have a problem with acknowledging the existence of objective moral constraints on their behavior. That can’t be the explanation for their assessment that Christian belief is unreasonable.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Indeed atheists do not, as a rule, have any particular difficulty holding beliefs requiring them to act in ways that are not in their own self-interest. They usually strive to behave in accordance with what they take to be their moral duties, even when such behavior is disadvantageous to them personally. This fact significantly reduces the plausibility of the suggestion that atheists are moved to reject Christianity/theism because Christian belief prohibits them acting in their own self-interest.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">No doubt there are aspects of mainstream Christian teaching that are particularly off-putting to some. Take traditional Christian sexual teaching for example. It’s not implausible that gay people will be more likely than others to reject the widespread Christian belief that gay sexual relationships are sinful. However, most atheists aren’t gay, so a desire to engage in such relations can’t explain their failure to believe. Further, most actively gay atheists are aware that they are welcomed by – and can even be married within – at least some religions (including even some Christian denominations). This still further reduces the plausibility of the suggestion that even their atheism is largely motivated by wishful thinking.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Wishful-thinking-based explanations for the failure of individuals to appreciate the reasonableness of Christian belief also run into obvious trouble with those tortured individuals who struggle valiantly to keep their faith but lose it nonetheless. Their rejection of Christianity does not appear to be motivated by wishful thinking. Quite the opposite.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">To summarize: wishful thinking may play some role in producing atheists like Ada, but what evidence we possess regarding the beliefs and desires of atheists provides little reason to suppose it plays any significant role. Indeed, we might plausibly suppose that Ada would, on balance, actually much prefer it if Christianity was true, not false. As a matter of fact, so would I.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><b>(2) Atheists fail to recognize the reasonableness of Christian belief because they are ignorant of the Christian message and/or the strength of the intellectual case in its favour.</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Is this true? One recent U.S. study found that those self-identifying as atheists and agnostics scored better on average on a general religious knowledge quiz than did the religious. They also had a better knowledge of Christianity, on average, than did those self-identifying as Christian. <a name="_ednref4" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref4"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn4" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref4">[iv]</a> It does not appear to be ignorance of the Christian message that accounts for widespread lack of belief, at least not in the U.S.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Might non-belief or disbelief be better explained by a failure to appreciate of the power of the arguments both for the existence of God and the truth of Christianity? Most professional philosophers and philosophy graduate students possess at least a passing knowledge of those arguments. They also have considerable training and expertise in assessing the cogency of arguments. Yet a recent PhilPapers survey indicated that, globally, only 14.6% of professional philosophers and philosophy graduate students favour or lean even towards theism, let alone Christianity. <a name="_ednref5" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref5"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn5" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref5">[v]</a></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The above statistic might prompt some Christians to claim that the proportion of theists is at least higher among those specializing in the philosophy of religion (perhaps about 70%, most of whom are Christian<a name="_ednref6" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref6"></a> <a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn6" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref6">[vi]</a>), and that this in turn supports the view that a greater familiarity with the arguments for theism, and indeed Christianity, does indeed lead to an increased likelihood of belief. However, even if it were true that a higher percentage of philosophers of religion are theists and Christians, that would not, as it stands, support the conclusion that this is a result of them having acquired a better appreciation of the strength of the case for theism and Christianity. Philosophy of religion is more likely to attract committed theists and Christians in the first place. Indeed, a recent survey of philosophers of religion revealed that while philosophical training and engagement did indeed lead to belief revision among the 151 respondents, “the direction of this revision was most frequently in the direction of theism to atheism.” <a name="_ednref7" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref7"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn7" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref7">[vii]</a> This suggests greater familiarity with the arguments for theism and Christianity doesn’t increase belief, but, if anything, tends to decrease it.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Setting aside these more general worries with the above explanation of atheist belief, there remains the obvious problem that the explanation does not apply in Ada’s case. We stipulated that Ada is philosophically sophisticated individual who informed about Peter’s Christian beliefs and familiar with the various arguments at his disposal.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><b>(3) A faulty God-sense/IIHS</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">A third explanation for the failure of atheists like Ada to recognise the reasonableness of Christian belief begins with the thought that some people can know directly that God exists by virtue of their possessing a reliable sensus divinitatis or God-sense. Such individuals need not infer that God exists. God just directly makes himself known to them via this additional, reliable, God-given faculty. According to Alvin Plantinga, it may be ‘perfectly sensible’ for such an individual to believe in God. Plantinga says:</p><blockquote style="background-color: #eeeeee; border: none; box-sizing: border-box; clear: both; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">[suppose] I have a rich interior spiritual life… it seems to me that I am in communion with God, and that I see something of his marvelous glory and beauty, that I feel his love and his presence with me. Then (unless I’ve got some powerful defeater, and we need not hypothesize that I do) a response that involves believing that there is such a person is clearly perfectly sensible.<a name="_ednref8" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref8"></a> <a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn8" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref8">[viii]</a></p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">So why do atheists like Ada fail to have direct awareness of God’s existence and consequent reasonable belief? According to Plantinga, because their sensus divinitatis is malfunctioning as a result of sin.</p><blockquote style="background-color: #eeeeee; border: none; box-sizing: border-box; clear: both; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Were it not for sin and its effects, God’s presence and glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the presence of other minds, physical objects and the past. Like any cognitive process, however, the sensus divinitatis can malfunction; as a result of sin, it has been damaged.7</p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">According to Plantinga, the failure of atheists reasonably to believe in God is, at least in part, a result of their possessing a faulty, sin-corrupted God-sense.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Plantinga might offer a similar explanation for the failure of atheists reasonably to believe the great truths of the Christian Gospels. On Plantinga’s extended A/C model of how such beliefs might be warranted, knowledge of and reasonable belief in such truths, including the truth of the resurrection, might be had through the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit (IIHS). On reading the Gospels, the Holy Spirit illuminates what is read and causes the Christian to recognise that it is true. But why, then, on reading the same Biblical passages, does the atheist not benefit from a similar revelation? Presumably, because sin somehow smothers or blocks their epistemic access.<a name="_ednref9" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref9"></a> <a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn9" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref9">[ix]</a></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">How plausible is the sin-blocked-sensus/IIHS explanation for the failure of atheists to recognize reasonableness of Christian belief? Most religious people concede that many atheists are virtuous, moral people – sometimes at least as moral as many of their Christian counterparts who nevertheless appear to enjoy such revelatory experiences. So why, assuming these atheistic individuals are not significantly more sin-ravaged than their Christian counterparts, do they not similarly enjoy the benefits of a reliably functioning sensus divinitatis and the revelatory activity of the Holy Spirit when reading the Gospels, and thus come sensibly to believe in both God and the great claims of the Gospels?<a name="_ednref10" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref10"></a> <a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn10" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref10">[x]</a></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Suppose Peter claims to enjoy just the sort of revelatory experiences that Plantinga supposes a reliably functioning sensus divinitatis and the IIHS might deliver. Ada lacks these experiences. Yet, like many atheists, Ada doesn’t appear particularly sinful. We might plausibly suppose she appears at least as virtuous as Peter. Perhaps more so. But then the sin-based explanation for the failure of Ada reasonably to believe what Peter reasonably believes seems to fail in this case.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">What if the sin-blocked nature of the mechanisms that might otherwise provide an atheist with reasonable belief in both God and the great truths of the Gospels is accounted for not by that atheist’s own personal sin, but by the sin of others? Perhaps, as a result of the general damp environment in which it’s currently located, Ada’s car won’t start. Similarly, because of the sin-filled environment in which she is currently located, Ada’s sensus divinitatis won’t work. It’s not her own personal sin that’s caused the malfunction, but her sin-filled environment.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">We’ve rescued the sin-based explanation for Ada’s failure reasonably to believe in God and Christianity, but only by introducing more puzzles. Given that Ada and Peter occupy much the same environment, why does its sin-filled character cause Ada’s sensus divinitatis to malfunction, but not Peter’s?</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">We might similarly wonder why it is that the virtuous members of other religions who have heard the Gospel message also fail to recognise its truth. Presumably it’s not their own personal sin that is blocking the IIHS. But if it’s our more general sin-filled environment that’s responsible for the blockage, why is it that Peter receives full epistemic access via the IIHS while neither Ada nor, say, Peter’s virtuous Muslim colleague, perhaps sitting next to Peter in the same library and reading the very same Gospel passages, does not?</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Of course, if the only sin that really matters – the only sin that blocks an individual’s epistemic access – is that of not believing in the existence of God and the truth of Christianity, then of course atheists like Ada as well as those of other religious faiths are indeed all sinners in the requisite sense. Peter, by contrast, though he might in other respects be less virtuous than Ada, would be, in this vital respect, sin-free. That, we might suppose, is why Peter enjoys these revelatory experiences while both Ada and Peter’s otherwise-equally-virtuous Muslim colleague do not.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">But notice that if that is how we understand Ada’s sensus divinitatis and IIHS blocking sin, we can’t now explain Ada’s failure to believe as a consequence of her sin. For our explanation would then be circular. Our explanation for Ada’s failure to believe would be that she fails to believe.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">In summary, what evidence there is concerning the way in which immorality, belief, and such revelatory experiences are distributed tends not to support such sin-based explanations for the failure of atheists to recognise the reasonableness of theistic and Christian belief but, if anything, to undermine them.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Notice two further shortcoming of the sin-blocked sensus/IIHS explanation for the Ada’s supposed error in judging that Peter believes unreasonably. First, it doesn’t explain that assessment. It explains, at best, only why Ada herself fails reasonably to believe (i.e. her sensus/IIHS access is sin-blocked and she lacks other adequate grounds for belief). It doesn’t explain why Ada mistakenly judges that Peter believes unreasonably. Given (i) Peter claims sincerely to have just the kind of experiences Plantinga describes, (ii) Plantinga clearly and successfully explains why Peter’s belief is, under the circumstances, ‘perfectly sensible’, and (iii) Ada fully understands that Plantingian explanation, why is it that Ada fails to recognise that, though she may lack such experiences herself, it is ‘perfectly sensible’ for Peter to believe what he does given his experiences? Ada’s error here – and indeed my own, as I am of the same opinion – might yet be explained, but, as it stands, the Plantingian account of why Ada and others do not enjoy such experiences fails to deliver the required explanation.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">A second weakness of the sin-blocked sensus/IIHS explanation for Ada’s error is that it explains at best only why Ada fails reasonably, or not unreasonably, to believe on the basis of religious experience. It doesn’t explain why she fails to recognise that Peter’s Christian belief is not unreasonable given the evidential case with which she has been presented. For according to Peter, that evidential case establishes his belief is not unreasonable.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">I’ll digress here briefly to examine a variant of the sin-blocking explanation offered by philosopher William Lane Craig. According to Craig, the Holy Spirit works in all men to reveal the truth of Christianity. However, the atheist deliberately blocks this activity:</p><blockquote style="background-color: #eeeeee; border: none; box-sizing: border-box; clear: both; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The Bible says all men are without excuse. Even those who are given no good reason to believe and many persuasive reasons to disbelieve have no excuse, because the ultimate reason they do not believe is that they have deliberately rejected God’s Holy Spirit. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, (Revised edition, Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), p. 37.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">… when a person refuses to come to Christ it is never just because of lack of evidence or because of intellectual difficulties: at root, he refuses to come because he willingly ignores and rejects the drawing of God’s Spirit on his heart. No one in the final analysis really fails to become a Christian because of lack of arguments; he fails to become a Christian because he loves darkness rather than light and wants nothing to do with God.[1] [1] Ibid, pp. 35-36.</p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Notice Craig’s diagnosis of how sin blocks or smothers the internal activity of the Holy Spirit brings us back to the first of our four popular explanations: wishful thinking. On Craig’s view, the atheist in whom the Holy Spirit has been at work does, at some level, know that God exists and that Christianity is true. However the atheist deliberately suppresses or rationalizes away this knowledge because they do not want to have to face it overtly. Craig suggests this explanation for atheist rejection of Christian and indeed theistic belief accounts for the fact that atheists are deserving of hell. Rejecting God in this way is the one unforgiveable sin.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Craig’s variant of the wishful-thinking explanation runs into much the same difficulties that plague other wishful-thinking-based accounts. Most obviously, it’s clear many atheists and agnostics really do desperately want Christianity to be true, and struggle valiantly, if ultimately without success, to retain their faith.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><b>(4) Atheists are led astray by the devil/demons</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The devil is sometimes credited with blinding people to the existence of God and truth of Christianity. The Bible says, for example:</p><blockquote style="background-color: #eeeeee; border: none; box-sizing: border-box; clear: both; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Those by the way side are they that hear; then cometh the devil, and taketh away the word out of their hearts, lest they should believe and be saved. Luke8:12</p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">C.S. Lewis’s The Screwtape Letters presents a fictional narrative to illustrate how he supposes demons (in whom he really believed <a name="_ednref11" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_ednref11"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_edn11" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_ednref11">[xi]</a>) engage in skillful psychological manipulation: they whisper into our ears and leading us away from the truth. So perhaps part of the explanation for the failure of Ada and others to recognize the reasonableness of Christian belief is that they have allowed themselves to be seduced by such diabolical trickery.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><strong style="box-sizing: border-box;">Explanations and ‘just so’ stories</strong></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The explanations outlined above aren’t supposed to be exhaustive, but they are intended to illustrate something of the range of explanations available to Peter. Peter might suppose Ada’s failure to recognise the reasonableness of Peter’s Christian belief is due to (i) some intellectual weakness of hers (e.g. Ada is ignorant of, or lacks the intellectual ability to appreciate the strength of, the case for considering Peter’s Christian belief not unreasonable), (ii) her own emotional or spiritual resistance to that case, or (iii) something else blocking or interfering with mechanisms that might otherwise deliver that recognition (e.g. devils lead Ada’s thought processes astray). The explanations might be employed individually or in combination.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">However, the explanations examined have various drawbacks. The first drawback is that the first two explanations don’t appear to apply to someone like Ada whom, we are supposing, is neither ignorant of the claims or the case for Christianity nor intellectually weak, and who does not find Christianity unattractive.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Of course, Peter might suggest Ada and others who profess not to find unattractive are deluding themselves. They say they don’t find it unattractive. But in reality, deep down, they do find it unattractive. That’s a possibility of course. However, this suggestion faces an obvious drawback: it’s a ‘just so’ story. There is little in the way of independent evidence to suggest that it is true.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">This same drawback afflicts Peter’s remaining two explanations in terms of a sin-blocked sensus/IIHS and/or the activities of devils. True, if there are devils that can lead us astray in the way C.S. Lewis supposed, then that might explain why atheists like Ada fail to recognise the reasonableness of Christian belief. But, even setting aside worries about whether a coherent story can be told regarding why a loving God would allow demons so disastrously to dupe us in this way, there remains the obvious objection that while this explanation might make internal sense from the point of view of Christianity, there is little in the way of independent evidence to suggest the explanation is true.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">The sin-blocked sensus divinitatis/IIHS explanation suffers the same flaw. Perhaps we can know that, if God exists and Christianity is true, it is likely God would both furnish us with a sensus divinitatis and also make the truth of Christianity known by some similar mechanism. However, even if we can know that, if God exists and Christianity is true, then such mechanisms probably do exist, what independent evidence is there not only that such mechanisms exist, but that the failure of atheists like Ada to recognise that belief in God and Christianity is not unreasonable is due, even in part, to their sin-blocked nature? Little, if indeed any.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Notice that the kind of explanations offered by Peter tend to be offered not just to account for the failure of sceptics to recognise the reasonableness of other religions, but also to account for the failure of sceptics to recognise the reasonableness of belief in other new Age and fringe belief systems. Suppose Alice believes, on the basis of testimony of others and her own subjective sense that such things exist and communicate with her, in the existence of disembodied spirit guides. She finds that many are sceptical, and think she believes unreasonably. To explain this, she might very well appeal to a combination of wishful thinking (people don’t want to be distracted by other-worldly considerations from their narrow, self-interested pursuit of material wealth and power; also, they often find unattractive the thought that they inhabit a world in which invisible beings monitor their every move, stripping them of all privacy), ignorance (people are unaware of the good evidence that exists for such beings), a blocked spirit sense (it has spiritually corrupted by worldly concerns, or perhaps the spirits can see some individuals are not yet ready to receive their spiritual wisdom), or the activities of other, less benevolent disembodied beings who have an interest in blocking our spiritual development and who consequently work to blind people to the reality of spirit guides. Notice Alice’s explanations suffer similar drawbacks to Peter’s. Wishful thinking? But many sceptics would like to believe in spirit guides. Ignorance? But many sceptics are by no means ignorant of the evidence Alice finds compelling. And of course, Alice’s last two explanations are also ‘just so’ stories: they might be true, but there’s little if any independent reason to suppose they are true.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><i>This is an excerpt from a book chapter of mine.</i></p><div style="box-sizing: border-box;"><hr align="left" size="1" style="border-bottom: 0px; border-image: initial; border-left: 0px; border-right: 0px; border-top-color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.1); border-top-style: solid; box-sizing: content-box; height: 0px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 1rem; overflow: visible;" width="33%" /></div><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn1" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn1"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref1" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn1"></a>(Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York: Oxford `University Press 1997). p130).</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn2" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn2"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref2" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn2">[ii]</a> The Last Superstition (South Bend, Indiana: St Augustine’s Press, 2008) p. 10.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn3" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn3"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref3" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn3">[iii]</a> Indeed, the observation that “[m]ost of us think that in moral experience we do apprehend objective values and obligations” (and Craig here includes atheists) is used by William Lane Craig to support a premise of his moral argument for the existence of God. See William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd Edition (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway books, 2008) p. 180.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn4" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn4"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref4" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn4">[iv]</a> Results of a 2010 survey conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life – results summarized at: https://www.pewforum.org/U-S-Religious-Knowledge-Survey.aspx</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn5" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn5"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref5" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn5">[v]</a> Results of the Philpapers survey are at: https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn6" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn6"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref6" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn6">[vi]</a> In the English-speaking world just over 70 percent of those who specialize in philosophy of religion are theists according to two studies Most of them are</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Christian. See Bourget, David and David Chalmers 2009. “Correlations with: AOS:Philosophy of Religion,” in The PhilPapers Surveys. https://philpapers.org/surves/linear_most_with.pl?A=profile%3AAOS%3APhilosophy%20of%20</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Religion and De Cruz, Helen 2012. “Confirmation Bias or Expertise? The Prevalence of Theism in Philosophy of Religion,” https://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2012/02/one-of-thestri.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">html.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn7" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn7"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref7" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn7">[vii]</a> Preliminary report of results from the 2013 British Academy funded survey are available online from Helen de Cruz here: https://prosblogion.ektopos.com/2013/12/31/results-of-my-qualitative-study-of-attitudes-and-religious-motivations-of-philosophers-of-religion/</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn8" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn8"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref8" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn8">[viii]</a> Alvin Plantinga, “Reformed Epistemology” in Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (eds.) A Companion to The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell 1997), p. 387</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn9" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn9"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref9" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn9">[ix]</a> Plantnga’s account of how firm and certain knowledge of the great truths of the Gospels can be had by means of a process of belief formation instigated by the Holy Spirit (a process that brings about belief in those truths in response to the of reading scripture, etc.) is presented in his Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See chapter 8.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn10" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn10"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref10" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn10">[x]</a> That this is true of many atheists is of course widely acknowledged even by many theists. See for example Daniel Howard-Snyder, who writes.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Even though some nonbelievers lack true benevolence, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that others possess it since they really do earnestly seek the truth about God, love the Good, assess evidence judiciously, and, if anything, display a prejudice for God, not against Him.<span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 12px; line-height: 0; position: relative; top: -0.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">(</span> Howard-Snyder, Daniel (2006).<a href="https://www.cc.wwu.edu/~howardd/HiddennessofGod.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;">“Hiddenness of God”</a>. In Donald M. Borchert. Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed.)</p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="border-collapse: collapse;"><tbody style="box-sizing: border-box;"><tr style="box-sizing: border-box;"><td style="box-sizing: border-box;"></td><td style="box-sizing: border-box;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;">Encyclopedia of philosophy [Ressource électronique] / Editeur en chef Donald M. Borchert<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />Detroit : Macmillan Reference USA, 2006<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />0-02-866072-2</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"><a name="_edn11" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: inherit; overflow-wrap: break-word;" title="_edn11"></a><a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/just_why_cant_we_atheists_see_that_religious_belief_can_be_reasonable_some_/#_ednref11" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #084d93; overflow-wrap: break-word; text-decoration-line: none;" title="_edn11">[xi]</a> As Lewis explained in an interview in Time magazine, ‘There is no uncreated being except God. God has no opposite. . . . The proper question is whether I believe in devils. I do. That is to say, I believe in angels, and I believe that some of these, by the abuse of their free will, have become enemies to God.’</p><div class="clearfix" style="box-sizing: border-box;"></div><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px;"></p></div><footer class="entry-meta" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 1em;"><div class="entry-meta-category-tag" style="border-top: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); box-sizing: border-box; margin-top: 50px; padding-top: 25px;"><div class="author-bio" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><div id="law-stephen" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #212529;"></div></div></div></footer>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-5397249423992205262022-05-18T17:10:00.006+00:002022-05-20T09:48:02.099+00:00My Foreword to God and Horrendous Suffering, ed. John Loftus<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhm1oDegW8F1WXR-WZdWbht_vxxUGfUwYD3dKgZkFB2a1UNrXkLk-L0D-6O5-C_rYWqjBpga7KpRYldfkGdq76bBtKkZalDW9kvYtNBpn2XkrdOhlXZY3GSPtrEABnVVRo4uVsYIIvliKpBAtwilnRQYj_fR4zl8jp7yxUZI5-9OGusKOrrYCZfNBGJ/s738/Screenshot%202022-05-18%20at%2018.09.34.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="446" data-original-width="738" height="193" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhm1oDegW8F1WXR-WZdWbht_vxxUGfUwYD3dKgZkFB2a1UNrXkLk-L0D-6O5-C_rYWqjBpga7KpRYldfkGdq76bBtKkZalDW9kvYtNBpn2XkrdOhlXZY3GSPtrEABnVVRo4uVsYIIvliKpBAtwilnRQYj_fR4zl8jp7yxUZI5-9OGusKOrrYCZfNBGJ/s320/Screenshot%202022-05-18%20at%2018.09.34.