tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post6903643539628532717..comments2024-03-22T06:22:08.010+00:00Comments on Stephen Law: Good and bad ways of influencing the beliefs of othersStephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-53268051160265522622013-01-08T06:47:38.916+00:002013-01-08T06:47:38.916+00:00Thought-provoking post.
The above argument sugges...Thought-provoking post.<br /><br />The above argument suggests that rational arguments are the ethical way of influencing others. At least, significantly less ethically-dubious than those other ways of shaping beliefs that we agree are bad.<br /><br />Personally I hardly needed convincing, however one can easily object by pointing out the false dichotomy: moralizers argue that teaching a rational approach to ethics is no good, using some degree of valid logic and true facts.<br /><br />That grey area between critical thinking and indoctrination is where I think we really start loosing sight of what "ought" be taught (because of what "is" known to be true). Are the arguments of moralizers "non-arguments" or valid?<br /><br />Once we've accepted that teaching kids the truth is ethically responsible, we have terrible trouble identifying which teachings are sufficiently misleading that they're "indoctrination". Particularly when political parties argue.@blamerhttp://twitter.com/blamernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-60393217595784583332013-01-05T22:46:53.464+00:002013-01-05T22:46:53.464+00:00I think this reveals the importance of argument in...I think this reveals the importance of argument in philosophy. When you argue a position or point of view, you are putting it at risk - a point you allude to yourself. If you avoid all challenges to your position, you are not practicing philosophy in my view. It's only by being challenged that an argument can be strengthened, paradoxically.<br /><br />Regards, Paul.Paul P. Mealinghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14573615711151742992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-88080708883789716382013-01-04T21:40:06.176+00:002013-01-04T21:40:06.176+00:00Really good post. Really good post. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-5615454956948545842013-01-04T17:37:02.096+00:002013-01-04T17:37:02.096+00:00In his excellent book, The Secular Conscience, Aus...In his excellent book, <em>The Secular Conscience</em>, Austin Dacey reminds us that "there is nothing illiberal about asserting an objective truth, a claim that is made true by the way the world is. You do it every time you give the time of day to someone who asks. You don't thereby <em>coerce</em> your neighbor into believing it is noon, you give him a reason to believe it." (p.138) He's responding to Pope Benedict's ill-considered attack on secular liberalism, but also showing how liberals themselves can fall into an all-values-are-equal relativism through what he calls the Liberty Fallacy: "Conscience is free, so it must be liberated from shared objective standards of rightness and truth."Jon Wainwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01890086418385419984noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-59293954906886353882013-01-04T16:46:45.985+00:002013-01-04T16:46:45.985+00:00Yes you're spot on re Nozick, Jon.Yes you're spot on re Nozick, Jon.Stephen Lawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-56187304223938550732013-01-04T16:11:41.084+00:002013-01-04T16:11:41.084+00:00I've always liked Robert Nozick's descript...I've always liked Robert Nozick's description of a philosophical argument as "an attempt to get someone to believe something, whether he wants to believe it or not. A successful philosophical argument, a strong argument, <em>forces</em> someone to a belief." Until now, however, I don't think I understood this important distinction between the causal and normative power of an argument, and that Nozick is talking about normative and not causal force.<br /><br />This also reminds me of Jamie Whyte's idea that no one is entitled to their beliefs, which sounds a bit intolerant on first hearing, but is actually an important constraint, since this kind of intellectual protectionism discourages argument. If I'm entitled to my beliefs regardless of any argument you care to make, we're not going to get very far.Jon Wainwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01890086418385419984noreply@blogger.com