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /><i>Book is </i><a href="https://www.gcrr.org/gcrr-press/god-and-horrendous-suffering" style="font-style: italic;" target="_blank">here</a><i>. Prepublication draft below.</i><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><b>FOREWORD<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><b>STEPHEN LAW<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">The problem of evil is widely considered to be one of, if not the, most significant threat to traditional theism, by which I mean the kind of theism that posits a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (roughly: all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good). This volume focuses on what's often called the Evidential Problem of Evil, one version of which runs as follows:<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm 0cm 0cm 1cm;">If God exists, then there are no gratuitous evils<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm 0cm 0cm 1cm;">Gratuitous evil exists.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm 0cm 0cm 1cm;">Therefore, God does not exist.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">A 'gratuitous' evil, in this context, is an evil for which there is no adequate God-justifying reason. Yes, God might allow some evils if that's the price he must unavoidably pay to allow for still greater goods. But God won't allow <i>gratuitous</i> evils - evils that would be pointless from God's perspective.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Notice that this simple argument is deductively valid: necessarily, if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. Theists cannot consistently accept both premises while denying the conclusion. Typically they reject the second premise.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">In this foreword, I thought I'd sketch out a map of my own thinking on the Problem. I hope it will provide a useful overview of the issues and a helpful point of comparison when reading the book.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">It seems to me that, in response to the Evidential problem, theists typically pursue at least one (and sometimes all) of the following four strategies:<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i>1. Theodicy strategy<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">The first strategy is to identify reasons that would justify God in allowing observed evils, thereby showing that they are not gratuitous evils after all. Such explanations for why God permits such evils are called <i>theodicies</i>. Two classic examples of theodicies are:<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i>Free will.</i> God gave us free will, which is itself a great good, and which also allows for the further great good of our being able to freely choose to be good. God could have made us puppet beings always compelled to behave well, but then we would not be morally responsible for our good behaviour. God cut our strings and set us free so that we might freely choose the good. The downside to this is that we sometimes choose to do evil, not good. That evil is the price God must inevitably pay to allow for these greater goods. And so the evil is not gratuitous.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i>Character building.</i> Sometimes the horrendous pain and suffering humans experience can make us grow stronger and become better people. Those who have survived an awful experience sometimes say they don't regret having endured it because of the valuable insights it allowed them. Further, the pain, suffering and poverty of others can provide us with opportunities to be compassionate and charitable. Compassion and charity are so-called 'second order goods' that require 'first order evils' like suffering and poverty. Such evils can be explained as a consequence of God giving us these important opportunities to develop morally and spiritually.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">While these and many other theodicies have been offered to explain why God allows the evils he does, such explanations appear - even to many theists - both individually and collectively deeply inadequate.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">For example, the appeal to free will explains, at best, only those evils for which we're responsible as free moral agents. What of the hundreds of millions of years of horrendous animal suffering before we humans showed up? What of natural diseases and disasters and the suffering they cause? What of the horrendous suffering of parents and children caused by childhood mortality rates of around 50% for almost the entire 200,000 year history of <i>homo sapiens</i>? None of this is a product of free will.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">The character building explanation also fails to account for most animal suffering. In addition it fails to explain the suffering of the vast numbers of humans who have bowed out of this life both physically and psychologically crippled by the experiences through which they have been put. Their characters have not been built. They've been destroyed.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">If there exists even a teaspoonful of gratuitous evil, then there is no God. The various theodicies that theists have constructed appear, both individually and collectively, to fall spectacularly short of explaining the horrendous pain suffering of humans and other sentient creatures. There remains rather more than a teaspoonful of gratuitous evil to explain away.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i>2. Skeptical Theism strategy<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">A second strategy theists employ to try to deal with the Evidential Problem is to insist that we can't reasonably assign a low probability to there being God-justifying reasons for all the evils we observe. We can't reasonably insist that it's unlikely there are such reasons just because we cannot <i>think</i> of such reasons. Theists often offer analogies at this point. If I look into a garage from outside and cannot see any elephants in there, then it's reasonable for me to believe there are no elephants in there. But if I look in and cannot see any insects, it is not reasonable for me to conclude that there are no insects present. My ability to spot insects at that distance is very limited. There could easily be insects present that I can't see. Similarly, given our limited human capacities, we can't reasonably conclude that, given we cannot think of any God-justifying reasons for the evils we observe, there are unlikely to be such reasons. And if there are such reasons, then no evil is gratuitous.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">The above response is that of a <i>Skeptical Theist</i>. Skeptical Theism does seem to many to successfully defuse the Evidential problem of Evil. Rather than identifying the reasons that would justify God in allowing observed evils, Skeptical Theism insists that, whether or not we can successfully identify such reasons, we're in no position to conclude that the existence of such reasons is unlikely.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">However, Skeptical Theism runs into problems of its own. It entails that we similarly have no clue whether it would be worse, all things considered, if I tortured my cat to death with a red hot poker than if I didn't, because, for all I know, there's an all-things-considered good reason for me to torture my cat to death. Just because we cannot think of such a reason doesn't give us good grounds for thinking no such reason exists. Perhaps my torturing my cat to death is necessary for some very great good further down the line. We cannot say this is unlikely, says the Skeptical Theist. But surely we are in a position to say this is unlikely.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Worse, Skeptical Theism entails that we have no clue whether God has an all-things-considered good reason to deceive us about whether Jesus offers us salvation. If there is such a reason, and if God always does what is best, all things considered, then for all we know God is deceiving us about 'Jesus saves' and truth of Christianity. And also about the existence of the external world, given that for all we know God has a good reason to deceive us about that too.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">In short, Skeptical Theism appears to open a skeptical Pandora's box - generating skeptical consequences that are not only implausible, but undercut any grounds for supposing Christianity is true, be those grounds empirical evidence, testimony, scripture, religious experience, or divine revelation. For a Christian, playing the Skeptical Theism card to deal with the Evidential Problem of Evil salvages the reasonableness of their Christian faith only by then undermining the reasonableness of their Christian faith in another way.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[1]</span></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Some Skeptical Theists, having spotted that Skeptical Theism entails that for all we know God has good reason to deceive us about the truth of Christianity, insist that we can nevertheless still trust God because God, being perfectly good, would not deceive us, not even if there were a compelling reason for him to do so. One difficulty with this response is that the Bible says God sometimes deceives (2nd Thessalionians says God sends a 'powerful delusion, leading them to believe what is false.' (2:11). The God-would-never-lie response also raises the question: why, if a morally perfect God won't lie to achieve a greater good, will he inflict horrendous suffering on children to achieve a greater good?<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i>3. Counter-balancing arguments strategy<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">A third strategy, in response to the Evidential Problem of Evil, is to suggest that while there appears to be a great deal of not just evil, but gratuitous evil, we can know that appearance is deceptive if we have far stronger grounds for supposing there is a good God that would never allow such evils. And of course, many theists believe they do possess such grounds. But do they? Most of the most popular arguments for the existence of God, certainly in their simplest forms, appear to provide no clue to as the moral character of our creator, first cause, intelligent designer, or Prime Mover. It's a huge, and, as it stands, unwarranted leap to go from 'there is some sort of intelligence behind the universe....' to '.... <i>and</i> it's perfectly good.' While there are a few arguments specifically for a good god, they are among the most contentious arguments. Take moral arguments, of which this is a typical example:<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm 0cm 0cm 1cm;">If there is no good God, then there are no objective moral facts.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm 0cm 0cm 1cm;">Objective moral facts exist.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm 0cm 0cm 1cm;">Therefore, God exists.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">This argument assumes there cannot be objective moral facts without a good God, which is, to say the least, contentious (many leading Christian philosophers reject this claim). The argument also assumes that there are objective moral facts. While there <i>appear</i> to objective moral facts, appearances can be deceptive (it really seems to us that the Earth is stationary, but it isn't). If the evidence against a good God were sufficiently powerful (and it is), then - even <i>if</i> it could be shown that if there's no good God, then there are no objective moral facts - the right conclusion to draw would then be that there are no objective moral facts (appearances notwithstanding), not that there is a good God.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">In order to more than just counter-balance the otherwise compelling argument against a good God provided by the Evidential Problem of Evil, an argument for a good God would need to be still more compelling. Yet even many theists admit that the arguments specifically for a good God fall far short of being decisive.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><i>4. The 'I just know' strategy<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Finally, theists presented with the Evidential Problem of Evil may insist that while it may indeed provide strong evidence against a good God, and while the arguments for a good God looks at best flimsy, it's nevertheless reasonable for them to believe in a good God given their own direct personal experience of such a God. Indeed, they can <i>just know</i> a good God exists by means of direct personal experience. Their direct personal experience trumps the evidence to the contrary.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Claims to such evidence-trumping personal experiences are common when it comes to beliefs in extraordinary hidden agents - ghosts, fairies, angels, dead ancestors, nature spirits, demons, gods, and so on. Suggest to Mary that there's overwhelming evidence that the deceased don't hang around and communicate with the living, and Mary may insist that, nevertheless, she <i>just knows </i>that her dead Auntie is currently in the room with her.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">How might we 'just know' that God exists? Many theists insist that God has furnished us with a reliably functioning God sense or <i>sensus divinitatis</i> that allows at least some of us to know directly that God is real. They may also insist that it could be reasonable for someone to trust such their personal experience even if they have been presented with strong evidence there's no such being. Compare a situation in which, say, I'm presented with compelling evidence that there are no oranges currently available anywhere in the UK (evidence that a devastating blight has destroyed every orange in the country, say). If I now appear to be directly aware that I'm eating an orange, then it can be reasonable for me to believe there's an orange present, notwithstanding that mountain of evidence to the contrary. My personal direct experience trumps the evidence.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">While I have some sympathy with the principle that we can reasonably believe and indeed directly know that something exists even when the available evidence strongly supports the conclusion that it doesn't, it seems to me that the orange analogy is misleading. I have no reason to distrust my orange experiences more generally. However, I possess a great deal of evidence that we humans are highly prone to false positive experiences of extraordinary hidden agents. And a good God is just another example of such extraordinary hidden agency. Given this additional knowledge about our proneness to false positive beliefs in such agency based on subjective experience, plus the strong evidence provided by the Evidential problem of Evil that there's no good God, relying on my subjective impression that there <i>is</i> a good God looks pretty unreasonable. That would be akin to my believing there's an orange present when I possess not only strong evidence that no oranges are present, but also strong evidence that I've been drugged with a substance that can induce compelling hallucinations of citrus fruit. Even if there is an orange present that's causing my current experience, I can't now reasonably believe that there is.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[2]</span></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">Many atheists consider the Evidential Problem of Evil fatal to traditional theism. They are right to do so. It is patently absurd to believe this world is the creation of a supremely powerful and <i>malevolent</i> deity, given the depth of good we observe - love, laughter, rainbows, ice-cream, and so (though, as I explain in my paper 'The Evil God Challenge' - we can similarly construct theodicies and appeal to Skeptical Theism to defend belief in such an Evil God<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[3]</span></span></span></a>). It's scarcely less absurd to believe this is the creation of a supremely powerful and <i>benevolent</i> deity, given the depth of observed evils. The real mystery, in my view, is why so many of us fail to recognise this obvious fact.</p><div><br clear="all" /><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[1]</span></span></span></a> <span lang="EN-US">For more on this objection, see Stephen Law, 'The Pandora's Box Objection to Skeptical Theism', </span><a href="https://link.springer.com/journal/11153"><i><span style="background: rgb(252, 252, 252); color: black; text-decoration-line: none;">International Journal for Philosophy of Religion</span></i></a><span style="background: rgb(252, 252, 252);">, </span><span style="background: rgb(252, 252, 252); border: 1pt none windowtext; color: #333333; padding: 0cm;">volume</span><span style="background: rgb(252, 252, 252); color: #333333;"> 78</span><span style="background: rgb(252, 252, 252); color: #333333;">, May 2015, <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">pages </span>285–299.</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div id="ftn2"><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[2]</span></span></span></a> <span lang="EN-US">For more on this objection see Stephen Law, 'The X-Claim Argument Against Religious </span><span lang="EN-US">Belief', </span><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies"><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); border: 1pt none windowtext; color: #333333; padding: 0cm;">Religious Studies</span></a><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); color: #333333;"> <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">, </span></span><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/volume/A76CC67C3AA152E43EACC5085D3B5AD1"><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); border: 1pt none windowtext; color: #333333; padding: 0cm; text-decoration-line: none;">Volume 54</span></a><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); color: #333333;"> <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">, </span></span><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/issue/C868106555592F6426997A7CE2E2CCB6"><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); border: 1pt none windowtext; color: #333333; padding: 0cm; text-decoration-line: none;">Issue 1</span></a><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); color: #333333;"> <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">, March 2018</span> <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">, pp. 15 - 35</span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div id="ftn3"><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[3]</span></span></span></a> Stephen Law, 'The Evil God Challenge'. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies"><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); border: 1pt none windowtext; color: #333333; padding: 0cm;">Religious Studies</span></a><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); color: #333333;"> <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">, </span></span><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/volume/C21FE5D070059740B4FADECC0D657E75"><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); border: 1pt none windowtext; color: #333333; padding: 0cm; text-decoration-line: none;">Volume 46</span></a><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); color: #333333;"> <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">, </span></span><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/issue/C6B21417C2D8E327DDB6F9605ADBFE39"><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); border: 1pt none windowtext; color: #333333; padding: 0cm; text-decoration-line: none;">Issue 3</span></a><span style="background: rgb(243, 243, 243); color: #333333;"> <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">, September 2010</span> <span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0cm;">, pp. 353 - 373</span></span><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="font-family: Cambria, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div></div>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-3488141711980068182022-05-06T13:35:00.000+00:002022-05-06T13:35:07.559+00:00‘I’m not going to answer a hypothetical question…’<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-align: left;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhjWJs2jAiXAFXZgbt4U0zso8D6HF8aEs7kxmmfNsC90Y2oVAkdZB4YdmADnQ1Sl7S5G4YBssZbt2kM7XT6QHPUER55Vwd4EXRl8a58fPnYndYtOLbj-EkYqwz0TOyJdxUmNaJhSv1yc9IXAp-zEP8TrV2Az4xLRCi6db1EmwQsZ7gZ6CitwJynEU-S/s1452/Screenshot%202022-05-06%20at%2014.29.59.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="822" data-original-width="1452" height="181" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhjWJs2jAiXAFXZgbt4U0zso8D6HF8aEs7kxmmfNsC90Y2oVAkdZB4YdmADnQ1Sl7S5G4YBssZbt2kM7XT6QHPUER55Vwd4EXRl8a58fPnYndYtOLbj-EkYqwz0TOyJdxUmNaJhSv1yc9IXAp-zEP8TrV2Az4xLRCi6db1EmwQsZ7gZ6CitwJynEU-S/s320/Screenshot%202022-05-06%20at%2014.29.59.png" width="320" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div>Politicians are, of course, skilled at dodging questions. Here is one of the many tricks in their arsenal. They use it to get themselves off the hook in all sorts of tight spots. A typical example:</span></div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm; text-indent: 36pt;">Interviewer: Minister, what will you do if the strike goes ahead?<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm; text-indent: 36pt;">Minister: Well, you can’t expect me to answer a hypothetical question.<o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm;">A hypothetical question is a ‘What if…?’ question. Politicians regularly refuse to answer these sorts of questions on the grounds that they are only obliged to consider what is actually happening. Many people – including, surprisingly, even television and radio interviewers – seem to think it's fair enough if a politician is unwilling to answer a hypothetical question.<o:p></o:p></p><p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">But actually, the ‘no hypotheticals’ move is usually just a rhetorical trick. It's about time we stopped falling for it.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">After all,<i> it is part of the politician’s job to consider hypothetical questions</i>, questions such as: ‘What if the global economy takes a nose dive?’ and ‘What if interest rates rise?’</span></p><p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In fact politicians are often <i>very keen</i> to answer such questions – for example, they are more than happy to tell us what they will do if they win the election, even if it's rather unlikely they will win.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The mere fact that a question is hypothetical is, by itself, no good reason not to answer it.</span></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-16452165308352172642021-12-19T18:27:00.002+00:002021-12-19T18:27:33.528+00:00The Pandora's Box Objection to Skeptical Theism (Int. J.Phil Religion 2015)<p><i> (Prepublication draft of paper published in Int. J. Phil Religion (78) 2015)</i></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">THE PANDORA'S BOX OBJECTION TO SKEPTICAL THEISM<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">ABSTRACT: Skeptical
theism is a leading response to the evidential argument from evil against the
existence of God. Skeptical theists attempt to block the inference from the
existence of inscrutable evils (evil for which we can think of no
God-justifying reason) to gratuitous evils (evils for which there is no God
justifying reason) by insisting that given our cognitive limitations, it
wouldn't be surprising if there were God-justifying reasons we can't think of. A
well-known objection to skeptical theism is that it opens up a skeptical
Pandora’s box, generating implausibly wide-ranging forms of skepticism,
including skepticism about the external world and past. This paper looks at
several responses to this Pandora's box objection, including a popular response
devised by Beaudoin and Bergmann. I find that all of the examined responses
fail. It appears the Pandora's box objection to skeptical theism still stands.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">1. The skeptical theist response to the evidential argument from evil<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Skeptical theism is currently one
of the most popular<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
theistic responses to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">the evidential
argument from evil</i>, a typical version of which is outlined below.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Let an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">inscrutable evil</i> be an evil that (even after careful reflection) we
can think of no God-justifying reason for God, if he exists, to permit. And let
a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">gratuitous evil</i> be an evil there's
no God-justifying reason for God, if he exists, to permit. Then an evidential
argument from evil runs:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">(1) There are
inscrutable evils.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">(2) Therefore,
probably there are gratuitous evils.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">(3) God, if he
existed, would not permit gratuitous evils.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">(4) Therefore,
probably God does not exist.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Skeptical theists challenge the
inference from (1) to (2). They maintain our inability to think of a
God-justifying reason for an evil does not allow us reasonably to conclude there
probably is no such reason. Inferences of this form are often termed ‘noseeum’<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.
Noseeum inferences can be sound: the fact that I can’t see any elephants in my
garage allows me reasonably to conclude there are probably no elephants there.
However, I can’t reasonably conclude there are probably no insects in my garage
given only the fact that I can’t spot any (looking in from the street). Given
my perceptual limitations, there might still easily be insects present. The
skeptical theist maintains that, given our cognitive limitations, the inference
from (1) to (2) is similarly flawed. Michael Bergmann, a leading defender of
skeptical theism, puts the objection thus:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p><span></span></o:p></p><a name='more'></a> <p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 25.15pt; margin-top: 0cm;">The fact that
humans can’t think of any God-justifying reason for permitting and evil,
doesn’t make it likely that there are no such reasons; this is because if God
existed, God’s mind would be far greater than our minds so it wouldn’t be
surprising if God has reasons we weren’t able to think of. (2012: 11)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">According to Bergmann, the
skeptical theist’s skepticism (detached from their theism) includes as a main
ingredient endorsement of such skeptical theses as:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">ST1: We have no
good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are representative
of the possible goods there are.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">ST2: We have no
good reason for thinking the possible evils we know of are representative of
the possible evils there are.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">ST3: We have no
good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know of between
possible goods and the permission of possible evils are representative of the
entailment relations there are between possible goods and the permission of
possible evils.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 1.0cm;">ST4: We have no
good reason for thinking that the total moral value or disvalue we perceive in
certain complex states of affairs accurately reflects the total moral value or
disvalue they really have. (2012: 11-12)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Bergmann maintains that, given the
truth of ST1-ST4, we are simply in the dark about whether there exist
God-justifying reasons to permit the evils we observe. But then the evidential
argument from evil fails.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">2. The Pandora’s box objection to skeptical theism<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Skeptical theism has been
criticised on the grounds that it opens up a skeptical Pandora’s box,
generating forms of skepticism that are implausibly wide-ranging and strong. In
particular, it is argued that skeptical theism requires we also embrace <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">skepticism about the external world and the
past.</i><a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Why so? Well, how do we know God doesn’t have good reason to create a false
impression of an external world, or good reason to create the false impression
that the universe and myself are more than five minutes old? Skeptical theism
blocks any attempt to justify the belief that there are unlikely to be such
God-justifying reasons by means of a noseeum inference: ‘I can’t think of a
good reason why God would deceive me in that way, therefore there probably is
no such reason.’ But then skeptical theism would seem to have the consequence
that, for all I know, God does indeed have a good reason to deceive me in this
way and is deceiving me for that reason. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Wilks points out one of the more
outlandish skeptical consequences he supposes skeptical theism generates. He
imagines an ‘eccentric theist’ who claims God has created a sub-10,000 year old
Earth orbited by the sun, with pink elephants. When compelling scientific
evidence against these claims is pointed out to our eccentric theist, he
replies: ‘We cannot fathom God’s reasons. For all we know, God has good reason
to present us with misleading evidence against these claims, despite their
truth. But then I have been supplied with no good reason to suppose my claims
about a sun-orbited young earth with pink elephants are false.’ Wilks maintains
that if skeptical theists are to be consistent, they should accept the
reasonableness of this reply, and that if they do so, then<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 23.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 361.5pt;">theism
comes off looking less rational than it did before the defense… [O]ne might as
well spare the effort of dispute and simply pronounce belief in God to be
irrational. (2009: 76)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Call the suggestion that skeptical
theism leads to such absurd skeptical consequences concerning the external
world and past the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Pandora’s box
objection</i>. My first aim in this paper is to spell out why one of the leading
responses to this objection – a response made by, among others, Beaudoin and
Bergmann – fails. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">3. Bergmann and Beaudoin’s response to the Pandora’s box objection<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">In response to the Pandora’s box
objection, Bergmann appeals to what he calls <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">commonsensism</i>:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 25.15pt; margin-top: 0cm;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Commonsensism</i>: the view that (a) it is
clear that we know many of the most obvious things we take ourselves to know
(this includes the truth of simple perceptual, memory, introspective,
mathematical, logical, and moral beliefs) and that (b) we also know (if we
consider the question) that we are not in some skeptical scenario in which we
are radically deceived in these beliefs. (2012: 10)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Having defined commonsensism,
Bergmann asks us to consider Sally, a hypothetical agnostic who endorses
skeptical theses ST1-ST4 but who, given her commonsensism, can still know many
things via perception and memory:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 23.4pt; margin-top: 0cm;">Take for example
her knowledge that she has two hands. Given Sally’s commonsensism – in
particular, clause (b) – she knows, in addition to the fact that she has hands,
that’s she’s not a brain in a vat being deceived into thinking she has hands.
And similarly, she knows that if God exists, then God doesn't have an
all-things-considered good reason for making it seems that she has hands when
in fact she doesn’t. She knows this despite her endorsement of ST1-ST4… By
endorsing ST1-ST4, Sally is committing herself to the view that we don't know, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">just by reflecting on possible goods,
possible evils, the entailment relations between them, and their seeming value
or disvalue</i>, what God’s reasons might be. But it doesn't follow that we
have no way <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">at all </i>of knowing
anything about what reasons God might have for doing things… In general, for
all the things we commonsensically know to be true, we know that God, (if God
exists) didn't have an all-things-considered good reason to make them false
(2012: 15)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: JA;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: JA;">Beaudoin suggests a similar move in response to
the objection that skeptical theism entails skepticism about <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">s</b>, where <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">s</b> is the state of affairs in which God created an old-looking
universe just five minutes ago. This objection, counters Beaudoin, <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: JA;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 30.45pt; margin-top: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: JA;">presupposes that the
basis on which any skeptical theist believes God does not actualize <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">s</b> is an… inference from ‘I can’t see
what would justify God’s actualizing <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">s’</b>
to ‘probably there is no reason - probably God does not actualize <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">s</b>.’ <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">This</i>
basis for believing that <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">s</b> does not
obtain is unavailable to the skeptical theist… But the point is other… reasons…
might still be available to the skeptical theist… Consider an analogy. Suppose
I know nothing about Smith’s honesty, or lack thereof. For all I know, Smith is
an inveterate liar. Now I claim to believe something (P) Smith told me, but not
on the basis of Smith’s telling me; instead I’ve confirmed with my own eyes
that (P). Clearly in this case it wouldn’t do for someone to challenge the
rationality of my belief by pointing out that for all I know Smith is a liar;
my belief that (P) isn’t based on Smith’s testimony… Perhaps there is some
theologically neutral, telling philosophical argument for rejecting skepticism
about the past. If there is, then on this basis the skeptical theist can
conclude that God has no [morally sufficient reason] for actualizing <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">s</b>, since he has not actualized it.</span>
(2005: 44-<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: JA;">45)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 25.15pt; margin-top: 0cm;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">According to Bergmann and Beaudoin,
then, given there are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">other </i>ways of
knowing about the external world and the past (ways that don’t rely on any
noseeum inference regarding God’s reasons), skeptical theism constitutes no
threat to such knowledge. But then, granted the fact that the skeptical theist
does indeed possess knowledge of the external world and past, they can conclude
that God has not, for some unknown reason, radically deceived them about such
things.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Call this the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Bergmann/Beaudoin response </i>to the Pandora’s box objection. As I
explain below, the Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">4. Why the Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">In the terminology of epistemic
defeat, the reason why skeptical theism might appear to require we embrace
skepticism concerning the external world and past is that it appears to
generate an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">undercutting defeater</i> for
all our beliefs grounded in perceptual experience and memory. A stock
illustration of an undercutting defeater involves widgets on an assembly line.
Given the widgets appear perceptually to me be red, I am prima facie justified
in believing that they are red. However, if I'm subsequently informed by a
reliable person that the widgets are illuminated by a red light (to reveal
imperfections) that makes them appear red even if they are not, then, it’s
suggested, I come to possess an undercutting defeater for my original belief.
Why so? Well I now possess good grounds for thinking that the method by which I
acquired by original belief, is, in the circumstances in which I formed it,
unreliable and not to be trusted.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">But what, exactly, is defeated in
such cases? Typically, it's supposed that justification, and thus knowledge,
are defeated. On acquiring that new evidence about the red light, I can no
longer be said either to<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> justifiably believe</i>
or to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">know</i> that the widgets are red. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Now, it is controversial whether,
in such a case, justification and knowledge really are lost. Lasonen Aarnio
(2010) suggests that the intuition that knowledge is lost in such cases is
often misleading. The implications of Lasonen Aarnio’s view for the Pandora’s box
objection will be discussed towards the end of this paper. For argument's sake,
I shall accept for the time being that the widespread intuition that justification
and knowledge are lost in such cases is indeed correct.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Why suppose skeptical theism
generates a defeater for beliefs about the external world and past? Well, given
that it appears to me both that I ate toast for breakfast this morning and that
there is an orange on the table in front of me, perhaps I am prima facie
justified in believing I ate toast for breakfast and that there is an orange
before me. But if I now learn that, (i) God exists, and (ii) for all I know,
God has an all-things-considered good reason to deceive me about these things,
then, runs the objection, I can no longer justifiably believe I had toast for
breakfast or that there is an orange there. At the heart of the Pandora’s box
objection lies the thought that, just as learning about that red light
generates an undercutting defeater for the belief that the widgets are red, so
learning that (i) and (ii) generates an undercutting defeater for beliefs about
the external world and past.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Consider what appears to be an
analogous case. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Olly’s
orange. </i>Suppose<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i>I see what
appears to be an orange on the table in front of me. Let’s assume I'm thereby
prima facie justified, and indeed can be considered commonsensically to know,
that there’s an orange there. But suppose I then discover the following.
Someone – call him Olly – possesses a holographic projector capable of
producing entirely convincing-looking visual appearances onto the table in
front of me. Now suppose the probability that Olly is using his projector is
inscrutable to me. Suppose, for example, that I learn Olly has an urn of balls.
Prior to my observing the table, Olly selected a ball at random from this urn.
If the ball was black, Olly projected an entirely convincing-looking
holographic image of an orange onto the table. If Olly selected a non-black ball,
he placed a real orange on the table. I have no clue concerning what proportion
of balls in Olly’s urn are black. For all I know, all the balls are black, none
are black, 50% are black, etc. I can’t reasonably assign any probability to any
of these hypotheses. Thus I remain in the dark about whether Olly placed a real
orange, rather than a holographic image of an orange, on the table.<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><o:p></o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">On being informed by a generally reliable
source of this backstory to my experience, do I remain justified in believing
there is an orange on the table before me? Can I be said to know there’s an
orange there? Intuitively not<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.
Even if there’s a real orange before me, it appears I’m no longer justified in
believing this. For all I know, I'm observing a holographic image. The
backstory appears to provide me with an undercutting defeater for my belief
that there is a real orange on the table, notwithstanding the fact that I might
otherwise have been justified in believing, and indeed might otherwise have
been considered commonsensically to know, that there’s an orange present. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">But suppose I now attempt to defend
in the following manner (Beaudoin-and-Bergmann-style) my belief that there’s an
orange before me. Of course I don’t believe there’s an orange there because I
suppose it’s unlikely Olly picked a black ball from his urn. Rather, I have
some <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">other way of knowing</i> there’s an
orange there: in this case direct perceptual experience. Given there clearly
appears to be an orange present, I can <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">commonsensically</i>
consider myself to know there is an orange present. And, granted I <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">do</i> know there is an orange present, but
can know this only if Olly didn’t pick a black ball, I can conclude Olly didn’t
pick a black ball.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Clearly, the above argument fails.
It overlooks the fact that the backstory about Olly and his urn appears to
provide me with a defeater for my belief that there is an orange before me <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">despite the fact that my belief is grounded
in direct perceptual experience.</i> Beliefs that are prima facie justified and
that may be commonsensically considered known given such an experience can in
principle be defeated, and such a defeater is what the backstory about Olly and
the urn appears to generate.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">At the heart of the Pandora’s box
objection lies the thought that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">skeptical
theism provides us with an analogous backstory to our everyday perceptual
experiences.</i> Ordinarily, perhaps I'm prima facie justified in believing,
and indeed can be commonsensically considered to know, that there is an orange
before me given that is how things visually appear. But if I learn there is a
God who has complete control over my perceptual experiences, and that, for all
I know, this God has good reason both to generate a false impression of an
orange and indeed deceive me about the external world more generally, then this
discovery appears analogously to supply me with an undercutting defeater for my
belief that there is an orange on the table. If I can no longer be said to know
there’s an orange on the table given my discovery of the backstory about Olly
and the urn, how can I be said to know there’s an orange on the table given my
discovery of the truth of skeptical theism? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Bergmann and Beaudoin suppose that
to argue that skeptical theism provides grounds for withholding judgement about
the external world and the past is akin to arguing that the fact that I am in
the dark about whether Smith is an inveterate liar gives me grounds for
suspending judgement about the truth of Smith’s assertion that (P). Beaudoin
reminds us, correctly, that I might have <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">independent</i>
grounds for believing (P), and thus grounds for supposing Smith isn’t lying
about (P). Bergmann and Beaudoin suggest that, in the same way, I may have some
independent way of knowing about the external world and the past (i.e. some way
independent of inferring that God has no reason to deceive me given only that I
cannot think of such a reason). They then insist that, granted the fact that I
do have knowledge about the external world and past by this other route, I can
conclude that God has not, for some unknown reason, radically deceived me about
such things.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">As should now be clear, the analogy
Beaudoin tries to draw with the Smith case fails. What skeptical theism appears
to generate is not just a defeater for beliefs about the external world and
past based on a noseeum inference about God’s reasons, but a defeater for
beliefs about the external world and past grounded in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">other</i> potential methods of knowing too<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">, including perceptual experience and memory</i>. But then pointing out
that skeptical theists don’t attempt to justify their beliefs in the external
world and the past by means of such a noseeum fails to engage with the
objection raised. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Notice that for atheists who
embrace the skeptical part of skeptical theism, no such defeater need be generated.
The atheist who accepts ST1-4 is in a position analogous to someone who
justifiably believes that while there is indeed an urn containing some unknown
percentage of black balls, there’s no such person as Olly who generates a
deceptive perceptual appearance of an orange if the ball he draws at random
from that urn is black. Such an individual does not, on learning about the urn
and its mysterious contents, come to possess an undercutting defeater for their
belief that there is an orange before them given only that is how things
visually appear.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">So, while the Pandora’s Box
objection to skeptical theism might yet be successfully dealt with, the
Bergmann/Beaudoin response fails. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">5. Relevant disanalogies?<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">The skeptical theist may insist
there's some relevant difference between my situation in Olly’s orange and that
in which skeptical theists find themselves: a difference that explains why my
coming to believe the backstory in Olly’s orange generates a defeater for my
belief that there’s an orange before me, whereas coming to believe the truth of
skeptical theism does not. Perhaps there is such a difference: I won’t attempt
to deal here with every suggestion here that might be made, but I will look at
two more obvious suggestions and explain why both fail.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">First, consider the suggestion that
it is the role of a certain sort of probabilistic mechanism - pulling balls
from an urn at random in to determine whether or not to project a deceptive
image - that leads us to suppose a defeater is generated in Olly’s orange. But
then, as no such probabilistic mechanism is employed by God in determining
whether or not to give us deceptive experiences, the skeptical theist is not in
a relevantly similar situation.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">However, in Olly’s orange, the urn/ball
component of the backstory would seem to be inessential so far as the intuition
of defeat is concerned. What generates the intuition of defeat is the fact that
I’m in the dark about the probability of it being a real orange rather than a
deceptive image that Olly placed on the table. The urn/ball component is
included in the backstory to explain why I'm in the dark about that
probability, but that component is optional. No explanation of why I'm in the
dark about probability need be included. Alternatively, my being in the dark
about that probability might be explained by my being in the dark about the
probability that Olly has an all-things-considered good reason to place a
deceptive image rather than a real orange on the table (this would obviously make
Olly’s orange still more closely analogous to the skeptical theist’s position).
Either way, the story generates the same intuition of defeat.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">A second suggestion regarding a relevant
disanalogy between Olly’s orange and the skeptical theist’s situation is that
the skeptical theist may have good reason to suppose that God, if he exists, is
morally perfect, and that a morally perfect God will not deceive us even if he
has an all-things-considered good reason to do so. Thus the probability that we
are being deceived by God, if he exists, is not, as it is in Olly's case, inscrutable,
but low.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">But why suppose a morally perfect God
won’t deceive us? Descartes offers an argument for that claim in his Third
Meditation, where he says God ‘cannot be a deceiver, since it is a dictate of
the natural light that all fraud and deception spring from some defect’, and
God is without defect. But as Maitzen (2009) points out, while all fraud and
deception flow from some defective situation (a terrorist about to explode a
bomb who can only be thwarted by deception, for example) it does not follow that
‘fraud and deception are defective <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">responses</i>
to that situation’ (2009, 97). Maitzen here follows Hobbes who, in response to
Descartes, points out that it<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm;">… is the common
belief that no fault is committed by medical men who deceive sick people for
health’s sake, nor by parents who mislead their children for their good … M.
Descartes must therefore look to the this proposition, God can in no case
deceive us, taken universally, and see whether it is true… (Haldane and Ross
1967: 78)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Where an all-things-considered good
reason to deceive exists, our engaging in such deception does not require there
be any defect in us. So why would God’s engaging in such deception require
there be some defect in him?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Furthermore, those who consider the
New Testament a reliable source of information about God should note that it
contains passages suggesting God does indeed engage in deliberate deception.
For example, St. Paul describes God as sending some people ‘a powerful delusion,
leading them to believe what is false.’ (2<sup>nd</sup> Thessalonians 2:11). So
the thought that God is no deceiver appears Biblically challenged, too.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">To conclude this section: there may
be some relevant disanalogy between the skeptical theist’s position and mine in
Olly’s orange which explains why, though my belief is defeated in Olly’s orange,
the skeptical theist’s beliefs about the external world are not. However,
neither of above suggestions appear to succeed in identifying such a disanalogy.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">6. Externalism and defeat<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Finally, I want briefly to anticipate
some other responses to the Pandora’s box objection – responses grounded in
externalist thinking about knowledge and defeat.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Skeptical theism is usually
associated with externalist epistemologies on which whether or not a subject is
justified and/or warranted in believing that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i> is determined by factors that may lie beyond the awareness of
that subject - factors such as whether the belief was formed in a reliable way
and/or via properly functioning faculties. Externalists typically allow that a
subject’s beliefs may be justified/warranted even if they lack information
about whether such conditions are satisfied. Externalists may be right about
that.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">However, from the supposed fact
that you do not need information about the reliability of your faculties in
order to have knowledge or justified belief about the world, it does not follow
that the acquisition of such information cannot affect what you know or are
justified in believing about the world. Indeed, many externalists, Bergmann
included, allow that if a subject comes to possess information that their
belief was formed in an unreliable way, then their belief may be defeated<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i>(Bergmann 1997: 405-6).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Bergmann distinguishes three
doxastic attitudes towards a proposition <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i>:
believing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i>; disbelieving <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i> (believing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i> is false); and withholding <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i>
(refraining from either believing or disbelieving <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i>). (He also allows one can also take no doxastic attitude at all
towards a proposition (2005: 422).) Bergmann proposes that, where <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p*<sub><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">S</span></sub> </i>is the proposition that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">S</i>’s belief that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i> is
formed in a reliable way, then disbelieving or even just withholding on<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> p*<sub><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">S</span></sub> </i>supplies<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> S </i>with
a defeater for the belief that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p </i>(2005:
426).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Bergmann uses the following
modified widget example to illustrate how withholding on<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> p*<sub><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">S </span></sub></i>generates
a defeater for <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i>. Suppose Sally comes
to form the belief that the widgets are red based on how the widgets look to
her as they pass by on the conveyer belt. And suppose Sally has no idea whether
there is a red light shining on the widgets or even how likely it is that there
would be such a light shining on them. Bergmann continues:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 25.15pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 12.0cm;">Sally
now considers the higher-level proposition that her belief <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The widgets are red</i> is formed in a reliable way. Being completely
uncertain about whether that higher-level proposition is true, she resists
believing both it and its denial. In other words, if <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i> is the proposition <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The
widgets are red</i>, she withholds <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p*<sub>Sally</sub></i>.
Does this give her, in these circumstances, a defeater for her belief that the
widgets are red? I think it does. (2005: 426)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><o:p> </o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">So, on Bergmann’s view, a belief is
defeated if one either disbelieves, or even just<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> withholds judgement</i> on whether, the belief was formed in a
reliable way.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">The above principle would explain why,
in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Olly’s Orange</i>, my belief that
there is an orange on the table before me is defeated. On realizing I’m in the
dark about whether Olly picked a black ball from his urn (and so generated a
deceptive impression of an orange) I disbelieve, or at least withhold on
whether, my belief was formed in a reliable way. Thus my belief is defeated.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">So now consider Sarah, a skeptical
theist, who, as a result of her perceptual experience, believes there’s an
orange on the table before her. On Bergmann’s view, Sarah’s belief about the
orange is defeated if, as a result of her skeptical theism, she comes to
disbelieve, or even just withhold judgement on whether, her belief was formed
in a reliable way. Now I take it that at the heart of the Pandora’s box
objection lies something like the following thought. Given her skeptical
theism, Sarah really should suppose she is in the dark about whether God has an
all-things-considered good reason to deceive her about the orange. But then she
should disbelieve, or at least withhold, on whether her belief about the orange
was formed in a reliable way. So she should consider her belief defeated.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Now, in response, an externalist
like Bergmann may point out, correctly, that he is committed only to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">S</i>’s belief that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i> being defeated if <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">S</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in
fact</i> disbelieve or withhold on <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p*<sub><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">S</span></sub>. </i>Bergmann may<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i>insist that, so long as Sarah doesn’t
actually disbelieve or withhold judgment on whether her belief about the orange
before was formed in a reliable way, no defeater is generated. So let’s suppose
Sarah fails either to consider the matter of whether her belief about the
orange was reliably formed, or that, if she does consider it, she finds herself
unable to do anything other than believe it was reliably formed,
notwithstanding her skeptical theism. Then Sarah’s skeptical theism <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">fails to generate a defeater for her belief.</i>
And so, assuming the relevant externalist conditions for knowledge are met,
Sarah can still know there’s an orange present.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Does the above suggestion allow a
skeptical theist successfully to deal with the Pandora’s box objection? I don’t
see that it does. Let’s return to Olly’s orange for a moment. Suppose that,
having accepted the backstory about Olly and his urn, I nevertheless continue
to believe that my belief that there’s an orange on the table before me is
reliably formed. On Bergmann's characterisation of defeat, given that I too fail
to disbelieve or withhold on whether my belief was reliably formed, my belief
remains undefeated. So, given my belief is undefeated, can I reasonably take
myself to know there’s an orange present?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Intuitively not. True my belief
about the orange remains undefeated (given Bergmann’s characterisation). But,
given my acceptance of the backstory about Olly and his urn (that Olly has the
means to deceive me, did deceive me if he picked a black ball from his urn, and
I'm in the dark about whether he picked a black ball), surely I <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">should</i> consider my belief defeated. And
if I should consider it defeated, then I shouldn’t suppose I commonsensically
know it to be true. I <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">should</i> be
skeptical about that orange.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">But then similarly, if skeptical
theism has the consequence that Sarah should, on reflection, consider her
belief about the orange defeated, then she shouldn’t suppose she
commonsensically knows there’s an orange before her either. Sarah should be
skeptical about her orange. And, given his skeptical theism, Bergmann should be
skeptical about his.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Here’s a second suggestion as to
how their externalism might allow skeptical theists to deal with the Pandora’s
box objection. When introducing the notion of defeat above, I mentioned that we
might question the reliability of our intuitions with respect to widget and other
cases in which it’s usually supposed that an undercutting defeater has been
generated. Maria Lasonen Aarnio argues that externalists should take seriously
the suggestion that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">knowledge can be
retained even in the face of seemingly strong defeating evidence</i>.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Suppose, for example, that I judge
the widgets are red based on visual appearance. I then come to possess strong evidence
that there’s red lighting in play that makes non-red things look red. Suppose that,
despite my acquiring this new evidence, I nevertheless stick with my belief
that the widgets are red. And suppose that, as a matter of fact, the new
evidence is misleading - in fact there is no red lighting in play and the
widgets really are as they appear to be. Then, according to Lasonen Aarnio, I
may still <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">know</i> the widgets are red.
For it may be that the relevant externalist conditions on knowledge are
satisfied (so, for example, the method by which I arrive at my belief may still
be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">safe</i><a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">So why do we intuit that knowledge
is lost in such cases? Because, suggests Lasonen Aarnio, the policy of
continuing to believe, given the new evidence, is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">unreasonable</i>. But, suggests Lasonen Aarnio, it doesn't follow from
the fact that my continued belief is unreasonable that I don't know. This is an
example of what Lasonen Aarnio calls <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">unreasonable
knowledge</i>.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">In what sense is my continued
belief unreasonable? Lasonen Aarnio suggests <span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">reasonableness<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 23.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">is
at least largely a matter of managing one’s beliefs through the adoption of
policies that are generally knowledge conducive, thereby manifesting
dispositions to know and avoid false belief across a wide range of normal
cases. Subjects who stubbornly stick to their beliefs in the face of new
evidence manifest dispositions that are bad given the goal of knowledge or even
of true belief.’ ((2010) 2)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Consider, for example, the rule or method of
belief formation that tells you to believe that <i>p </i>when you <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">see</i> that <i>p </i><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">even<i> </i></span>in the presence of good
evidence for thinking that your senses are not to be trusted. This method is,
in a sense, good, in that if you follow it, beliefs obtained as a result will
be safe (for, given you can see that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i>
only if <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i> is true, the policy can't produce
a false belief).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">However, the above method is epistemically a
bad method to adopt, suggests Lasonen Aarnio, because adopting it results in a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">bad disposition</i>. Lasonen Aarnio notes
that a '<span style="color: black;">subject who adopts this method is also
disposed to believe <i>p </i>when she merely <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">seems</i> to see that <i>p </i>in the presence of evidence for thinking
that her senses are not to be trusted' (2010, 14 my italics). But then, if a
subject were to adopt the method, they would end up believing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">p</i> in a significant proportion of cases
in which the evidence that their senses are not to be trusted is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> misleading. So while the method is indeed
safe, its adoption results in dispositions that are not knowledge conducive:</span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 23.4pt; margin-top: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is why the rule <i>believe p
when you see that p in the presence of evidence for thinking that your senses
are not to be trusted </i>is not part of a policy that is knowledge conducive
in the intended sense. A reasonable subject would not adopt or follow such a
rule, even though it is success entailing. (2010, 15)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-right: -4.95pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: JA; mso-themecolor: text1;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-right: -4.95pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: JA; mso-themecolor: text1;">On Lasonen Aarnio's view, someone presented with
evidence that the method by which they acquired their original belief is
untrustworthy <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">should</i> withhold belief.
If they fail to withhold, they are being (in Lasonen Aarnio's sense)
unreasonable. They can be properly criticised for sticking with their original
belief. But that's not to say they don't know. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">So, if Lasonon Aarnio is right,
perhaps I might continue to know that there’s an orange on the table even after
I'm presented with the evidence about Olly and his holographic projector. If I
continue to believe there’s an orange there, and it so happens that Olly's
holographic projector is not deceptively employed (i.e. my belief is actually a
product of a safe method), I can still know there's on orange present. But then
can't the skeptical theist suggest that, for much the same reason, Sarah’s
skeptical theism fails to generate a defeater for her belief that there’s an
orange before her. Just so long as Sarah continues to believe there’s an orange
there, she might similarly continue to know (assuming the relevant externalist
conditions - e.g. safety conditions - on knowledge are met). <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Of course the Pandora’s box
objection is not so easily dealt with. Even on Lasonen Aarnio’s view, it
remains <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">unreasonable</i> for me to
believe that there’s an orange on the table given the new evidence concerning
Olly and his holographic projector. Whether or not my belief is defeated (it
may not be), and whether or not I know there's an orange before me (perhaps I do),
I <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">should</i> revise my belief about the
orange given the new evidence. It's unreasonable for me not to withhold belief,
not to become skeptical. But then, if the analogy drawn between Olly’s orange
and skeptical theist’s position is correct, it's similarly unreasonable for
Sarah to believe there’s an orange before her given her skeptical theism.
Whether or not Sarah knows there’s an orange present (and she might), her skeptical
theism should lead her to be skeptical about that orange. For, just as in
Olly's orange, she has reason to distrust the method by which she acquired her
belief.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Here’s a third and final suggestion
how externalism might allow skeptical theists to deal with the Pandora’s box
objection. As we have just seen, the proponent of the Pandora’s Box objection may
insist that, whether or not Sarah <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">knows</i>
there's an orange before her, her skeptical theism <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">should</i> lead her to be skeptical about that orange and indeed about the
external world more generally. An externalist may resist that conclusion by maintaining
that what one should or shouldn’t believe depends on ones cognitive design plan
(which specifies how ones cognitive faculties are supposed to work)<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>,
and it may be that God has designed our cognitive faculties in such a way that,
while local skepticism about the orange is appropriate in Olly’s orange, we
should never embrace global skepticism about the external world, not even if we
have been presented with logically impeccable arguments for being globally
skeptical (notice that, given we do indeed inhabit a world of the sort we seem
to see around us, this particular cognitive design plan may even be aimed at
truth). In Sarah’s case, unlike in Olly’s orange, it’s not just belief in the presence
of an orange that’s threatened by her skeptical theism, but all her beliefs
about the external world. But if Sarah’s cognitive design plan is such that no
argument, no matter how good, should ever lead her to embrace that sort of
skepticism, then her skeptical theism <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">shouldn’t</i>
lead her to embrace it. The proponent of the Pandora’s box objection is
mistaken in supposing otherwise.<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><o:p></o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">The above response muddles two varieties
of ‘should’. The proponent of the Pandora’s box objection insists that, given
her skeptical theism, Sarah should embrace skepticism about the external world,
in the sense that this is what logic dictates. Now Sarah’s cognitive design
plan may be such that she should never accept such a skeptical conclusion, irrespective
of the strength of any argument for it. But if the force of an argument is such
that, logically speaking, Sarah should be skeptical about the external world,
then, surely, under those circumstances, Sarah’s design plan requires that she
believe illogically. Sarah should, logically speaking, be skeptical,
irrespective of what her design plan dictates. But then, if the Pandora's box
objection is that Sarah <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">should</i>
embrace skepticism about the external world in the sense that this is what her
skeptical theism logically requires of her, then the above response clearly
fails to engage with that objection. It's that last italicised 'should' that
proponents of the Pandora's box objection are presumably insisting upon,
irrespective of what Sarah's cognitive design plan says she should do.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">In short, I do not yet see how the
resources provided by epistemic externalism allow a skeptical theist like Bergmann
to deal effectively with the Pandora’s box objection.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">7. Conclusion<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Bergmann attempts to deal with the
Pandora’s box objection to skeptical theism by appealing to commonsensism and
the thought that beliefs grounded in simple perceptual experience and memory
provide us with a secure basis from which we may then establish that God lacks
an all-things-considered good reason to deceive us about such things. I have
explained why, as it stands, that particular solution fails. I then examined a
number of other suggestions as to how the skeptical theist might deal with the
Pandora’s box objection - in particular, by appealing to (i) God’s moral
perfection, and/or (ii) externalist thinking about defeat. None of the examined
suggestions prove successful. It seems to me that, currently, there is no
satisfactory skeptical theist response to the Pandora's box objection.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><o:p> </o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">References<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Alston, W. (1991). The inductive argument from evil and the
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">(1996). Some (temporarily)
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">(2001). Skeptical theism and
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">(2005). </span>Defeaters and
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">(2006). <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Justification Without Awareness. </i>Oxford:
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">(2009). Skeptical
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Feldman, R. (2005). Respecting the
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Fitzpatrick, F. J. (1981). The onus of proof in arguments
about the problem of evil. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Religious
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoEndnoteText" style="line-height: 200%;">Gale, R. (1996). Some
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<p class="MsoEndnoteText" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Haldane, E, and Ross, G.R.T.
(trans.). (1967). <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Philosophical Works
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="Default" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Howard-Snyder, D. (ed.) (1996). <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Evidential Argument from Evil</i>. Indiana: Indiana University Free
Press.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">1996a.
Introduction to Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Lasonen
Aarnio, M. (2010). Unreasonable Knowledge. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Philosophical
Perspectives</i>, 24, 1-21.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Maitzen, S. (2009).
Skeptical theism and moral obligation. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">International
Journal of the Philosophy of Religion</i>, 65, 93-103.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">McBrayer, J. (2012). Are skeptical
theists really skeptics? Sometimes yes and sometimes no. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion</i>, 72, 3-16.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">McBrayer, J. and Swenson, P. (2012).
Skepticism and the argument from divine hiddenness. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Religious Studies</i>, 48, 129-150.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moore, G.E. 1(959). A defence of common sense. In his <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Philosophical Papers</i>. London: George
Allen and Unwin.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Plantinga, A. (1996). <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Epistemic
probability and evil</i>, in Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996), 69-96.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-fareast-language: JA;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Russell, B. (1996). Defenseless. In
Howard-Snyder (1996), 193-205.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Segal, A. (2011). Skeptical theism
and divine truths. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Religious Studies</i>,
47, 85-95.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">Van Inwagen, P. (1996). The problem
of evil, air, and silence. In Howard Snyder (ed.) (1996), 151-174.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Wilkes, I. (2009). Skeptical theism and empirical unfalsifiability. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Faith and Philosophy</i>, 26, 64-76.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Williamson, T. (2000). <i>Knowledge and its Limits</i> (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Wykstra, S. (1984). The Humean obstacle to evidential
arguments from suffering: on avoiding the evils of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>‘appearance’. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">International Journal for Philosophy of Religion</i>, 16, 73-93.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">(1996). Rowe's noseeum
arguments from evil. In Howard-Snyder (1996), 126-50.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><br clear="all" />
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Proponents of a
skeptical theist response to the evidential argument from evil include Alston
(1991, 1996), Bergmann (2001, 2009), Fitzpatrick (1981), Howard-Snyder (1996a),
McBrayer and Swenson (2012), Plantinga (1996), Segal (2011), van Inwagen
(1996), and Wykstra (1984, 1996).</span><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
After Wykstra (1996): ‘We don’t see ‘um so they probably ain’t there.’<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">See for example Russell
(1996), Gale (1996).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">As already noted, the accuracy
of such intuitions has been question. I address this worry towards the end of
this paper.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In fact, there’s a prima facie
case for saying, not just that Bergmann shouldn’t consider himself
commonsensically to know there an orange present, but also that he doesn’t know
there’s orange present. In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Justification
Without Awareness</i> (2006) Bergmann considers a case where he supposes a
subject, Jill, clearly should consider her belief defeated given her background
knowledge. Jill bets her brother that both their parents are out of town that
day given what she’s been told by a reputable source. Jill knows that if she
wins she gets $300 that will enable her to buy a bike. Jill and her brother now
see both parents walk in, yet Jill continues to believe she’ll be able to buy
that bike. Bergmann observes that Jill fails ‘to put two and two together’ in
the way she should. He concludes that while Jill’s belief is not defeated, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">neither is it known</i>. This is because, on
Bergmann’s view, Jill’s ‘defeater system is not functioning properly’ (2006:
171), this being another Bergmannian condition on knowledge. Someone like Jill <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">should</i>, in a case like this, ‘put two
and two together’.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The proponent of the Pandora’s box
objection will presumably point out that Bergmann’s own defeater system would
appear not to be functioning properly if Bergmann similarly fails to ‘put two
and two together’ and conclude that his perceptually grounded belief that
there’s an orange before him is defeated given his skeptical theism has the
consequence that he’s in the dark about whether God has an
all-things-considered good reason to deceive Bergmann about that orange. Our
critic will insist Bergmann should suppose his belief is defeated given his
acceptance of skeptical theism in just the same way that I should consider my
belief there’s an orange before me is defeated given I accept the backstory
about Olly and his urn. Bergmann may insist there is some relevant disanalogy
between his situation and mine in Olly’s Orange, but the onus is presumably now
on Bergmann to explain what the disanalogy is. There is at least a prima facie
case here for saying Bergmann does not know there’s an orange before him.
However, see my final comments re Lasonen Aarnio on defeat.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Safety conditions on knowledge are associated particularly with Williamson,
Sosa, and Pritchard. A simple example of a safety condition says <em><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">S</span></em><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"> knows <em>P </em>only if <em>S</em>
is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">safe from error</i>; that is, there
must be no risk that <em>S</em> believes falsely in a similar case. So, for
example, if Ted looks at a stopped clock when it happens to read the right
time, his belief is not safe, because his belief could easily have been false. For
an example of the safety view see Williamson (2000).</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Bergmann offers a 'proper
function' theory of justification in which cognitive design plans play a key
role. See Bergmann (2006 chpt. 5). Bergmann does not actually offer the
response to the Pandora's box objection that I sketch here. It's merely a
response of a sort that I anticipate Bergmann or other skeptical theists might
yet make.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<!--EndFragment-->Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-42493039273132919492021-07-08T12:05:00.008+00:002021-07-08T12:18:33.003+00:00How philosophy can help your business or organisation - two testimonials<p><span color="rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9)" face="-apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; font-size: 16px; white-space: pre-wrap;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHsYlpxHfFGOfYYqaFhAV2JZkTz9Q_YiPfumjk3TBaLMoQNizX5ZLnxo3ib1jRDFolWZXVtv7jrLvswN1QBso_0nR80ZSUu59qihrsX4Zvv0BdlBBm5NxSRw1VY9fZ3nmTqSQUeM9VYI0/s686/Screenshot+2021-07-08+at+13.03.41.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="318" data-original-width="686" height="185" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHsYlpxHfFGOfYYqaFhAV2JZkTz9Q_YiPfumjk3TBaLMoQNizX5ZLnxo3ib1jRDFolWZXVtv7jrLvswN1QBso_0nR80ZSUu59qihrsX4Zvv0BdlBBm5NxSRw1VY9fZ3nmTqSQUeM9VYI0/w400-h185/Screenshot+2021-07-08+at+13.03.41.png" width="400" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><span style="font-family: arial;">Can philosophy and critical thinking benefit your business or organisation? Yes!</span><p></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Here are two testimonials regarding work I've done recently for the Government of Malta and E.On Next:</span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><i><span style="font-family: arial;">Charles Deguara, Auditor General at National Audit Office (Malta):</span></i></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><i><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></i></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;">'In line with our policy of offering diverse professional development opportunities to our staff, Dr Stephen Law, a well renowned professor in philosophy in international circles , was invited recently by the National Audit Office to conduct a three hour webinar on critical thinking to all its employees...[T]his webinar made us even more aware of the beneficial effect of philosophy especially to facilitate our thinking and reasoning processes. Undoubtedly, as auditors this is extremely important in our work, particularly when it comes to collecting and evaluating audit evidence and eventually to the expression of professional judgement.</span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br style="box-sizing: inherit;" /></span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;">In actual fact, this webinar’s success exceeded all expectations, as clearly evidenced by the extremely positive results arising out of the course evaluation carried out after each training event. It is significant to note that 70% of respondents believe that the study of philosophy can benefit the auditing profession in a tangible manner.</span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The way in which Dr Law managed to convey certain philosophical concepts, in such a clear and understandable manner, to an audience which had never studied philosophy is indeed impressive. This is due mainly to his excellent and comprehensive knowledge of this subject as well as to his excellent communication skills and abilities; thus Dr Law managed very successfully to relate such philosophical concepts to real life situations and circumstances, which the audience found extremely interesting.'</span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><i><span style="font-family: arial;">Yonadav Yuval. Chief Information Officer, E.On Next:</span></i></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br style="box-sizing: inherit;" /></span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;">'Highly recommended. Stephen raised our awareness to topics that subtly and not-so-subtly affect us in the company every day. The content and the delivery were pitched just right and hit home with everybody that attended. It’s also a great way to bring together people from across the business to explore common themes.'</span></p><p style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); counter-reset: list-1 0 list-2 0 list-3 0 list-4 0 list-5 0 list-6 0 list-7 0 list-8 0 list-9 0; cursor: text; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br style="box-sizing: inherit;" /></span></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-69194076282482166382021-04-12T17:01:00.001+00:002021-04-12T17:01:08.082+00:00My book The Philosophy Gym: 25 Short Adventures in Thinking<p><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWim6YiXazY9pL7VUCN9c2q94y94Z2WtBf8hiv4DK2QHT72ia_Lz3eQVXMOxVHTltrY7XiaPJsm9wSMjuLxFnXUSsdnxCw9PNV2gwTyZ3k3Z0YDmyoPngqB7XH6UKXYzqgrdJ1BRvpn6M/s688/Screenshot+2021-04-12+at+17.59.10.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="688" data-original-width="454" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWim6YiXazY9pL7VUCN9c2q94y94Z2WtBf8hiv4DK2QHT72ia_Lz3eQVXMOxVHTltrY7XiaPJsm9wSMjuLxFnXUSsdnxCw9PNV2gwTyZ3k3Z0YDmyoPngqB7XH6UKXYzqgrdJ1BRvpn6M/s320/Screenshot+2021-04-12+at+17.59.10.png" /></a></div><br />My book The Philosophy Gym: 25 Short Adventures in Thinking! Philip Pullman called it 'a vivid, enlightening introduction to clear thinking.'<br style="background-color: white; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: inherit !important;" /><br style="background-color: white; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: inherit !important;" /><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">'Where did the universe come from? Is time travel possible? Are genetically designed babies morally acceptable? If you have ever asked yourself such questions, then you have already begun to think philosophically. This book is for those who want to take the next step.</span><br style="background-color: white; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: inherit !important;" /><br style="background-color: white; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: inherit !important;" /><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">Teachers - LOTS of stuff in here relevant to the IB Theory of Knowledge, as well as A Level Religious Studies (God, personal identity, meta-ethics, etc.). Includes essays, dialogues. Sometimes irreverent!</span><p></p><p><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">On amazon.co.uk <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Philosophy-Gym-Short-Adventures-Thinking/dp/0747232717/ref=sr_1_7?dchild=1&qid=1618236063&refinements=p_27%3AStephen%20Law&s=books&sr=1-7&text=Stephen%20Law&fbclid=IwAR1ZnnytP6dFN3zrQN2S9Xrr1hecndnrXgvW4VfoFcuk3WLTZpMfqOBOf8s" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></p><p><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.9); font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Fira Sans", Ubuntu, Oxygen, "Oxygen Sans", Cantarell, "Droid Sans", "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Lucida Grande", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">On amazon.com <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Gym-Short-Adventures-Thinking/dp/0312314523" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-30303468413432863892021-03-23T11:56:00.029+00:002021-03-24T08:22:33.956+00:00Why do the British public support moderately left-wing policies, but fail to vote Labour?<p><span style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 12px;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwyyk7Ckt3taenxZuykScgmHXngCb9I6P0vZkECt6hReAZ4KL1Bg4qRNtRvWvlAVVfTDGwcDJz0Yjvzn0jziCXt5QBEQmVi5Jd68Im2CZnkF15r1N1UjjMkfg6FP4FEnr2MXc-lGuLIJk/s1142/Screenshot+2021-03-23+at+11.49.03.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="620" data-original-width="1142" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwyyk7Ckt3taenxZuykScgmHXngCb9I6P0vZkECt6hReAZ4KL1Bg4qRNtRvWvlAVVfTDGwcDJz0Yjvzn0jziCXt5QBEQmVi5Jd68Im2CZnkF15r1N1UjjMkfg6FP4FEnr2MXc-lGuLIJk/s320/Screenshot+2021-03-23+at+11.49.03.png" width="320" /></a></span></div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /><span>Centrists, like Blair, who argue Labour must return to centrist policies to have any chance of winning again, have a problem with <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/11/12/labour-economic-policies-are-popular-so-why-arent-" target="_blank">polling</a> that shows moderately left-leaning Corbyn-style policies (e.g. free university tuition, free childcare, nationalised rail, higher taxes on wealthiest, etc.) were and still are popular.</span></span><p></p><p><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Centrists need to explain that polling away.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Of course, they respond by saying ‘But Labour lost in 2017 and 2019! So the policies can’t be popular, can they?’ In addition, <a href="https://twitter.com/modernuklabour/status/1373995802159353867" target="_blank">Tony Blair is now adding this</a>:</span></p><ol class="ol1"><li class="li1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">‘In a 3 sec conversation people say they support rail nationalisation, say, but after a 30 sec or 3 minute conversation they’re much less keen.’ An obvious problem with this reply is that, while it explains why people <i>would</i><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>drop support for such policies given longer exposure to centrist counter-arguments (assuming that’s true, which I doubt), it obviously doesn’t explain why, when the public <i>haven’t</i> dropped support for such policies (which they haven't), they still fail to vote Labour.</span></li><li class="li1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">‘Leftist policies may be <i>individually</i> popular but they’re not necessarily <i>collectively</i> popular.’ The problem with this response is while it <i>could</i> be true (just as it <i>could</i> be true that Tony Blair is working for the CIA), there’s no actual evidence it’s true, and on the face of it it’s pretty implausible: 'Yes I like rail nationalisation, free university education, free child care, and more tax on the wealthiest as <i>individual</i> policies, but I wouldn't want to see <i>all four</i> introduced - definitely not!'. </span><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Blair is here offering a classic example of an ‘ad hoc’ response to evidence against a hypothesis, a bit like a kid explaining away the evidence he didn’t do his homework by saying squirrels ate it. Repeated appeal to this sort of ‘explaining away’ strategy is a sign of cult-think,<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BCalVkNO5MU" target="_blank"> as I explain elsewhere</a>.</span></li></ol><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Supporters of moderately left-wing Corbyn-style policies, on the other hand, can much more plausibly explain why public enthusiasm for left policies didn't translate into winning. The MSM coverage of the actual policies was largely non-existent, so people were often unaware that they were Labour policies, as <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7lsRbDKOXg&t=1s" target="_blank">this video</a> shows.</span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" class="BLOG_video_class" height="266" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/W7lsRbDKOXg" width="320" youtube-src-id="W7lsRbDKOXg"></iframe></span></div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /><span><br /></span></span><p></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><span>Media coverage instead focused on character assassination (antisemite, terrorist sympathiser, etc.) and fostering a perception of the Labour left as extremists, thugs, trots, bigots, etc. This was in large part down to the work of centrists inside and outside the Party, </span><i>including Tony Blair himself</i><span>, feeding the MSM that line on a daily basis.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">There <i>is</i> good evidence that the public largely didn’t know what Labour’s policies were, but just thought Labour must be extreme, Stalinist, etc. because, after all,<i> that's what Tony Blair and the centrists were telling them.</i></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><i><br /></i></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq6UHwFDZeYq9A7Q-s0ttZNmt3o99N2fzd6WrLH4b7WE-GJZmMvjIPYMSIQdRu7ggZABsmg5dR3UfHyacZBCzA72M6Gw5hg_tqtV2ANr8ybswZQy63TTH4ykfMasUsTrrluiKwf8VxWa4/s1880/Screenshot+2021-03-23+at+12.22.12.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="820" data-original-width="1880" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq6UHwFDZeYq9A7Q-s0ttZNmt3o99N2fzd6WrLH4b7WE-GJZmMvjIPYMSIQdRu7ggZABsmg5dR3UfHyacZBCzA72M6Gw5hg_tqtV2ANr8ybswZQy63TTH4ykfMasUsTrrluiKwf8VxWa4/s320/Screenshot+2021-03-23+at+12.22.12.png" width="320" /></a></span></div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /><i><br /></i></span><p></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">So, despite the manouevering from Blair, the evidence clearly supports the lefts’ diagnosis more than it does the centrists'.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Still, centrists and those on the right (Tim Montgomerie <a href="https://twitter.com/montie/status/1374258168881164289" target="_blank">has already done so</a>) will seize on Blair's not-terribly-plausible attempt to explain away the polling evidence that the public are actually rather more left-wing than he is, because it allows them to retain their beliefs in the teeth of evidence to the contrary.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Blair's whole interview is <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/former-prime-minister-calls-for-partys-renewal-on-visit-to-kings" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Incidentally, Blair's suggestion that these two points explain why Thatcher was popular despite e.g. privatisation and tax cuts for the wealthiest not being popular policies is implausible. Blair is actually suggesting that 1. people didn't like Thatcherite policies individually but did <i>collectively, </i>and 2. did like them after a 3 minute conversation because Thatcher was, er, actually <i>right</i> according to Blair.</span></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-21397384499437669822021-02-11T11:49:00.001+00:002021-02-11T11:49:10.119+00:00'That May Be True For You, But It's Not True For Me' - Relativism Explained<p><em></em></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkHn8nNnx2DZOh1EH1OeVatGUTLkUpmsopSK-6wjAnY1aF68tOLBtHfn1DCPRBeyk3LLyhTcnH_o0G1fiZ6lAM5BycuH9-1ia-XUp2TJHtpSnadqbqZoY55jkiNbr50074dlOYjsCxRak/s566/Screenshot+2021-02-11+at+11.48.09.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="566" data-original-width="466" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkHn8nNnx2DZOh1EH1OeVatGUTLkUpmsopSK-6wjAnY1aF68tOLBtHfn1DCPRBeyk3LLyhTcnH_o0G1fiZ6lAM5BycuH9-1ia-XUp2TJHtpSnadqbqZoY55jkiNbr50074dlOYjsCxRak/s320/Screenshot+2021-02-11+at+11.48.09.png" /></a></em></div><em><br />According to the relativist, people who speak simply of what’s
‘true’ are naïve. ‘Whose truth?’ asks the relativist. ‘No claim is ever
true, period. What’s true is always true for someone. It’s true relative
to a particular person or culture. There’s no such thing as the
absolute truth on any issue. </em><p></p>
<p><em>This sort of relativism is certainly popular. For example, many
claim that we ought never to condemn cultures with different moral
points of view to our own. Differing moral perspectives are all equally
valid. Similarly, some claim that while astrology and Feng Shui might be
‘false’ from a Western, scientific viewpoint, they are ‘true’ when
viewed from alternative, New Age perspectives. What’s ‘true’ ultimately
comes down to ones point of view. </em></p>
<p>This is a chapter adapted from my book <em>The Philosophy Gym</em>.</p>
<h3>Introduction</h3>
<p>Let’s begin with a couple of illustrations of how appeals to relativism can creep into everyday conversation.</p>
<h4><em>1. Olaf’s condemnation of female circumcision</em></h4>
<p>OLAF: Female circumcision is wrong.</p>
<p>MRS BARBERY: Why?</p>
<p>OLAF: It dramatically reduces the possibility of a woman enjoying a
full sex-life. It has a major impact – a largely negative impact – on
her existence. And it’s forced on young girls. It’s obviously <em>true</em> that compelling children to undergo such life-blighting surgery is morally abhorrent.</p>
<p>MRS BARBERY: You speak of what’s ‘true’. But whose ‘truth’ are we
talking about here? You’re judging another culture by your own Western
standards. But those Sudanese people who practise female circumcision
have their <em>own</em> moral standards. What’s ‘true’ for you is actually ‘false’ for them.</p>
<p>OLAF: You believe there’s no objective, independent fact of the matter about whether female circumcision is <em>really</em> wrong. Moral ‘truth’ is always relative to a particular culture?</p>
<p>MRS BARBERY: Exactly. So it’s wrong of you to judge.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><em>2. Mystic Madge’s defence of astrology</em></p>
<p>MYSTIC MADGE: Do you want an astrological reading?</p>
<p>FOX: Definitely not.</p>
<p>MYSTIC MADGE: You’re hostile. I can tell from your aura.</p>
<p>FOX. There are no such things as auras. Aura reading, astrology, psychic powers, tarot cards – it’s all bunk.</p>
<p>MYSTIC MADGE: Why do you say that?</p>
<p>FOX: Because when these things are investigated scientifically, it
turns out there’s hardly a shred evidence to support them. In fact
almost all the evidence points the other way.</p>
<p>MYSTIC MADGE: I see the problem. You’re applying a particular form of
reasoning – Western scientific and logical reasoning, to New Age
systems of belief. In fact, judged by their own <em>internal</em> standards of rationality, astrology and these other belief systems come out looking very sensible indeed!</p>
<p>FOX: But these other ways of thinking are unrigorous and flabby.</p>
<p>MYSTIC MADGE: No, they’re not. They’re just <em>different</em>,
that’s all. We need to throw off the straightjacket of traditional
Western thinking and open ourselves up to other modes of thought!</p>
<p>FOX: You believe these ‘alternative’ ways of thinking are equally valid?</p>
<p>MYSTIC MADGE: Yes I do. Each produces its<em> own kind of truth</em>.
From your Western, analytical, science-based perspective, the claim
that astrology works is false. But from the perspective of an astrologer
the claim is true. In fact, <em>what’s false for you is true for me</em>. You shouldn’t arrogantly assume that your truth is the only truth.</p>
<p>FOX: There is no single, objective ‘truth’?</p>
<p>MYSTIC MADGE: I see your chakras are finally opening.</p>
<h4>Interesting vs. boring relativism</h4>
<p>In both of the above examples it’s suggested that<em> a claim that is true for one person or culture can be false for another</em>. I call this highly controversial form of relativism<em>interesting relativism</em>. Interesting relativism shouldn’t be muddled up with <em>boring relativism</em>.</p>
<p>Here’s an example of boring relativism. Suppose we both say, ‘I like
sausages’. Despite the fact that we utter the same sentence, it may be
that what I say is true and what you say is false.</p>
<p>[ILLUSTRATE: TWO PEOPLE SAYING I LIKE SAUSAGES, LABELLED TRUE FALSE]</p>
<p>Isn’t this a form of relativism about truth?</p>
<p>Yes, in a sense. But it’s relativism of a very dull and yawn-inducing
sort. We can all agree that truth is ‘relative’ in the sense that one
and the same <em>sentence</em> can be true as uttered by one person and false as uttered by another.</p>
<p>How does interesting relativism differ? Interesting relativism is the view that not just the <em>same sentence</em> but the very <em>same claim</em> can be true for one person or culture and yet false for another.</p>
<p>Notice that you and I make <em>different claims</em> when we say, ‘I
like sausages’. I make a claim, which, if true, is made true by a fact
about me. Your claim, if true, is made true by a fact about you. That’s
why the possibility that I might speak truly and you falsely is
unsurprising.</p>
<p>Here’s a way of bringing out the difference between interesting and
boring relativism. Truths that are relative in the boring sense don’t
conflict. For example, the person who claims she likes sausages and the
person who claims she doesn’t don’t disagree. Both can happily accept
that one of them likes sausages and the other doesn’t.</p>
<p>Truths that are relative in the interesting sense, on the other hand,
are incompatible. Olaf and a defender of female circumcision <em>really</em> <em>do disagree</em>
about what’s morally acceptable. Interesting relativism accepts that
they disagree, but nevertheless insists that the claim that female
circumcision is wrong is true for Olaf and false for his opponents.</p>
<p>We are going to look at the issue of whether some or even all truths
might be relative in the interesting sense. From now on when I use the
term ‘relativism’ I’ll just be talking about the interesting variety.</p>
<h4>Is all truth relative? – Plato’s objection</h4>
<p>Relativism has a long history. For example, the Ancient Greek Protagoras (<em>c</em>.490-c.421 BC) is portrayed in Plato’s (<em>c</em>.428-347 BC) dialogue <em>Theatetus</em>
as a relativist. Protagoras declares that ‘man is the measure of all
things’ and so each person’s opinion can be considered equally ‘true’.</p>
<p>Those who believe that all truth is relative face a famous and
powerful objection that also traces right back to Plato. The objection
is as follows.</p>
<p>Think for a moment about the claim that all truth is relative. Is
this claim supposed to be itself only relatively true? Or is it an
absolute, non-relative truth?</p>
<p>Clearly, to claim that it’s non-relatively true that all truth is
relative would be to contradict oneself. So a relativist like Protagoras
must say that the truth that truth is relative is itself only a
relative truth. But as Plato points out,</p>
<p>Protagoras …is surely conceding that the opinion of those who make
opposing judgements about his own opinion – that is, their opinion that
it is false – is true.<a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/that_may_be_true_for_you_but_its_not_true_for_me/#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title="_ednref1"></a></p>
<p>Protagoras must concede that if we take the view that truth is really absolute and relativism is false, then we’re right.</p>
<h3>Moral relativism</h3>
<p>But relativism isn’t quite so easily dealt with. One way in which a relativist can side-step Plato’s<br />
objection to Protagoras’ relativism is to concede that not all truths
are relative but still insist that some are. Then they can maintain that
the truth that some truths are relative is one of the non-relative
truths.</p>
<p>If not all truths are relative but some are, then that raises the
question: which truths relative? One of the most popular forms of
relativism is with respect to moral truth.</p>
<p>Here is a common line of argument.</p>
<p><em>Historically, Western societies have tended to impose their own
moral perspective on others. We have often arrogantly presumed the right
to coerce others into adopting and conforming to our own views about
right and wrong. We have assumed that we must be correct and everyone
else incorrect. </em></p>
<p><em>More recently, however, we have begun to question our own moral
supremacy. We have become increasingly aware not only that our own moral
perspective is just one among many, but also that it is itself in a
state of flux. We have also discovered that there can be much to learn
spiritually and morally from other cultures. </em></p>
<p><em>But if this is true, then must we not at least accept relativism
about moral truth? We might happen morally to disapprove of, say,
polygamy. Other cultures happen to approve. For us, the claim ‘Polygamy
is wrong’ is true. For others, it is false. And surely there’s no
independent ‘fact of the matter’ about whether it is right or wrong
really. Moral truth is relative. That’s precisely </em>why<em> it would be wrong for us arrogantly to impose our own particular moral point of view about polygamy on these other cultures.</em></p>
<p>Undoubtedly, it can be tempting to appeal to relativism –
particularly moral relativism – in order to encourage people to be more
tolerant of and sensitive towards other cultures. Relativists often
present themselves as the defenders of open-mindedness and freedom.
Those who oppose relativism are somtimes portrayed as arrogant, as
believing themselves incapable of error, and as fascistically wishing to
impose their own brand of ‘absolute’ truth on everyone else.</p>
<p>The above argument for relativism about moral truth has a certain superficial appeal. But it’s fatally flawed.</p>
<p>Certainly, we should in many cases respect those whose opinions on
moral issues differ from our own. We should also acknowledge that we’re
fallible. We shouldn’t just take it for granted that we’re correct. Nor
should we assume that we have nothing to learn from others. Certainly,
simply to coerce others into adopting the same moral attitudes as
ourselves is usually a mistake.</p>
<p>But the fact is that tolerance, sensitivity and open-mindedness are
not the unique preserve of the relativist. To respect and tolerate
someone else’s point of view is not to say that it is correct. I respect
and tolerate those who believe in an afterlife, though I don’t agree
with them.</p>
<p>Certainly, to commit yourself to the existence of non-relative truth
is not to commit yourself to the view that that you are incapable of
error. You can acknowledge that truth is non-relative while also
acknowledging that your ability to discover what’s true may be quite
limited.</p>
<p>Nor is to believe that truth is absolute to believe that you have
unique or privileged access to it. Those who reject relativism may well
believe that there is a great deal to learn from others, and also that
others may be in a position to correct your own mistakes.</p>
<p>So, contrary to what some relativists suggest, those who reject
relativism need not be arrogant, jackbooted bullies intent on ramming
their beliefs down everyone else’s throat.</p>
<p>Indeed, it’s ironic that, actually, only those who reject relativism
are free to consider tolerance and open-mindedness universally
applicable virtues. The relativist must accept that, for, say, religious
zealots who believe tolerance is a bad thing, it is a bad thing. They
must say, ‘If these zealots think tolerance should be suppressed and
that those who oppose them should be hunted down like dogs, then, hey,
that’s true for them. Who are we to judge?’ It is only those who reject
relativism that can consistently condemn such intolerance.</p>
<p>In fact, are any of us really prepared to accept that all moral truth
is relative? I rather doubt it. Take slavery, for example. Even the
most relativistically-inclined among us will surely agree that slavery
is wrong period, and not merely wrong-for-us. The same goes for
genocide. Surely not even Mrs Barbery (who supposes that female
circumcision is wrong-for-us but right-for-the-so-and-sos) believes that
(to pick a clichéd example) the Holocaust was wrong-for-us but
right-for-the-Nazis.</p>
<p>Interestingly, most of those who preach relativism tend not to apply
their relativism consistently. Those who would defend the seemingly
barbaric practices of, say, some remote forest culture by saying ‘Who
are we to judge?’ are often first in line to condemn the corporate
culture that chops down the same forest and barbeque its inhabitants.</p>
<p><strong>‘You shouldn’t morally condemn the morality of others’</strong></p>
<p>Most moral relativists face a further difficulty. A variant of
Plato’s argument comes back to haunt them. For most moral relativists
take the view that we are wrong to judge those who take a different
moral stance. For example, we saw that, on Mrs Barbery’s view, it’s
wrong of Olaf to condemn those Sudanese who believe that female
circumcision is morally acceptable.</p>
<p>This sort of relativistically-inspired condemnation is, again, quite popular. But it’s also seriously confused. For <em>the condemnation is actually self-condemning.</em></p>
<p>A person who morally condemns someone for morally condemning the
morality of others is a hypocrite. For they are doing precisely what
they insist one shouldn’t: they are morally condemning someone for
morally condemning the morality of others.</p>
<p>Mrs Barbery made precisely this mistake when she condemned Olaf.
Those who point the finger at, say, Westerners outraged by the practices
of some remote tribe and say ‘It’s wrong of you to judge!’ are also
being downright hypocritical.</p>
<h3>Rejecting the ‘tyranny’ of traditional logical and scientific reasoning</h3>
<p>We’ve seen that moral relativism, at least as it’s usually
formulated, is both pretty unpalatable and typically self-condemning.
Let’s now set moral relativism aside and consider whether there might be
other areas for which relativism is more plausible.</p>
<p>We saw at the beginning of this chapter that Mystic Madge defends
astrology by insisting that, while astrology may not look particularly
reasonable from a purely logical, scientific perspective, alternative
belief systems such as astrology have their own internal standards of
rationality, standards against which astrology comes out looking very
sensible indeed. Yes, certain scientific claims might seem to force
themselves upon us if we adopt the standards internal to traditional
scientific practice. But there are other, no less valid forms of
reasoning. We need to be more open minded. We should reject the tyranny
of traditional logical and scientific thinking and immerse ourselves in
these ‘alternative’ modes of thought.</p>
<p>On Mystic Madge’s view, the ‘truths’ that Western scientific
reasoning reveals are relative. What may be true from a purely
scientific perspective may be false when viewed from another.
Unfortunately, the arrogance of scientists tends to blind them to the
possibility of these alternative perspectives.</p>
<p>Is Mystic Madge’s defence of astrology cogent? When we try to justify
reasoning in the way we do, we run into a notorious problem that might
seem to lend Madge’s relativistic views a degree of credibility.</p>
<p>Suppose I use traditional logical and scientific reas<br />
oning. And suppose I want to justify my use of this form of reasoning. I
want to make a case for claiming that my way of reasoning is
objectively the right way to reason. How do I do this?</p>
<p>You can immediately see I face a problem. For of course I will <em>need to</em> <em>employ reasoning</em>
to provide my justification. But if the form of reasoning I use in
trying to provide my justification is traditional logical or scientific
reasoning, then won’t my justification be unacceptably circular?</p>
<p>Yes, it seems it will. Here’s an analogous case. Suppose Dave always
trusts what Mystic Madge tells him. Dave believes that appealing to
Mystic Madge is a reliable method of finding out the truth about
anything. How might Dave justify his trust in Mystic Madge?</p>
<p>Clearly, it won’t do for Dave to justify this trust by appealing to
what Mystic Madge has to say about her own reliability. That would be an
unacceptably circular justification.</p>
<p>The trouble is, my use of traditional reasoning to justify
traditional reasoning seems no less unacceptably circular. A similar
circularity would appear to plague any attempt to use a form of reason
to justify itself. Of course, I could try to justify one particular form
of reasoning <em>A</em> by appealing to another, different form of reasoning <em>B</em>. But then <em>B</em> would itself stand in need of justification. So I would merely have postponed the problem.</p>
<p>It seems, then, that <em>no form of reason can be justified</em>. The most we can say is: ‘This is how we <em>do</em> reason, how it <em>strikes us</em>that we should reason. But we can’t <em>justify</em>our reasoning in this way’.</p>
<p>Many of those who defend relativism will derive comfort from this
conclusion. ‘You see?’ they’ll say. ‘There’s no rational reason to
prefer one self-justified form of reason over another.’ But while there
clearly is a problem about justifying one particular form of reasoning
as objectively the ‘correct’ form, we should remember that, even if no
form of reasoning can ultimately be justified, it doesn’t follow than
none <em>is</em> objectively ‘correct’. We have not established that relativism about reason is true.</p>
<h3>The collapse of the case for relativism about reason</h3>
<p>In fact, those relativists who want rationally to convince us that
there’s no objectively and universally valid form of reasoning
themselves face a serious problem. For they are offering us an argument,
an argument that makes use of certain principles of reasoning. And they
believe we ought to agree with their conclusion. But <em>why do they believe we ought to agree if they do not believe that the reasoning to which they appeal has universal validity?</em>
After all, if they’re right, then their reasoning may be valid for
them, but not valid for us. Doesn’t the fact that such relativists
believe we <em>ought</em>to agree with their conclusion – they believe we should recognise that they have a <em>good</em>argument
– show that their attitude towards their own reasoning is actually that
it does have objective and universal validity? Yet this is precisely
what relativists about reason deny.</p>
<p>So the relativist’s case for why we ought rationally to accept their position also collapses.</p>
<h3>Conceptual relativism</h3>
<p>Here’s a rather different route into relativism. One of the most
popular relativist arguments starts with the observation that there are
many possible <em> conceptual schemes.</em></p>
<p>When I look at what’s on top of my desk, I see the large object
situated directly before as a computer. But not everyone would see
things this way. For example, a jungle inhabitant unfamiliar with such
technology and lacking the concept <em>computer</em> might simply see the object as a large, grey rectangular box.</p>
<p>Were I to enter the jungle, I might be able to make out only an
undifferentiated mass of leaves, whereas a native would no doubt order
what she saw in a much more sophisticated way, probably discriminating
between leaves of many different species.</p>
<p>In short, the jungle inhabitant and I operate with <em>different systems of concepts</em> and that, in a sense, changes what we ‘see’. Here’s another example. Take a look at the objects on this tabletop.</p>
<p>ILLUSTRATE: TABLE WITH GOLDFISH BOWL (WITH ONE FISH) AND PEN (WITH CAP ATTACHED).</p>
<p>How many objects are there? Clearly, that rather depends on what one
counts as an ‘object’. Is the pen one object or two (the pen body plus
the cap)? Is the goldfish bowl a single object, or does it comprise
three objects: the goldfish, the bowl, and a quantity of water?
Obviously people will give different answers to the question, ‘How many
objects are there?’ depending on how they carve the world up into
‘objects’. And there are innumerable ways of doing that.</p>
<p>But now suppose someone were to ask, ‘Yes, I know that one can carve
the world up in many different ways, so that from one person’s
perspective there are, say, three objects on the table and yet from
another person’s perspective only two. But how many objects are there in
fact? Which of these perspectives is actually correct? Which
perspective reveals things as they <em>really</em> are?’</p>
<p>How should we respond to this question? You might well think the
question involves a mistake. Surely there is no singly ‘correct’ way of
conceptually carving the world up into ‘objects’.</p>
<p>Indeed, isn’t it confused to talk of ‘how things <em>really</em> are’? What the questioner tries to help herself to is a conception of the world <em>as it is</em> <em>anyway</em>, independently of<em>any</em>
particular way of conceiving of it. It’s as if the questioner is trying
to take a step back, with the world on one side and our differing ways
of conceiving of it on the other, so she can ask, ‘Which of these
differing conceptions captures the world as it <em>really </em>is,
intrinsically?’ But is such a conceptual vantage point really available?
Many philosophers argue that it is not, for the questioner is now
trying to<em> conceive of the world as it is unconceived</em>, and that is the one thing one <em>can’t</em> conceive. So the question about which conceptual scheme is ‘correct’ itself involves a conceptually confusion.</p>
<p>But if there’s no uniquely ‘correct’ conceptual scheme, and if what’s
true and what’s false differs from one scheme to the next, then it
seems that truth is relative after all. Perhaps for me, given my way of
conceptually carving things up, there are exactly three objects on the
table. For you there may only be two. And there’s no fact of the matter
as to which of us is ‘correct’. All these ‘truths’ are relative.</p>
<p>Indeed, there’s a sense in which, according to conceptual relativism,
by bringing our concepts to bear, we are actively involved in ‘making
our world’. So cultures with radically different conceptual schemes
inhabit different universes. It’s hardly surprising, then, that what’s
true within one of these universes may be false within another.</p>
<h3>Is ‘conceptual relativism’ boring relativism?</h3>
<p>The kind of conceptual relativism outlined illustrated by my tabletop example does appear quite plausible. It also <em>seems</em> to require that truth be relative. But on closer examination, the situation is not so clear cut.</p>
<p>I said at the start of this chapter that the <em>interesting</em> kind of relativism about truth is the relativism that requires that, where two people or communities are considering <em>the very same claim</em>,
that claim may be true for one person or community and false for
another. The two individuals or communities in question must actually <em>contradict</em> each other<br />
. Otherwise we merely have an example of boring relativism.</p>
<p>But now suppose that, because of our differing ways of carving the
world up into ‘objects’, I claim that there are three ‘objects’ on the
table but you claim there are only two. Do we contradict each other?</p>
<p>Not if the difference in our judgements is simply down to the fact
that we are using the term ‘object’ differently. You can say, ‘Oh,
you’re using “object” to apply to just<em>those</em> sorts of thing.
Then I agree: there are three “objects” in your sense. But it’s also
true that, as I’m using “object”, there are only two.’</p>
<p>Given that we are using the term ‘object’ differently, the fact that I
may speak truly and you falsely by saying ‘There are three objects on
the table’ is not philosophically surprising. It’s no more surprising
than is the fact that, if one person uses ‘bank’ to mean riverbank and
the another to mean a financial institution, then one may speak truly
and the other falsely when they say, ‘There’s a bank in Binford’.</p>
<p>It turns out, in other words, that this example of conceptual
relativism is actually an example of uncontentious, boring relativism
after all.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Despite its popularity, and the fact that it can <em>seem</em> to be
the only position able to promote tolerance and open-mindedness,
relativism is actually a rather unattractive position and extremely
difficult to defend.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><em>This is a chapter of </em>The Philosophy Gym<em> by Stephen Law, published by Headline, 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2003. Illustrations thanks to Daniel Postgate.</em></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-29660768004235730972021-02-06T13:49:00.000+00:002021-02-06T13:49:25.436+00:00My new Critical Thinking course - ideal for pupils, students, teachers, sceptics.<p><span class="css-901oao css-16my406 r-poiln3 r-bcqeeo r-qvutc0"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-KL9hFXryixmmW0JpajcPJ_px6gqt5MEtSdmvoJ0aFrNki97BTKVYtGswvur7JTseuU2Ijx1M9SCNb7giBCAWJYtCwhy3ViWHFby2pHZEVXWoNwZl4ZLdpXKsdAsZhC3hkqHYAeWK-2c/s2040/Screenshot+2021-02-06+at+13.45.58.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="704" data-original-width="2040" height="147" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-KL9hFXryixmmW0JpajcPJ_px6gqt5MEtSdmvoJ0aFrNki97BTKVYtGswvur7JTseuU2Ijx1M9SCNb7giBCAWJYtCwhy3ViWHFby2pHZEVXWoNwZl4ZLdpXKsdAsZhC3hkqHYAeWK-2c/w428-h147/Screenshot+2021-02-06+at+13.45.58.png" width="428" /></a></div><br />My new Critical Thinking course - ideal for pupils & teachers wanting to sharpen their thinking skills!
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I'm offering online (via Zoom) talks and sessions to schools on A Level RS, Philosophy, and more.</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;"> </div></div><div class="o9v6fnle cxmmr5t8 oygrvhab hcukyx3x c1et5uql ii04i59q"><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">ZOOM sessions can be organised to suit your exact class and needs, and can involve interaction, powerpoint slides, etc.</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;"> </div></div><div class="o9v6fnle cxmmr5t8 oygrvhab hcukyx3x c1et5uql ii04i59q"><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">All sessions are accompanied by a pdf explaining the key points.</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;"> </div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">Sessions offered include:</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">· Ontological Arguments</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">· Natural Law and its practical application to e.g. embryo research and designer babies, abortion, assisted suicide, capital punishment, etc.</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">· The Kalam Cosmological Argument (incl. 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I am happy to tailor sessions to your exact needs and syllabus.</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;"> </div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">All these sessions are interactive - I will take questions from pupils, and can include small group work and other activities within a session (to be agreed in advance with teacher).</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;"> </div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">I also offer mind-stretching sessions suitable for G&T that get pupils to think outside the box on issues such as the limits of science, naturalism, and the supernatural.</div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;"> </div></div><div class="o9v6fnle cxmmr5t8 oygrvhab hcukyx3x c1et5uql ii04i59q"><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">Cost is £220 for one hour, £380 for anything up to 5 hours.<br /> </div><div dir="auto" style="text-align: start;">If you would be interested in any of the above, do please get in touch.</div></div></span></div></div></div></div>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-66795200293559760202020-12-24T11:40:00.015+00:002020-12-24T16:08:12.348+00:00Suggesting a new named fallacy: the Non Post Hoc Fallacy (or David Cameron Fallacy)<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiXNC-uDuSYvYvjHqHcv1SWRCAqfW_yeIoaEeobWCYytVEohWAKXlPOBtLPdB2wdCuZNi5_VY3tU7TSdgwxyx2SVZLoG1zQTwuQcBVSXkYhShS6tJGT3BjZw39aa2nnjmvIjhmfRZupTjE/s874/Screenshot+2020-12-24+at+11.39.09.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="582" data-original-width="874" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiXNC-uDuSYvYvjHqHcv1SWRCAqfW_yeIoaEeobWCYytVEohWAKXlPOBtLPdB2wdCuZNi5_VY3tU7TSdgwxyx2SVZLoG1zQTwuQcBVSXkYhShS6tJGT3BjZw39aa2nnjmvIjhmfRZupTjE/s320/Screenshot+2020-12-24+at+11.39.09.png" width="320" /></a></div><br />Many of us are familiar with the <i>Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc </i>Fallacy ('<i>after</i> this, therefore <i>because</i> of this) - <i>Post Hoc</i> Fallacy for short). It's the fallacy of supposing that, because B occurred after A, A must be the cause of B. For example:<p></p><p><i>My car stopped working after I changed the oil, so changing the oil caused it to stop working.</i></p><p>Or: </p><p><i>I wore my red jumper to the exam and I passed, so that jumper is lucky: it caused me to pass.</i><br /></p><p>This fallacy is so common, it gets a latin name. However, there's a related common fallacy that I think also deserves a name. I am going to call it the <i>Non Post Hoc</i> Fallacy ('<i>not</i> <i>after</i> of this, therefore <i>not</i> <i>because</i> of this), or, perhaps more memorably, the David Cameron Fallacy.<br /></p><p>Every now and then someone desperate to ‘prove’ that X is <i>not </i>
causally responsible for Y – e.g poverty is <i>not</i> a cause of crime, will
commit the following fallacy. They will argue that as X has often occurred
without Y following, therefore X was <i>not</i> the cause of Y in this case. </p>
<p> Back in 2011 many right-wingers were desperate to show that poverty
was not the, or even a, cause of the London riots. In order to try to
show that, they pointed to poor people and areas where no rioting
occurred. UK Prime Minister David Cameron said: “These riots were not
about poverty. That insults the millions of people who, whatever the
hardship, would never dream of making others suffer like this.” A letter
to <i>Newseek</i> magazine argued: 'Saskia Sassen blames conditions
in disadvantaged areas for the UK riots, ignoring urban areas for the UK
riots, ignoring that other deprived regions – Glasgow, Tyneside, South
Wales – didn’t riot.' That was fallacious reasoning. Compare: </p>
<p> <i> Bert smoked 40 a day for 40 years and didn’t get lung cancer.
Joe smoked 40 a day for 40 years and didn’t get lung cancer. Therefore
Jim’s smoking 40 a day for 40 years did not cause his lung cancer. </i> </p>
<p> Clearly, Jim’s smoking could easily be <i>a</i> – indeed <i>the</i> cause – of his lung cancer. True enough, smoking that much is not causally <i>sufficient</i>
to produce lung cancer. Various other factors have to be in play too,
including genetic factors, etc. However, the fact that only a minority
of those who smoke 40 a day for 40 years end up with lung cancer does
not show that smoking does not play a – perhaps even <i>the</i> – key role in producing the lung cancer of those who do smoke that much. </p>
<p> Journalist James Bloodworth made the same mistake back in 2016, arguing ‘The
West is not responsible for Jihadist violence, Islamist ideology is.’
His argument? It’s as follows: </p>
<p> <i> Yet if, as some suggest, American imperialism really is the
“root cause” of modern anti-Western terrorism; if the West really has
brought terrorism on itself, there are several questions that urgently
require an answer. First of all, where are the Cuban, the Argentinian
and the Chilean suicide bombers? Where are the Guatemalans and the
Brazilians intent on the random slaughter of “unpure” populations and
the mass capture of sexual slaves
? If fanatical religious ideology isn’t the main driver of the spate of
recent attacks, where are the masked Latinos rampaging through parks
and shopping centres with Kalashnikovs? </i> </p>
<p> <i> As any good anti-imperialist ought to know, outside of South
East Asia there is arguably no part of the world that has suffered more
under the heel of American imperialism than its own supposed back yard.
The Middle East certainly hasn’t. Where, then, is the supposedly
inevitable blow back </i> . <a href="https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/west-not-responsible-jihadist-violence-islamist-ideology-1552069">Source</a>. </p>
<p> Now, as a matter of fact, I don’t doubt that Islamist
ideology is <i>a</i> cause of Jihadist terror attacks on the West. But
that doesn’t mean the West is not causally or morally to blame. The West
may still be <i>a</i>, perhaps even <i>the</i> – root cause, as the smoking example illustrates. </p><p>Notice that someone can, and plenty have, argued that Islamist ideology is <i>not</i> to blame for Jihadist terror attacks because the majority of those who sign up to Islamist ideology don't engage in terror attacks. That would be an equally crap argument analogous to Bloodworth's, but to the opposite conclusion - and another example of the <i>Non Post Hoc</i> Fallacy.</p><p><span class="css-901oao css-16my406 r-1qd0xha r-ad9z0x r-bcqeeo r-qvutc0">I think this fallacy deserves a name, and certainly needs to be more widely recognised given its popularity with dodgy politicians and journalists. It's right up there with slippery slope and <i>ad hominem</i>. </span></p>
Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-58680562772694803332020-11-28T12:44:00.003+00:002020-11-28T12:55:47.756+00:00Logical Objections to Theism (my chpt in Companion Guide to Atheism and Philosophy)<p>
</p><p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></i></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhXm96oy81j3CoqTzRW9fiZ5yoFkHfDz1h5EClT_WM2eKnV1qF7ufzBPs8C_GTdS7Ubhydis0w1pzZ_UGFIgZoMYTuMhHaVFITptgm0joFIB86J2whbprqDExH1kC7AejmhOEpjh4FPkXA/s854/Screenshot+2020-11-28+at+12.44.17.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="472" data-original-width="854" height="201" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhXm96oy81j3CoqTzRW9fiZ5yoFkHfDz1h5EClT_WM2eKnV1qF7ufzBPs8C_GTdS7Ubhydis0w1pzZ_UGFIgZoMYTuMhHaVFITptgm0joFIB86J2whbprqDExH1kC7AejmhOEpjh4FPkXA/w363-h201/Screenshot+2020-11-28+at+12.44.17.png" width="363" /></a></i></div><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><br />(From A Companion Guide to Atheism and Philosophy - Graham Oppy, Wiley Blackwell, 2019)</i><p></p><p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Abstract</span></i><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">: This chapter looks at
a range of objections to theism that one might class as 'logical'. Some of
these objections aim to show that theism involves an internal logical contradiction.
Others aim to show that theism is at least logically incompatible with other
beliefs to which the theist is also typically committed. Also included are
objections grounded in the thought that theism is nonsensical or meaningless.
The chapter provides both an overview of this broad terrain, including a map of
possible responses to different kinds of objection, and then a number of
examples</span>
</p><p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Introduction</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">This essay is in
two parts. In Part One, I map out several varieties of logical objection to
theism, provide some illustrations, and then set out a number of response
strategies that may be employed by theists in defence of their belief. In Part
Two, I examine in more detail some of the best-known examples of logical
objections to theism, including (i) objections associated with the doctrines of
divine simplicity, divine personhood, and divine foreknowledge, (ii) the
logical problem of evil, and (iii) some verificationist and falsificationist
objections.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">PART ONE: A MAP OF THE TERRAIN</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">By <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">theism</i> I mean belief in an omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly good being. Of course, these are not the only attributes
associated with God. Many insist that God is, in some sense, simple. Many also
require that God be a person - an agent who acts (in creating the universe <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex nihilo</i>, for example) and with whom one
might enter into a personal relationship.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There are a
variety of arguments that I think might reasonably be included under the title
'logical objections to theism'. I will categorise them as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">internal</i>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">external</i>, and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">nonsense objections</i>.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Internal objections</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If someone
claims to have discovered in the rainforests of Brazil a triangle possessing
not three but four sides, mathematicians won't mount an expensive expedition to
confirm whether or not that object exists. We can know, from the comfort of our
armchairs, that there is no such thing. A triangle is, by definition,
three-sided. To assert that there exists a triangle that is not three-sided is
therefore to involve yourself in a straightforward logical contradiction, and
contradictions cannot be true<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[1]</span></span></span></span></a>.
It appears we can similarly know, from the comfort of our armchairs - just by
unpacking the concepts involved - that neither are there are any married
bachelors or female stallions out there waiting to be discovered.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Internal
objections to theism turn on the thought that we can similarly rule out, from
the comfort of our armchairs, the truth of theism. The suggestion is that theistic
belief involves a logical contradiction. Thus we can know - by means of a
priori, armchair reflection alone - that theism is false. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Internal
objections to theism come in two varieties: those that maintain that theism
requires the instantiation of particular divine attributes that are logically
impossible, and those that maintain theism requires the co-instantiation of
divine attributes that cannot logically be combined.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">A familiar alleged
example of the former sort of inconsistency is what I shall term<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i>the<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">
Riddle of the Stone</i> objection to God's omnipotence. That objection runs as
follows. If God is omnipotent then he can bring about any state of affairs. But
if God can bring about any state of affairs, then he can create a stone so
heavy that even he cannot lift it. But then it follows that, having created
such a stone, God can't do everything: he can't lift it. Thus, some are quick to
conclude, the very idea of an omnipotent being involves a logical
contradiction: God's omnipotence logically entails his non-omnipotence. Thus we
can rule out an omnipotent God from the comfort of our armchairs, by means of
logic alone.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The second variety
of internal objection maintains, not that any particular divine attribute
involves or generates a logical contradiction by itself, but rather that
certain divine attributes in combination do so. An example is the supposed
logical incompatibility of divine simplicity and divine personhood.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For those who define God as being both simple
and a person (and not all theists do), paradoxes such as the following arise. The
concept of simplicity seems to require that God be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">non-temporal</i> (for otherwise, being extended in time, God would have
temporal parts). The concept of personhood, on the other hand, appears to
require that persons be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">temporal</i> (for
a person must be capable of possessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">psychological
states</i>, such as beliefs and desires, which must have temporal duration; moreover,
persons can perform <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">actions</i>, which require
a temporal framework within which to take place). But the claim that there exists
a being that is both temporal and non-temporal involves a straightforward contradiction.
Thus there's no such simple person, and so no God, so defined.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">External objections</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">I turn now to
externalist objections. The objection is not that there is some internal
logical inconsistency involved in theistic belief <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">per se</i>, but rather that theistic belief is logically incompatible
with certain other belief or beliefs the theist holds. Probably the best-known
external objection is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logical problem
of evil</i>.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Theists
typically accept the existence of at least some evil. The logical problem of
evil involves the thought that the theist's belief in the existence of evil is logically
incompatible with their belief in God. It's argued that a God, being omniscient,
would know of the existence of such evil, and, being omnipotent, would have the
power to prevent such evil. Moreover, being perfectly good, God would not want
evil to exist. Thus, if evil exists, then God does not. So theists who also believe
evil exists might seem to be caught a straightforward contradiction.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[2]</span></span></span></span></a></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Nonsense objections</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">A third kind of
objection to theism that I include under the umbrella of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>'logical' objections are those that maintain
that God talk is not false, but meaningless or nonsensical. Note that both
internal and external objections conclude that theism is false. But what if
theism fails in a more radical way, by failing to get even as far as asserting
something capable of being true or false? That is what the proponents of
nonsense objections maintain.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Why might we conclude
that God talk is neither true, nor false, but meaningless?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Most obviously, because we find it fails to
satisfy our preferred criterion of meaningfulness. The criterion best-known for
having been applied in this way is the Verification Principle (closely
associated with A.J. Ayer and the logical positivists). Here's a simple
version:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>(VP) A statement is meaningful if
and only if it is verifiable.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Under what
circumstances is a statement verifiable? According to Ayer in his <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Language, Truth and Logic</i>, there are
just two ways a statement might be verified.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">First, the
statement might be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">analytic</i> (roughly:
true in virtue of meaning, in the way e.g. bachelors are unmarried, and
triangles have three sides, are supposed to be). Such statements, being true in
virtue of meaning, can potentially be verified <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a priori</i>, by reflection alone, from the comfort of our armchairs.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Second, Ayer
says a statement is verifiable if there are possible observations 'relevant to determining
that statement's truth or falsehood' (2001: 38).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Note that verification,
in Ayer's intended sense, is a fairly weak notion. There is no suggestion that
for a statement to be verified its truth must be establishable <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">conclusively</i>. It's sufficient, thinks
Ayer, that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">observation might supply
grounds either for supposing the statement is true or for supposing it is
false.</i></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Scientific
statements, such as that all actions are accompanied by equal and opposite
reactions, all emeralds are green, and so on, are not analytic. Nevertheless, that
statement about emeralds, while incapable of being established conclusively (there's
always the risk of a future non-green emerald cropping up), can at least be
supported by observational evidence. The statement can also be disconfirmed observationally
(by an observation of a non-green emerald). Hence, on Ayer's view, though such scientific
claims aren't analytic, they are verifiable, and so are meaningful.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">However, Ayer
famously goes on to rule out a great deal of talk as meaningless, including
moral talk. On Ayer's view, moral statements, being unverifiable, are literally
meaningless, and thus incapable of being true or false. Ayer also maintains
that the statement that God exists is unverifiable; it is, he concludes,
meaningless.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Response strategies</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Before we look
in more detail at various examples of these three varieties of logical
objection - internal, external, and nonsense - I want briefly to map out some
possible <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">response strategies</i>. Theists
don't typically shrug, admit their mistake, and wander off converts to atheism
when presented with such objections. They have a developed a range of strategies
designed to deal with such criticisms. I briefly set out below the general form
such manoeuvres take so we will then be able more easily to navigate our way
through further examples.</span></p>
<p align="right" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Responses to internal objections</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">When presented
with an internal objection, theists may:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">(i) maintain that
the alleged logical contradiction is merely apparent,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">or</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">(ii) drop the
divine attribute(s) causing the problem.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There are two
ways in which theists might adopt strategy (i). First, they might adopt (i) by
(a) attempting to show that there's some error in the reasoning of those who claim
there is an internal contradiction. The theist may insist the critic has
slipped up, logically speaking, and concluded there's a contradiction where in
truth there is none. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Alternatively, a
theist might adopt (i) by insisting that (b) while, if what the critic took the
theist to mean were correct, then the theist would indeed be guilty of
contradicting themselves, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">the critic has
misunderstood</i>. The critic's <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logic</i>
may be faultless, but they have nevertheless failed properly to understand what
the theist means by at least one of the terms involved. Suppose I say, 'There's
a bank nearby, but there's no bank nearby'. I appear to have contradicted
myself. However, if it turns out that by my first use of 'bank' I meant
riverbank, and by the second, financial bank, then the contradiction is
revealed to be merely apparent. Theists may similarly suggest that what they
mean by terms like 'simple' or 'omnipotent' as applied to God is not what the
critic assumes. Once what the theist means by such terms has been clarified, any
supposed internal contradiction can be shown to be merely apparent.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Here's an
illustration of strategy (i)(b). Some theists respond to the Riddle of the Stone
by claiming, first, that, in saying God is 'omnipotent', they don't mean God that
can do the logically impossible. God can do anything possible, but making a
four-sided triangle, or a stone so heavy that even an omnipotent being could
not lift it, is not a logical possibility. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">But why suppose
that God's inability to bring about such logically contradictory states of
affairs entails he lacks omnipotence? One suggestion would be to say that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logical</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">impossibilities are no real limitation on God's power</i>, for it is
not as if there is some possible state of affairs - the existence of a four-sided
triangle, say - that God is somehow <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">prevented</i>
from realizing. Rather, the expression 'There's a four sided triangle' fails to
pick out any possible state of affairs.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">So, some may conclude,
when<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> properly </i>understood, the claim
that God is omnipotent generates no contradiction. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Alternatively, a theist confronted with the Riddle of the Stone
might adopt option (ii) and drop omnipotence from the list of divine
attributes. That provides a straightforward solution, though it's a far less
popular move.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Responses to external objections</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">When presented
with external objections, theists have a further option. As with internal
objections, they may:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">(i) maintain
that the alleged logical contradiction is merely apparent,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">or</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">(ii) drop the
divine attribute(s) causing the problem,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">However, they
may also:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">(iii) drop the external
belief(s) causing the problem.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Consider, for
example, the logical problem of evil outlined earlier. Theists might respond by:
(i) insisting that the supposed contradiction involved in believing that there
exists both God and evil is merely apparent, or (ii) dropping one of the divine
attributes causing the problem - the logical problem can be neatly solved by
dropping any one the three omni-attributes (so, for example, the theist might
drop omniscience, maintaining that God is indeed omnipotent and omnibenevolent,
but is ignorant of the evil it would be in his power to remove.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[3]</span></span></span></span></a>).
However, theists also have option (iii). It is the addition of the theist's
external belief in the existence of evil that generates the logical problem of
evil. So the theist might avoid contradiction by dropping, not their theism,
but rather their belief that evil exists. For example, a theist might respond
to the logical problem of evil by suggesting that, though there might appear to
be evils, the evils are in fact illusory.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Pseudo-profundity and embracing
contradiction</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Notice that
there is a further way in which theists may respond to both internal and
external objections to theism. They may choose to embrace - and perhaps even <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">make a virtue of</i> - the supposed
contradiction.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If you want to
appear profound, there are several fairly tried and trusted recipes you can
follow. One of the most effective is to contradict yourself regarding one of
life's big themes, such as life and death, meaning and purpose, war and peace,
and so on. Here are three examples I made up:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Sanity is a
kind of madness<br />
<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Life is often a kind of death<br />
<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The ordinary is extraordinary<br />
<br />
Such sentences are interpretable in all sorts of ways and can easily appear
profound. In George Orwell’s novel <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Nineteen
Eighty-Four</i>, two of the three slogans of the Party have a similarly
contradictory character:<br />
<br />
<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>War is peace<br />
<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Freedom is slavery<br />
<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Ignorance is strength</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If you are an
aspiring guru, the attraction of making such contradictory remarks is two-fold.
First, they make your audience do the intellectual labour for you. You can sit
back, adopt a sage-like expression, and let your disciples figure out what you
mean. Secondly, such remarks are interpretable in numerous ways. This gives you
enormous wiggle room if someone dares challenge you (for you can imply your
critic is a crude, overly-literal thinker who has failed properly to grasp the
true meaning of your remark).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The thought that
contradiction is a sign of profundity often crops in religious contexts.
Non-believers usually take what look like straightforward contradictions within
a religious doctrine to indicate falsehood. The faithful, on the other hand,
may take those very same contradictions to indicate genuine insight. Indeed,
religious folk will sometimes make a point of appearing to contradict
themselves, saying things like 'God is, and yet he is not', 'God is one, and
yet he is many', and 'God is good, and yet he is not.'</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There's no
denying that seemingly contradictory remarks can sometimes express something
profound. No doubt we can find some kind of truth even in Orwell's poisonous
examples. However, given the formulaic way in which contradiction can be used
to generate the illusion of depth and profundity - that's to say, to generate <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">pseudo-profundity</i> - it's wise not to be
too easily impressed.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Responses to nonsense objections </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Responses to
nonsense objections include:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">(i) rejecting
the criterion of nonsense/meaningfulness on which theism comes out as
nonsense/meaningless,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">and:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">(ii) maintaining
that, whether or not the proposed criterion of nonsense/meaninglessness is
correct, theism meets it.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">In response to
Ayer's verificationist challenge to the meaningfulness of God talk, then,
theists may challenge the principle of verification on which Ayer relies, and/or
insist that theism is in fact verifiable in the required sense. As we will see,
both kinds of responses to Ayer's challenge have been made. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">PART TWO: SPECIFIC EXAMPLES</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">As promised, I
now turn to some examples of logical objections to theism. What follows is
merely a selection. There are many more such objections.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Divine simplicity</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">God is widely
supposed to be, in a certain sense, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">simple</i>.
The doctrine of divine simplicity is characterised neatly by Eleanor Stump (1997:
250) as involving four claims:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">1. God cannot
possess spatial or temporal parts.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">2. God cannot
have any intrinsic accidental properties.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">3. There cannot
be any real distinction between one essential property and another in God's
nature.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">4. There cannot
be a real distinction between essence and existence in God.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The first
condition is straightforward, and rules out God being extended in space in the
way that, for example, physical objects are. God's simplicity is also widely supposed
to require that God be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">eternal</i> rather
than temporal. If God were spread out across time, then he would have temporal
parts, with one part occurring before another.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The second claim
involves a familiar philosophical distinction between essential properties -
roughly, those an entity must possess - and accidental properties - those an
entity possesses but might have lacked or might come to lack. Physical objects
are widely thought to have both essential and accidental properties. For
example, it's widely supposed that it's essential to this table that it be made
of wood - a table not made of wood would not be this very table. However, it's
not essential to this table that it be painted red, or be in my living room -
these are merely accidental properties of the table. Some properties of my
table are also merely extrinsic - they can be changed without a change in the
object (being in my living room is an extrinsic property of this table, it can
be relocated without any change to it). Other properties are intrinsic - a
change in the property involves a change in the object (a change in the length
of one table leg would involve an intrinsic change in the table). The doctrine
of divine simplicity requires that all God's intrinsic properties be essential
to him. So, while it may not be essential to God that he possess the extrinsic
property of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">currently being</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">thought about by me</i> (presumably, God
might easily have lacked that particular property), the property of
omnipotence, being intrinsic to God, is essential to him.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The third claim
requires that all God's essential properties be identical. So, for example,
God's essential properties of omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness
must, in truth, be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">one and the same
property</i>: a single property that, say, we are merely conceptualising or
thinking about in different ways.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The fourth claim
exploits another philosophical distinction - between essence and existence. The
essential properties of thing typically do not include existence. For example,
this table's essential properties do not include existence - the table might
not have existed and it will one day cease to exist. God's essence, on the
other hand, includes existence. Indeed, given the third claim, his property of
existence must be identical with his other essential properties - of
omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and so on. God's essence <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">is</i> existence.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The doctrine of
divine simplicity might be thought logically inconsistent with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">other</i> doctrines regarding God, such as
the doctrine of the Trinity. How can God be both a simple being and yet triune?
And how can God, who lacks spatial and temporal parts, be Jesus, who had spatial
and temporal parts (arms and legs, and a birth and death, for example)?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Further, the
claim that God is simple has also been accused of being logically contradictory
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">per se</i>. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One of the more obvious objections runs as
follows: surely, we can logically separate out God's properties of omniscience,
omnipotence and omni-benevolence from him as their logical possessor. But then God
is himself logically and ontologically complex, not simple.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">However, there
is a long theistic tradition that insists that God's omni-properties are not,
in fact, logically distinct properties of him, in the way that, say, my height
and my weight are logically distinct properties of me. God does not merely <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">possess</i> his omni-properties, he is
numerically <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">identical with</i> them. God
and his omnipotence are one and the same thing; God and his omniscience are one
and the same thing, and so on. But then and, given the transitivity of identity
(if <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a</i> is identical with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">b</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">b</i> with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">c</i>, then <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a</i> is identical with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">c</i>) then all these omni- properties are also identical with each
other. Hence God is, after all, logically simple.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Perhaps more
problematic is the following external objection: God, while simple, is also is widely
supposed by theists <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">to share at least
some properties with his creation</i>. For example, God possesses knowledge and
power, but then so do I (even if not to the maximum, as God does). The
difficulty is: if power is a property that God and I share, then surely God
cannot be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">identical</i> with that
property. And so God's possession of that property - power - does entail that
he have some logical complexity after all: we can logically distinguish God
from some property of his. It might seem that the only way we can salvage the
doctrine of divine simplicity is by denying any commonality between God and his
creation.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">One response to
this external objection is to insist that while God is indeed perfectly
powerful, and I too am powerful to some limited degree, it doesn't follow that
there is, then, some property - power - that we share. Miller (1996) argues
that perfect power is not power. Perfect power is a kind of limit, as is zero
power. And zero power is not power. Similarly, the lower limit in the case of
speed - zero mph - is not a speed. Miller suggests that perfect power should
not be thought of as maximum amount of power (what he calls a 'limit
simpliciter') but as a 'limit case' like zero power or zero speed.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Graham Oppy
(2003) outlines a different response to this external objection, suggesting
that in correctly describing individuals <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a</i>
and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">b</i> as being <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">F</i>, it does not follow that there exists some single corresponding
property in the world joint possession of which by <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">b</i> makes both '<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a</i> is F' and '<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">b</i> is F' true. For the predicate 'is F' may not pick out an
objectively existing property. Suppose, for example, that 'is F' is defined
like so: something is F if and only if it possesses either property G or property
H. Suppose both <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">b</i> are F. It doesn't follow there is one
property they share - for it may be that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a</i>
is F by virtue of being G and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">b</i> is F
by virtue of being H. But then similarly, while both God and I are powerful,
God may be powerful by virtue of his possessing (or being identical with) a
property P1, while I am powerful by virtue of my possessing some other property
P2. In which case, while we can both be correctly described as 'powerful',
there need be no property we share.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">That concludes my
brief sampling of the many internal and external logical objections that might
be raised in connection with the doctrine of divine simplicity. But note there
is also the potential for a form of nonsense objection to be raised against the
doctrine. For example, in his <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Philosophical
Investigations</i> (1998) Ludwig Wittgenstein attacks the notion of absolute logical
simplicity, which played a crucial role in his earlier philosophy (Book I,
sections 45-48). Our talk of what is 'simple' and 'composite' has its home in
settings in which we describe, for example, a chessboard as a complex made up of
squares. But is each chess square simple? Within the context of the game of
chess, perhaps. However, in other contexts each square might be thought of as
made up of two rectangles, or of a larger shape from which another has been
subtracted. A chess square's cream colour might also be seen as a composite of
yellow and white. Each chess square is bounded by four straight lines. And each
of those lines might in turn be viewed as a combination of mathematical points.
Conversely, a mathematical point might be seen as the intersection of two
lines. Talk of 'simple' and 'composite' is highly diverse and has its home in
such varied linguistic contexts. Wittgenstein thought that to abstract away
from all such linguistic contexts or 'language games' and try to apply the
terms 'simple' and 'composite' in an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">absolute</i>
way - to talk about a thing or things that are simple,<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> period</i> - is to end up talking nonsense:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 25.15pt; margin-top: 0cm; margin: 0cm 25.15pt 0cm 1cm;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">But what are the simple
constituent parts of which reality is composed? -- What are the simple
constituent parts of a chair? -- The bits of wood of which it is made? Or
the molecules, or the atoms? -- 'Simple' means: not composite. <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">And here the point is: in what sense
'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts
of a chair'. (<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Philosophical
Investigations</i>, I, section 47)</span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">It's arguable
that the attempt to define God as being <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">absolutely</i>
'simple' involves a similar drift into nonsense.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Divine foreknowledge</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The classic problem
of divine foreknowledge is an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">external</i>
objection. The objection is that the divine attribute of omniscience is
logically incompatible with the theist's further belief that God has imbued human
beings with free will - that's to say: the freedom to act as they freely
choose, without their action being compelled or determined by anything outside
themselves. The Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1135-1204) produced a classic
statement of the objection:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Does God know or does He not know that a certain
individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily
follows that [that] man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would
act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect…(1996: 99-100)</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The suggestion
seems to be that, if God knows Tom will do x tomorrow, then necessarily, Tom
will do x tomorrow. But then Tom lacks the freedom to do otherwise. Whether or
not Tom performs some future action x is never up to him - it is determined by
factors outside himself: by what God knows he will do.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There is also an
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">internal</i> objection to theism
generated by divine foreknowledge. If God, being omniscient, knew yesterday that
he will do x tomorrow, then God can't do anything other than x tomorrow. But if
God can't do other than x tomorrow, then he is not omnipotent: his power is
limited by his <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">own</i> foreknowledge.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">But have we
really identified a problem regarding divine foreknowledge? After all, we also have
(admittedly fallible) knowledge of what will happen in the future. I might
know, for example, that Ted will go to the shops tomorrow. But it is a
necessary condition of knowing that P that P is true. Hence my knowing Ted will
go to the shops tomorrow entails that Ted will indeed go to the shops. So does <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">my</i> knowledge of what Ted will do
tomorrow entail he lacks the freedom to do otherwise? </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Actually, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">this</i> problem of foreknowledge has a
solution. What is necessary is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">conditional</i>
(if-then) statement that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">if</i> I know
that P, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">then</i> P. It does not follow
that if I know that P, then necessarily P, i.e. that it is a necessary truth
that P, that things could not have been otherwise. More generally:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Necessarily: If x, then y</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">does not entail</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>If x, then necessarily: y.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Compare:
necessarily, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">if</i> Tom is a bachelor, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">then</i> Tom is unmarried. That conditional
is a necessary truth. But of course it does not follow that if Tom is a
bachelor, then it's a necessary truth that Tom is unmarried - that Tom <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">lacks the freedom</i> to get married. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Similarly then,
while it's a necessary truth that if I know Ted will go to the shops tomorrow,
then Ted will go to the shops tomorrow, it doesn't follow that my knowledge of
what Ted will do entails Ted lacks the freedom to do otherwise.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">So have we
solved the problem of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">divine</i> foreknowledge?
If my knowing that Ted will go to the shops tomorrow is consistent with Tom's
having the freedom to do otherwise, why shouldn't God's knowing what Ted will do
tomorrow be consistent with Ted's freedom to do otherwise?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If there is
still a problem regarding <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">divine</i>
foreknowledge, it seems that will be because there's something special about
God's foreknowledge. Of course there are differences between human foreknowledge
and God's foreknowledge. In particular, unlike us, God is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">infallible</i> about what will happen in the future<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">.</i> So does God's infallibility entail that, if God knows Ted will go
to the shops tomorrow, then necessarily Ted will go to the shops tomorrow -
that Ted lacks the freedom to do otherwise?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">It seems not.
God's infallibility requires:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Necessarily: if God <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">believes</i> that P, then P.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">So, necessarily:
if God infallibly believes Ted will go to the shops tomorrow, then Ted will go
to the shops tomorrow. However, it does not follow that if God infallibly
believes Ted will go to the shops tomorrow, then necessarily Ted will go to the
shops - that Ted lacks the freedom to do otherwise. Again, that inference
involves an illicit slide from: Necessarily: If x, then y, to: If x, then necessarily:
y. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Of course, if
Ted knows today that God believes he, Ted, will go to the shops tomorrow, then
Ted might, given his freewill, choose not to go to the shops and so render God
fallible. Now obviously, given that necessarily, God is infallible, Ted must
lack the ability to make God fallible. But does this in turn require that Ted
lack freewill?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">No. Whenever Ted
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">thinks</i> he knows what God believes Ted
will do tomorrow, and Ted acts to make God's belief false, it turns out Ted's just
mistaken about what God believed Ted would freely choose to do.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">However, while God's
infallible belief that Ted will go to the shops tomorrow does not seem to be
incompatible with Ted having the freedom to do otherwise, perhaps, if we also
add into the mix (i) the suggestion that God knew <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">yesterday</i> what Ted will do tomorrow, and (ii) a further necessity -
that the past is unalterable - then a successful argument that divine
foreknowledge is incompatible with free will might constructed. Some more
sophisticated versions of the problem of divine foreknowledge take this form. Here's
one example (let T be: Ted will go to the shops tomorrow)<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[4]</span></span></span></span></a>:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">1.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Yesterday,
God infallibly believed P</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">2.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If E
occurred in the past it is now necessary that E occurred then.</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">3.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Thus
it is now necessary that God believed T.</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">4.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Necessarily,
if God believed T, then T.</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">5.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If p
is now necessary, and necessarily (if p then q) then q is now necessary.</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">6.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Thus
it is now necessary that T.</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">7.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If
it is now necessary that T, then Ted cannot do other than go to the shops
tomorrow.</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">8.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Thus,
Ted cannot do otherwise than go to the shops tomorrow.</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">9.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If
you cannot do otherwise when you act, you do not act freely.</span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">10.<span style="font: 7pt "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Thus when Ted goes to the shops tomorrow,
he will not do so freely.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">It remains
contentious whether any such argument is cogent. Rather than explore in yet more
detail the precise form the problem of divine foreknowledge might take, let's
now look briefly at perhaps the best-known response to the problem: that of Boëthius.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Boëthius (1999:
Book V) attempts to deal with the problem of foreknowledge by denying the first
premise of the argument sketched above. That's to say, Boëthius would deny that
God infallibly knew <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">yesterday</i> that
Ted will go to the shops tomorrow. This is because Boëthius considers God to be
eternal - a timeless being. It's not that God lacks knowledge; rather his
knowledge is not temporally locatable in the way ours is. Being a timeless being,
God does not know anything <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">at a time</i>.
Rather, he knows timelessly.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Of course, the
view that God is a timeless being is controversial, and indeed we will see that
some theists consider the claim that God is eternal to be incompatible with the
claim that he is a person, for example (see <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Divine
Personhood </i>below). Boëthius's solution is obviously not available to those
who believe both that God is a person and that God's personhood requires that
he be a temporal being.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Not only is Boëthius's
solution unavailable to a certain sort of theist, it appears his solution in
any case fails. The original objection can easily be tweaked to deal with it. For
suppose Boëthius is correct and God only <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">timelessly</i>
infallibly knows that T. Still, it is presumably now necessary that God
timelessly infallibly knows T. But then it still follows that it is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">now</i> necessary that Ted will go to the
shops tomorrow. But then Ted still lacks the freedom to do otherwise. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Divine personhood</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The thought that
God is a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">person</i> is the source of
various internal objections to theism.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">We noted in Part
One that the suggestion that God is a person would seem to require that God
possess beliefs and desires on the basis of which he may rationally act.
However, as we saw above, the doctrine of divine simplicity seems to require
that God be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">eternal</i> - be a timeless
being. And now an objection looms. Arguably, psychological states like belief
and desire necessarily have temporal duration, and thus require a temporal
setting. But then the claim that there exists an eternal personal God appears
to generate a contradiction: God must be timeless, but not timeless.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There are various
further internal objections relating to divine personhood and eternity - for
example: (i) that being a person involves being capable of change, but change
in turn requires that the being in question be temporal, (ii) that the
possibility of performing actions (arguably a condition of personhood) requires
that God be located in time, for actions require a temporal setting. (Pike, for
example, argues that 'a timeless individual could not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">produce</i>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">create</i>, or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">bring about</i> an object, circumstance, or
state of affairs' since that would involve temporally locating the agent's
action (1970: 110).), (iii) that being a person requires having a mind, and </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">'the
quickest and most direct way of showing the absurdity of a timeless mind is as
follows: A mind is conscious, and consciousness is a temporally elongated
process.<a name="ref7"></a>' (Gale 1991: 52).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There are also <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">nonsense</i> objections that focus on the
combination of divine personhood and eternity, on which the suggestion that God
is a timeless, unchanging being who is also an agent capable of performing
actions is held to involve, not a contradiction, but a drift into incoherence. Bede
Rundle for example, says: 'I can get no grip on the idea of an agent doing
something where the doing, the bringing about, is not an episode in time,
something involving a changing agent.' (2004: 77)</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Some theists, in
response to these kinds of objection, have dropped one or other of the divine
attributes in question. You might drop timelessness in order to maintain attributes
required for personhood. For example, Nicholas Wolterstorff drops timelessness
in order to accommodate the Biblical thought that, among things, God, as a
person, planned certain things and remembers certain things: God's 'planning
must occur before the planned event occurs. For otherwise it is not a case of
planning'. (2007: 164). Alternatively, a theist might drop personhood in order to
maintain timelessness. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">An alternative
response, other than dropping one of the divine attributes of personhood and timelessness,
would be to maintain that 'person', 'action', and so on, when applied to God,
mean something other than what these terms usually mean when applied to human
beings. One possibility here is to insist that, when used to describe God, such
language should be understood not literally but analogically. God is not literally
a person, at least not in the usual sense of the term, but he is, in certain
crucial respects, person-like, etc. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">And of course
there is also the possibility of tackling such objections head-on and
maintaining that God can be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">literally</i>
both a person, with all that that entails, and also timeless, without
contradiction. For example, with regards to the problem generated by the
thought that God, as a person, must have beliefs and desires, and that these in
turn require a temporal setting, some have responded by trying to show that
what is essential so far as the holding of beliefs is concerned is that the
being having <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">duration</i>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">there being a kind of duration that is
non-temporal</i>. The view that God's knowledge and belief involves a form of
non-temporal duration is taken by Eleanor Stump and Norman Kretzmann (1981: see
esp. 446)</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Omnipotence - The Riddle of The Stone,
and other problems</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There are a
variety of internal objections regarding the omnipotence of God including, as
we have seen, the Riddle of the Stone. Other internal objections include:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">1. God, if
omnipotent, has the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">power to bring it
about that he is not himself omnipotent</i>. But, being <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">necessarily</i> omnipotent, God must lack that power. Therefore, there
exists no necessarily omnipotent God. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">2. God, if
omnipotent, has the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">power to bring about
evil</i>. But God, being essentially morally perfect, cannot bring about evil.
Therefore, God does not exist.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">3.God, if
omnipotent, can <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">bring about his own
non-existence</i>. But God, being a necessary being, cannot do this. Therefore
there is no God.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">4. God, if
omnipotent, possesses the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">power to bring it
about that another omnipotent being exists</i>. But there cannot be more than
one omnipotent being (the existence of one omnipotent being limits the power of
all other beings - for example, if God, being omnipotent, can bring it about
that I sneeze now, there can't be another omnipotent being able to prevent me
sneezing now). But a being that lacks the power to bring it about that another
omnipotent exists is not omnipotent. Therefore, there exists no such being.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There are also <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">external</i> objections to theism including:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">5<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">.</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Omnipotence
and free will.</i> Most theists believe in what's sometimes called <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">libertarian free will</i>. That's to say,
they believe individuals can perform free actions, these being actions that are
not caused or determined by anything outside of that individual, including God.
An omnipotent God would have the power to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">bring
about our freely choosing one thing rather than another</i>. However no being
has the power to bring about our freely choosing one thing rather than another.
Thus there is no God.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">6. Omnipotence and the unalterability of
the past</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">. Most theists
accept that the past is unalterable. God might have prevented life emerging on
Planet Earth, and he might now snuff that life out, but God can't bring it
about that life never emerged if it already has. But if no being can bring
about a different past, then there is no omnipotent being, and so no God.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">7. Similarly, given
the unalterability of the past, God can't bring it about that Donald Trump is eating
cake for the first time given that Trump has already eaten cake. But if no
being can bring that about, then there is no omnipotent being, and thus no God.
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Note, by the
way, that not only does God lack the power to bring about Ted's freely chooses
to be kind (objection 5 above), Ted himself <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i>
possess that power. Ted also has the power to bring about his own non-existence.
So it appears there are beings, such as Ted, that possess powers God lacks. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">How do theists
respond to these objections?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Most of us,
unversed in philosophy and theology, would probably say that omnipotence
consists in something like <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">the power to
do anything</i>, as Peter Geach notes: 'The English word omnipotent would
ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything.' (</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">1973)</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">A few
philosophers have been prepared to accept that God can indeed bring about
anything - including the impossible. Descartes, for example, suggests God might
create a square circle. However, most theistic philosophers have understood
'omnipotence' in a more restricted way. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">So how should
omnipotence be understood? It appears all of the above objections can be dealt
with by defining omnipotence as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">maximal
power to bring it about states of affairs</i><a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[5]</span></span></span></span></a>
- where this is in turn understood as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">an
amount of power that it is impossible for any being to exceed (</i>see<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Hoffman & Rosenkrantz (2010)).</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Notice that this
definition of omnipotence immediately deals with a wide variety of internal
objections. Yes, God lacks the power to bring about the existence of a square
circle, or another omnipotent being (so that two omnipotent beings exist
simultaneously), or a different past. However, no possible being possesses such
powers - because these are powers to bring about the impossible. God's lacking such
power does not entail that he's not omnipotent. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Nor does God's omnipotence,
defined as maximal power, require that he must possess the power to bring about
states of affairs that some <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">other</i>
being cannot. God possesses maximal power just in case his total amount of
power exceeds that of any other possible being. However, that is compatible
with his lacking specific powers others possess. While the Grand High Wizard's
powers may vastly exceed those of any of his minions, his minions might still possess
powers he lacks (perhaps they can cook, while he can't). Similarly then, God may
be omnipotent, thus defined, even if it's true that God lacks powers possessed
by Ted, including the power self-destruct.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">What of the
Riddle of the Stone? Hoffman and Rosenkrantz point out that, if God is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">essentially</i> omnipotent, then his
creating a stone so heavy he cannot lift it is impossible, because his omnipotence
requires that there be no stone so heavy he cannot lift it. (However, a being
that is not essentially omnipotent could create a stone so heavy that they
could not lift it. The being would be omnipotent when creating the stone but,
having created it, would no longer be omnipotent.) Again, on their
understanding of omnipotence, an omnipotent God is not required to possess the
power to bring about what is impossible.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">So the definition of omnipotence as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">maximal power</i> (as explained above) does appear to deal with the
objections sketched out above. However, objections remain. For example, Sobel
(2004: chapter IX, esp. 362.) argues that no being can be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">essentially</i> omnipotent.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Logical Problem of Evil </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">As noted above
the logical problem of evil is an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">external</i>
objection. Theists are usually committed to two claims: the claim that God
(defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good) exists, and a claim
about the world - that it contains evil. The suggestion is these two claims are
logically inconsistent.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Note that talk
of 'evil', in this context, is of two varieties of evil - <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">moral</i> evils: these being the morally bad things that persons do of
the own free will, and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">natural</i> evils,
these being the natural diseases, disasters, and so on that befall the sentient
inhabitants of this planet and cause them great suffering. The suggestion is
that the existence of any evil<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> at all</i>
- be it of either variety - logically entails the non-existence of God. Thus,
according to Mackie, belief in the existence of both God and evil is
'positively irrational' (1955: 200)</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Alvin Plantinga's
'Free Will defence' (1974: chapter 9) provides the best-known response to the
logical problem of evil.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Plantinga's
response utilizes talk of 'possible worlds', a possible world being, roughly, a
way reality might have been (the actual world being a possible world). Although
I exist at the actual world there is a possible world in which I don't exist
(in which my parents never met, for example). There are, presumably, possible
worlds in which the laws of nature are different, and even worlds in which the
universe does not exist (given the universe might not have existed). Necessary
truths, on the other hand, including all mathematical and logical truths, are
true with respect to every possible world. There's no possible world at which 2
+ 2 fails to equal 4. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Plantinga's
approach to the logical problem turns on the thought that God will wish to
create or actualize a possible world containing free agents - agents that are
not antecedently caused or determined to do what they do but are capable of
freely choosing whether to do good or evil. For only such a world can contain
moral goodness.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">However, if God
creates a world containing free agents, then he can't, as it were, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">compel</i> its inhabitants to do good. If the
inhabitants are to be free, then they must be free to do evil. Given this
freedom, there are possible worlds in which those free agents always choose to
do good, not evil.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">But then why
can't God just actualize such a world? Why, in particular, can't God choose to
actualize one of the possible worlds in which there is a free agent, but as a
matter of fact that agent freely chooses always to do good, never evil, and so
moral goodness, but not moral evil, exists? Plantinga now argues it is possible
God lacks this freedom.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Because God can't
compel the free inhabitants of any world he has created not to do evil, it may
be that in any possible world containing free agents that God might choose to create,
some evil exists (i.e. evil that created by those free agents acting freely). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Why suppose it's
possible that any world God might create that contains a free agent will also
be a world in which some evil exists? Well it is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">possible</i>, argues Plantinga, that free agents suffer from what he
calls 'transworld depravity'. It may be that no matter what circumstances God
might put a given free agent in, that agent will always take at least one wrong
action, and so some evil will exist. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Of course,
Plantinga doesn't claim to have shown that free agents <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">do</i> suffer from transworld depravity. However, he points out it is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">possible</i> that they do - it's possible that
in any world actualised by God in which a free agent exists, some evil will
also exist. But if that is possible, then <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">there
is no logical inconsistency involved in supposing God has created a world
containing some evil</i>. It may be that some evil is the price God must inevitably
pay to allow for moral goodness. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Mackie is
unconvinced by Plantinga's treatment of the logical problem of evil. He argues
that there is a plausible position on free will - compatibilism - on which free
actions may nevertheless be causally determined. In which case, God <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">can</i> choose to create a world in which
free agents and moral goodness exist, but no evil exists because those free agents
are caused always to do the right thing. Plantinga responds by rejecting
compatibilist accounts of free will.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There is a fairly
broad consensus that the logical problem of evil has now largely been dealt
with by Plantinga and subsequent developments. Sobel, however, (2004) disputes
this. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">The hiddenness
argument</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">For many, God is largely hidden. We fail to find good
evidence for his existence. Nor does God directly reveal himself to us (via a
religious experience, say). Consequently, given this the degree of 'divine hiddenness',
many of us fail to believe. But surely God, if he exists, would want us to believe
in him?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">An argument against theism based on divine hiddenness has
been developed articulated in some detail by J.L. Schellenberg. Schellenberg's original
argument in his book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Divine Hiddenness
and Human Reason</i> (1993) might be summarised as follows:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">(1) There are people who
are capable of relating personally to a perfectly loving God but who, through
no fault of their own, fail to believe. </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">(2) If there is a perfectly
loving God, then there are no such people. </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">(3) Therefore, there is no
such God. </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Because he maintains that God would be perfectly loving,
Schellenberg concludes that God does not exist. Note that premise (1) concerns
the existence of what might be called inculpable or non-resistant<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;">[6]</span></span></span></span></a>
non-believers: individuals who </span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">do not willfully aim to shut the door on any relationship with God that
might be on offer, but who nevertheless fail to believe. </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">There
appear to be such people. Indeed, not only do there appear to be non-believers
who aren't resistant to belief, it seems many actually want to believe. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Why suppose premise (2) is true? Schellenberg argues that
a perfectly loving God will want to enter into a personal relationship with
each of us. However, we can only enter into such a relationship if we believe
God exists. Hence God, if he exists, will ensure that each of us believes in
him (unless, of course, we are resistant). It is only if we believe God exists
that the possibility of our entering into a relationship with God opens up to
us.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Is this an external <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logical</i>
objection to theism? It can be. To qualify as an external logical objection, as
I have defined it, the objection must be that the theist's belief in the
existence of non-resistant non-believers is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logically
incompatible</i> with their theism. Now, as I note below, not all theists accept
that there are non-resistant non-believers. For such theists, then, the above
argument is not a 'logical objection' to their theism. Still, many theists do
accept that non-resistant non-belief exists. Is this, then, a logical objection
to their theism? It depends on the status of the second premise. A variety of hiddenness
arguments are possible. We might argue that the existence of a perfectly loving
God <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logically entails</i> there will be
no non-resistant non-believers. If that is the argument, then this is indeed an
external logical objection (so far as it is aimed at theists who accept non-resistant
non-belief exists). However, we might instead merely argue that it is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">improbable</i> that a perfectly loving god would
allow non-resistant non-belief. If that is the argument, then the above
argument is an evidential objection to theism. Schellenberg offers both forms
of argument.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;">[7]</span></span></span></span></a></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Theists might respond to logical version of the
hiddenness argument in a number of ways. In particular, they may: (i) refuse to
accept that non-resistant non-belief exists, (ii) reject that principle that
belief non-resistant non-belief is logically incompatible with belief in a perfectly
loving God, or (iii) give up belief in a perfectly loving God.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">As we have already noted, some theists do deny that resistant
non-belief exists. Some maintain that, in a sense, non-belief does not exist.
All of us know, at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">some</i> level, that
God exists. We merely choose to suppress this knowledge. Alternatively, theists
may allow that some of us don't know that God exists, but that our lack of
knowledge is due to our own resistance. Difficulties with such responses
include the fact that there's good empirical evidence some of us really are non-resistantly
ignorant of God's existence, including those of us who have never even
encountered theistic belief, for example. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Some theists may be prepared to accept that God is not
perfectly loving. However, the most popular response to the hiddenness is to
reject premise (2).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Some theists maintain, for example, that God might be
justified in allowing non-resistant non-belief in order to achieve certain
greater goods. Michael Murray (2002), for example, argues that were God to make
his existence clearer to us, so that reasonable, non-resistant non-belief was
no longer possible, then we would no longer have the opportunity to develop
good characters for which we are ourselves responsible.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Others (the so-called <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">skeptical
theists</i>) maintain that whether or not we can think of a reason that would
justify God in allowing non-resistant non-belief, there could still be a
reason. In fact, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">for all we know</i>,
there is such a reason. Our mere inability to think of such a reason fails to
provide us with good grounds for believing no such reason exists (this, it's
suggested, would be a faulty noseeum inference - akin to arguing that if I
can't see any insects in my garage, then there probably aren't any insects in
my garage). In any case, given there could be such a reason, there can be no
logical<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i>inconsistency in believing
both that God is perfectly loving and that non-resistant non-belief exists. In
response, Schellenberg reverses this logic: if Schellenberg has, as he claims,
successfully shown that belief in a perfect being is incompatible with belief
in non-resistant belief, then he <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">has</i>
shown that there's no adequate reason for God to allow non-resistant non-belief
(2015: 111).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Verificationist and falsificationist
objections</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">We have already
briefly discussed A.J. Ayer's verificationist objection to theism. Ayer wields
his Verification Principle to try to show that the statement</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>God exists</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">is not false but
meaningless. We have also seen that responses to such nonsense objections
include (i) rejecting the criterion of nonsense or meaninglessness being
applied (in this case, the Verification Principle), and (ii) maintaining that,
whether or not the proposed criterion is correct, the statement in any case
meets it.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">The Verification
Principle is certainly a contentious philosophical principle. A standard
theistic objection is that the principle is self-undermining. For, it's claimed,
the verification principle is itself neither analytic nor observationally
verifiable. Thus, by its own lights, the Principle is meaningless. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">However, is the
Principle observationally unverifiable? Meaning and observation do appear to be
linked. The meaning of our public language is unavoidably taught and learned
through observational encounters (I learnt what words like 'cat', 'house' mean
by hearing them used in encounters with cats and houses, for example). But then
might not some empirically confirmed theory of how language acquires meaning
have the Verification Principle, or something like it, as a consequence? In
which case, the Principle itself might yet be empirically confirmed.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Whether or not
such a case for the Verification Principle might be made, Ayer himself provides
no grounds in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Language Truth and Logic</i>
(2001) for supposing his Principle is true. The Principle merely functions as
an assumption. So theists can justifiably point out that Ayer's case in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Language Truth and Logic</i> for supposing
that 'God exists' is meaningless rests on a principle that is both highly
controversial and for which he provides no argument.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">One ambiguity in
the Verification Principle is: <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">who</i>
must be in a position empirically to verify the statement if it is to qualify
as meaningful? An actual human being? But then the Principle seems too strong. Consider
the statement:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A dinosaur walked across that very
spot exactly 200 million years ago.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">This, surely, is
a meaningful statement. However, it may be that no actual human being will ever
be in a position to verify it. Obviously, there were no humans around 200
million years ago to verify it. And, given the amount of time that has elapsed,
it might be impossible for any actual humans to verify it either now or in the
future.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If, on the other
hand, we allow merely possible beings, human or not, to count as verifiers, then
God, as a possible being, is presumably in a position to verify all sorts of
things, including his own existence. In which case the statement that God
exists is not unverifiable.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Further, John
Hick (1966: 195) points out that while we actual humans may not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">currently</i> be able to verify that God
exists, it may be that we will be able to do so in the future - after we die.
Thus what Hick calls an 'eschatological' verification remains a possibility.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Finally, it's by
no means clear that we actual humans cannot now verify that God exists. Might
not, say, arguments from design provide us with good grounds for supposing God
exists by pointing to the fact that God best explains certain observed features
of the universe? Alternatively, might not the evidential problem of evil
provide us with good grounds for supposing that whatever, if anything, created
the universe, it is not God?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">If, in response
it's suggested that only a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">direct</i>
observation of God can verify his existence (that is not a suggestion Ayer
makes, by the way), then again our Principle will be too strong as surely
scientists are able meaningfully to posit the existence of all sorts of things that
cannot be directly observed: subatomic particles for example.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">An even tougher
criterion of meaningfulness says that a statement is meaningful only if it can
be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">falsified</i> - that's to say, only if
some possible experience might give us good grounds for supposing the statement
is false. Note that the Verification Principle allows two ways in which non-analytic
statements might satisfy the Principle's condition of meaningfulness: the
condition is met if there could be observational grounds for supposing the
statement is true, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">or</i> observational
grounds for supposing the statement is false. The suggestion, now, is that
there must be potential observational grounds for supposing the statement is
false. Observational grounds for supposing the statement is true won't do. So we
are setting the bar even higher than Ayer did for a statement to qualify as
meaningful.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Antony Flew (Flew,
Hare, and Mitchell1(964)) seems to suggest at least something like this falsificationist
principle. Flew begins with John Wisdom's well-known parable of the gardener.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 25.15pt; margin-top: 0cm; margin: 0cm 25.15pt 0cm 1cm;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Once upon a time two explorers came
upon a clearing in the jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers and
many weeds. One explorer says, ‘Some gardener must tend this plot’. The other
disagrees, ‘There is no gardener’. So they pitch their tents and set a watch.
No gardener is ever seen. ‘But perhaps he is an invisible gardener.’ So they
set up a barbed-wire fence. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds.
(For they remember how H. G. Wells’s The Invisible Man could be both smelt and
touched though he could not be seen.) But no shrieks ever suggest that some
intruder has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever betray an
invisible climber. The bloodhounds never give cry. Yet still the Believer is not
convinced. ‘But there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, insensible to
electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes no sound, a gardener who
comes secretly to look after the garden which he loves.’ At last the Sceptic
despairs, ‘But what remains of our original assertion? Just how does what you call
an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener
or even from no gardener at all?’</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">In this example,
suggests Flew, something that starts out as an assertion is gradually reduced,
step-by-step, to something else. The original assertion suffers 'the death of a
thousand qualifications' as what might potentially have counted as evidence
against the assertion is discounted until in the end, nothing at all is allowed
to falsify what's asserted. At that point, suggests Flew, nothing is asserted.
Flew suggests that similarly, when religious people assert such things as that
God loves us as a father loves his children, that God has a plan, and so on,
and skeptics point out what appears to be strong evidence against such claims,
the religious tend endlessly to explain that evidence away in much the same way
as the defender of belief in an invisible gardener. That's to say, they
endlessly qualify their assertions so as to immunise them against any empirical
refutation. But then such claims similarly end up dying the death of a thousand
qualifications. Ultimately, what the theist says ends up lacking any assertoric
meaning.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Is Flew's
criticism fair? R.M. Hare responds with is own parable. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 25.15pt; margin-top: 0cm; margin: 0cm 25.15pt 0cm 1cm;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">A certain lunatic is convinced that
all dons want to murder him. His friends introduce him to all the mildest and
most respectable dons that they can find, and after each of them has retired,
they say, ‘You see, he doesn’t really want to murder you; he spoke to you in a
most cordial manner; surely you are convinced now?’ But the lunatic replies
‘Yes, but that was only his diabolical cunning; he’s really plotting against me
the whole time, like the rest of them; I know it I tell you’. However many
kindly dons are produced, the reaction is still the same (Flew, Hare, and
Mitchell (1964)).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Hare points out there is no behaviour of the dons that this
will accept as counting against his theory. Therefore, on Flew's test, this
person asserts nothing. But this conclusion seems wrong: we consider such a
person mistaken. We disagree with him. If he made no assertion, no disagreement
would be possible.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Young Earth Creationism
provides another apparent counter-example. Many Young Earth Creationists won't
let anything count against their theory that the universe is only around 6,000
years old. Whatever evidence is provided against their theory (the fossil
record, light from distant stars, etc.) is, in one way or another, explained
away. Should we conclude, then, that when such a Young Earth Creationist says,
'the Universe is only a few thousand years old' they fail to assert anything at
all? Surely not. But then falsifiability, as a criterion of meaningfulness (or
at least of meaningful <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">assertion</i>), is
too strong. </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Also, notice that some
theists would not answer 'nothing' to the question: what, if anything, might
show that your belief in God is false? In which case, even if Flew's criterion
of meaningful assertion were correct, it would in any case fail establish that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">this</i> sort of theist failed to assert
anything by saying 'God exists'.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">Conclusion</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">There is a vast
array of logical objections to theism. By no means all have been included here.
New objections will no doubt emerge. Do any succeed?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">We have seen
how, with some ingenuity, it is always possible to find a way round an internal
or external logical objection, by, say, tweaking your definition of God,
finding some fault in the logic, or, in the case of external objections, giving
up one of your other beliefs. Does this mean that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">all logical objections fail</i>?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">In so far as such
objections force theists to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">revise their
position</i>, no.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">What these
objections target are very specific conceptions of God (sometimes in
combination with other beliefs) and, in many cases, the theism that involves
those very specific conceptions must, on pain of contradiction, be abandoned
(or else the other beliefs abandoned). The <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">target</i>
theistic belief or belief-combination is sometimes successfully refuted.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Theists
sometimes acknowledge this. However, other varieties of theism, very loosely
understood, always remain on the table. So the theist can always switch to one
of those other varieties. For example a theist convinced by logical objections
to a personal God may, in response, switch to a non-personal conception of God.
Indeed, the theist may insist that one of the other varieties of God was always
what they had in mind. They've just been misunderstood, and/or have themselves been
unclear about the character of the God they believe in.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[8]</span></span></span></span></a></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">From the
perspective of the theist, this strategy of switching and adjusting belief in
response to such objections constitutes <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">progress</i>
in getting clear about what theism fundamentally involves. Such logical
objections are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">helpful </i>to theism,
they say, by allowing theists to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">clarify
the nature of God.</i></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">From the
perspective of many atheist critics, on the other hand, these same logical
objections are in many cases a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">threat</i>
to theism, and the theistic strategy of switching, modifying, and/or abandoning
beliefs in order to retain at least some sort of logically consistent theistic
belief looks suspiciously like, not clarification, but rather a merry-go-round
of evasion.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Which of these
two perspectives is the more accurate is, I suspect, the fundamental question
to press regarding logical (and indeed evidential) objections to theism.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-themecolor: text1;">REFERENCES</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Boethius,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ancius
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Schellenberg,
John (2006) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Divine Hiddenness and Human
Reason</i> New Edition, Ithica NY: Cornell University Press.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Schellenberg,
John (2015) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Hiddenness Argument</i>
Oxford: Oxford University Press.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Sobel, Jordan
Howard (2004) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Logic and Theism, Arguments For and Against belief in God</span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"> Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Stump, Eleanor
(1997) 'Simplicity' in P. Quinn and-C. Taliaferro (eds.) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">A Companion to Philosophy of Religion </i>Oxford: Blackwell</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Eleanor Stump
and Norman Kretzmann (1981) 'Eternity' <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The
Journal of Philosophy</i> 78/8: 429-458.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Walterstorff,
Nicholas (2007) 'God is Everlasting' in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Philosophy
of Religion: Selected Readings </i>third edition Peterson, M., Hasker, W., Reichenbach,
B. and Basinger, D. (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Wittgenstein,
Ludwig (1998) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Philosophical Investigations</i>
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.</span></p>
<div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"><br clear="all" />
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I assume for the
purposes of this essay that contradictions cannot be true, though note that
some, including Graham Priest, argue that some contradictions can be true (and,
simultaneously, false). See Priest (2006).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[2]</span></span></span></span></a> <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">Note the argument is not that the evil we
observe provides good <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">evidence</i>
against the existence of God, making the existence of God less <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">probable</i>. That is the evidential problem
of evil. See the chapter in this volume 'Evidential Objections to Theism'.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[3]</span></span></span></span></a> <span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Of course, in suggesting that the
theist can solve the logical problem of evil by dropping any one of the three
classical omni-attributes, I am assuming those omni-attributes are logically
independent, which is contentious. If omnipotence logically requires
omniscience, say, then the theist does <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>
have the option of dropping omniscience <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">alone</i>.
They would have to drop omnipotence too.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[4]</span></span></span></span></a> <span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This example is adapted from one
provided by Linda Zagzebski in her entry to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Stanford
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> on 'Foreknowledge and Freewill': https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[5]</span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Note that, for
technical reasons, the authors prefer to characterise omnipotence in terms of
performing tasks, but in terms of bringing about certain states of affairs.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[6]</span></span></span></span></a>
Note that in later developments of the argument, <span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Schellenberg switches from talk of inculpable
belief to talk of non-resistant belief, acknowledging that one might somehow be
culpable - be to blame - for ones failure to believe in God even if one is not
aiming deliberately to shut the door on any relationship with God that might be
on offer. It is the latter 'resistant' form of non-belief that Schellenberg
maintains is incompatible with the existence of a perfectly loving God. (2015:
54-55)</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[7]</span></span></span></span></a> <span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Schellenberg has suggested to me in
correspondence that his (2015) volume presents an argument that belief in
perfectly loving god is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">incompatible</i>
with belief in non-resistant believers, whereas elsewhere - </span>e.g. in his
(1993) book and in his (2004) paper - he argues only that it is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">actually</i> false that God would permit
non-resistant non-belief or that non-resistant non-belief provides at least <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">evidence</i> against the existence of a
perfectly loving god.<span style="font-family: "Times","serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></p>
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[8]</span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">They may use
'God' as a label for something they first encounter <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">through a glass darkly</i>, as it were </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">(Paul uses the
phrase in Corinthians: 1 Cor. 13, 12)</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">. Thus the subject matter of their
belief - the God they 'have in mind' - can remain a constant, even while the
beliefs they hold about the subject matter may undergo considerable revision.
Compare: suppose I introduce 'Tim' as a label for <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">him</i> - <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that</i> person I now
see dimly through a mist; it's still Tim I have in mind when I later admit that
much of what I first believed about Tim (based on his misty appearance) was
incorrect.</span></p>
</div>
</div>
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{margin-bottom:0cm;}</style></p>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-65515577432364526242020-11-28T10:26:00.019+00:002022-09-18T14:02:14.911+00:00The Narrative Fallacy and Alister McGrath on Christianity 'making sense' of things<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh9StKLKvcB5jr__0CViOiAmx6KcJF2Qin0WgKRLfpzQxYkabwjzfxWQVD_LnwJTzvEZGsKKITFgY2EJpnagn0H5i54-7NqebwCuZWGllKDeSpW0TsLBYBGOg17VFjsSjrVDGymwElV2ag/s618/Screenshot+2020-11-28+at+10.22.22.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="618" data-original-width="446" height="326" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh9StKLKvcB5jr__0CViOiAmx6KcJF2Qin0WgKRLfpzQxYkabwjzfxWQVD_LnwJTzvEZGsKKITFgY2EJpnagn0H5i54-7NqebwCuZWGllKDeSpW0TsLBYBGOg17VFjsSjrVDGymwElV2ag/w235-h326/Screenshot+2020-11-28+at+10.22.22.png" width="235" /></a></div><br />Here are two sets of beliefs. Read each and decide which is set of
beliefs is more likely to be true.</span></span></span>
</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Belief set
one</span></span></i></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Mary lives in London</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Jill travelled in a sports car. </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Jill had a sun tan.</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Jill gave someone a case of wine. </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Belief set
two</span></span></i></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Mary, who lives in London, inherited a
sports car, but didn't have a driving license at that time, so she lent it to
her good friend Jill, who used it to drive down to the South of France for a
week long vacation on which she developed an impressive sun tan. On her return,
Jill gave Mary a case of good French wine she bought while there to show her
appreciation.</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">The first belief set involves just four disconnected claims. The second
set includes those claims but weaves them together into a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">narrative</i> that is coherent and makes sense. The story makes <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">meaningful connections</i> between the four claims. </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Many people will intuitively find the second set of beliefs much more
plausible than the first. They will suppose it's more likely to be true.</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">However, a moment's reflection reveals that the second belief set
can't be more probable than the first, because it makes the same four claims <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">plus several additional claims</i>. If the
story is true, then the four claims are true, but even if all four claims are
true, the story could easily be false.</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Here's a quite different story involving the same four claims.</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">Mary lives in a London, and suddenly
fell ill. Jill, her closest friend, was skiing at the time, and wanted to be by
her friend's side. So Jill persuaded someone staying at the same hotel, and who
was driving their sports car back to London the next day, to give her a lift.
Jill arrived in London tanned but exhausted, glad to see Mary recovering.
Jill was so grateful to the driver, she later sent them a case of wine.</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">It too 'makes sense' of the same four claims. But both these stories are rather <i>less</i> probable than just the four claims being true.</span></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">This tendency to find stories and narratives rather more probable than a
series of otherwise disconnected claims contained within them is flagged by Daniel Kahneman in his <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Thinking Fast and Slow</i>. He writes that the following two
scenarios were presented to different groups with a request to calculate their
probability:</span></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><i><span style="font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">A massive flood somewhere
in North America next year, in which more than 1,000 people drown</span></i></span></span></div><div style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><i><span style="font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"> </span></i></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><i><span style="font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">An earthquake in
California sometime next year, causing a flood in which more than 1,000 people
drown</span></i></span></span></div><div style="margin-left: 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><i><span style="font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"> </span></i></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">The second scenario was judged more probable, though it's actually
less probable as it involves more claims. However, it links events together
causally, in a narrative fashion, and so is more coherent. Kahneman suggests
our 'fast thinking' tends to confuse plausibility/coherence with probability,
leading us astray. As a result, we commit what's sometimes called<i> the narrative fallacy.</i><br /></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">I think this tendency may partly explain the human
propensity toward religious belief. Religions invariably tell a story about
human beings and our place in the universe. When we take a step back and look
at the 'big picture', a belief system like Christianity can seem to 'make sense'
of things in a way that can lead us to judge it to be much more probable than it really is. </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">I think this is going on in these quotes from the theologian
Alister McGrath, for example:</span></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div style="margin: 5pt 32.25pt 5pt 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span class="a"><span style="font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">it is the
Christian vision of reality as a whole – rather than any of its individual
components – that proves compelling. Individual observations of nature do not
“prove” Christianity to be true; rather, Christianity validates itself by its
ability to make sense of those observations. </span></span><span style="font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">p4 of<a href="https://www.academia.edu/32088608/The_Rationality_of_Faith_How_does_Christianity_make_sense_of_things" target="_blank">
'</a></span><span style="font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/32088608/The_Rationality_of_Faith_How_does_Christianity_make_sense_of_things" target="_blank">The Rationality of Faith: How
does Christianity make sense of things?'</a></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> <br /></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 32.25pt 0.0001pt 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span class="a"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">As a younger man, I found that the chief intellectual
virtue of Christianity then seemed to be that it offered a coherent and
rationally motivated account of the world, disclosing a hidden web of meaning
and connectedness behind the ephemeral and seemingly incoherent world that we
experience. No matter how fragmented our world of experience may seem, there is
a half-glimpsed bigger picture that holds things together, its threads
connecting together in a web of meaning what might otherwise seem incoherent
and pointless. What once might </span></span><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">have seemed to be a muddle and jumble
comes to be seen as an interconnected and meaningful vision of reality (Ibid. pp5-6)</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 32.25pt 0.0001pt 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;">And again, here's McGrath...</span></span></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 32.25pt 0.0001pt 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Cambria;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div style="margin: 5pt 25.15pt 5pt 1cm; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span>Faith does not
contradict reason, but transcends it through a joyous divine deliverance from
the cold and austere limits of human reason and logic. We are surprised and
delighted by a meaning to life that we couldn’t figure out for ourselves. But
once we’ve seen it, everything makes sense and fits into place…Like Moses, we
are led to climb Mount Nebo, and catch a glimpse of the promised land – a land
that really is there, but which lies beyond our normal capacity to see, hidden
by the horizon of human limitations. The framework of faith, once grasped,
gives us a new way of seeing the world, and making sense of our place in the
greater scheme of things.</span><span>(McGrath, <i><span>Surprised by Meaning</span></i>, p6) </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span> </span></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times; font-size: medium;">I suspect the Narrative Fallacy also partly explains the enduring popularity of argument-to-the-best-explanation type cases for miracles, religious and New Age belief systems, and conspiracy theories. An explanation of otherwise unrelated events/coincidences in terms of a narrative involving conspirators, spirit beings, ghosts, or gods, etc. is going to seem more intuitively plausible and appealing than just a bald statement of the facts to be explained, even if it's actually less likely to be true.</span></div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;">
</span></span><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><style>
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{page:WordSection1;}</style></span></span></div>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-5719522184907718702020-11-27T12:27:00.002+00:002020-11-27T12:28:30.839+00:00The Evil God Challenge - the movie<p> </p><div data-contents="true"><div data-block="true" data-editor="3jmdh" data-offset-key="1s2ba-0-0"><div class="public-DraftStyleDefault-block public-DraftStyleDefault-ltr" data-offset-key="1s2ba-0-0"><span data-offset-key="1s2ba-0-0"><span data-text="true">Here's my Evil God Challenge: The Movie (3 minute intro to problem of evil - useful classroom resource!).<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" class="BLOG_video_class" height="341" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/WiufsmxiUiU" width="481" youtube-src-id="WiufsmxiUiU"></iframe></div><br /></span></span></div></div></div>Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.com0