tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post5016910211924305022..comments2024-03-22T06:22:08.010+00:00Comments on Stephen Law: Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refutedStephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comBlogger151125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-71159711987194976472015-05-01T12:28:51.986+00:002015-05-01T12:28:51.986+00:00contd.
(2) Here I'm not sure that I have gott...contd.<br /><br />(2) Here I'm not sure that I have gotten the point of your argument.<br />You say: " Insofar as a human mind has any propositional content (like R), that content got there through the chemical/electrical properties of the nervous system". I agree with you, but think the proposition like "stars go to school when sun rises" has got there through the chemical/electrical properties of the nervous system, too. If you are taking imagination a cognitive faculty, alright, that proposition is product of my cognitive faculty (not a good idea), but it certainly is not a belief. So I do not think any proposition that I have in my mind should be taken as a belief.<br /><br /><br />(3) Yes sorry, it was because of my misunderstanding Prof. Plantinga's notion of defeat. I thought X is a defeater for Y, iff X --> ~Y. Thank you for guidance. But with regards to your guidance, I can correct my argument to the following:<br /><br />a) believes in N as a product of perception and induction.<br /><br />b) believes in "P(R|N+E) is low" as a product of Bayesian probability assigning faculty<br /><br />Now for the naturalist we have<br />1) N (premise)<br /><br />2) Q: P(R|N+E) is inscrutable (premise)<br /><br />3) P(R) is inscrutable (conclusion).<br /><br />If she can extend R to all our cognitive faculties, she has a defeater for every belief, including N and also Q (which is not mentioned in EAAN), then the Naturalist can conclude:<br /><br />4) ?N<br /><br />5) ?Q <br /><br />Naturalist, here, faces 2 equally produced beliefs, N and Q which lead to agnosticism and self-defeat if conjoined. Unless she thinks that Bayesian probability assigning faculty is fundamental, the naturalist has no reason to withhold N, rather than Q in order to escape from self-defeat. [Furthermore it is not clear why she should doubt all of her beliefs if she only doubts that majority of her beliefs (say two thirds) are true. any way my argument doe not focus on this point]<br /><br />I am happy that you agree with my Bayesian conclusion. Thank you for commenting.<br /><br /><br /> (4) a. Is R something we know about the world? (Just think of the beliefs of all people, including the mental retard and schizophrenic patients, all around the world and throughout history. Just think of the fallibility and systematic biases of our reasoning) I do not think more than half of those beliefs are true. Are we really created in God's image?) If we were sure about R, then we could say, theory B explains it better than theory A. The problem is the fact that no one is sure about R. Even those people, who are sure about their own beliefs, cannot be sure about the truth of other people's belief content (no access). Some technical problems may also arise if we set the primary probability of R too high (see Sober and Fitelson 1997).<br /><br />(4) b. Furthermore if we take R seriously (and I do not take it so), then I do not think N+E causes any conflict or falsification. If I believe in unguided evolution, and it does not provide any reason for R (P(R|N+E) is inscrutable), then I cannot say that it is in conflict with R. Silence differs from Conflict. The more accurate position would be imperfection. N+E should be enhanced by a state of affairs like X to explain R. For instance, I can add God (A supernatural being who occasionally interferes with nature), or it is possible to add an idea like Automated Naturalized Content (ANC) [this is imaginary, but can be defined within naturalism] which asserts that any thought (T) automatically creates content C, so that C is true iff T causes proper action (or T is indicator- There are many theories of naturalized content which describe how Prof. Plantinga's indicators can be created). P(R|N+E+ANC) is high. I believe my ANC works as well as TT, and creates less complexity. Unless we have some independent reason to favour one, the only possible ways of comparing ANC and TT will be Occam's razor and explanatory range.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-76879927904257840322015-05-01T12:28:08.560+00:002015-05-01T12:28:08.560+00:00Hi Ryan
Thank you very much for your thoughtful an...Hi Ryan<br />Thank you very much for your thoughtful answers and your interesting and light shedding analogies. Now I share my ideas. I hope they are plausible.<br /><br /><br />(1) I think I should agree with you that (1) does not hold, but I do not think that science is totally incapable of favouring naturalism over at least some branches of supernaturalism. First let me tell you the reason of my retreat. When comparing two metaphysical systems, one should consider all available data, namely, historical, scientific, philosophical, moral, etc. So fully alliance of science is not enough, because science alone is not decisive in nature. However it can be considered as one source of data beside others.<br /><br />I believe if we define supernatural as an entity which is not observable and there is no possible observable evidence to support it, then science can never favour naturalism over supernaturalism or vice versa. However, if there is any observable and significant evidence in favour of supernaturalism, science does have something to say. For example, although science may be agnostic about the mechanisms of telekinesis, it is not silent on whether it can significantly change the outcomes of random processes.<br /><br /><br />To keep on topic, I'm not going to discuss for whether current scientific data is (or can be) for or against Traditional Theism. <br /><br />Thank you for introducing resources. I will surely study them.<br /><br />to be continued<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-88997055943507940182015-05-01T12:25:29.503+00:002015-05-01T12:25:29.503+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-91401316767790076582015-04-27T16:34:45.097+00:002015-04-27T16:34:45.097+00:00...continued from previous post.
(3) Your argumen......continued from previous post.<br /><br />(3) Your argument here seems to suggest that if R is low, one should conclude that everything is false, including N and Q. However, if R is low, all that means is that no one knows what is true or false--everything is simply inscrutable because our cognitive faculties are broken. It may very well be that we do live in a naturalist's world, and our cognitive faculties are poor measures of truth. One, therefore, is not led to the denial of naturalism by the low reliability of cognitive function; instead, one is simply led to universal skepticism or agnosticism. So, I say [4] and [5] in your argument do not follow from [1-3].<br /><br />Furthermore, this assessment seems to apply equally to the Bayesian analysis you provided. The probability of N&E certainly does not depend on the (un)reliability of our cognitive functions. Something is not more or less probable depending on whether we can understand it! Whether our world is a naturalist world should have nothing to do with anything us humans happen to think about it. So, I agree with your Bayesian conclusion.<br /><br />(4) Yes, one does not necessarily know that God in fact exists and calibrated human cognitive faculties to track true propositions. Plantinga's case with respect to the EAAN is not deductive--it does not begin with the truth of God to show that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Instead, Plantinga's case is about conflict or concord--that is, it proceeds on the <i>assumption</i> of either naturalism or theism to show if either assumption leads to conflict. He shows that conflict arises under the assumption of naturalism, but the same conflict does not arise under the assumption of theism. This does not establish that theism is true, but it does seem to make theism more compatible with what we otherwise seem to know about the world--namely, that our cognitive faculties are reliable.Ryan S Ashtonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03152076078903650949noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-88030394080647692192015-04-27T16:34:11.865+00:002015-04-27T16:34:11.865+00:00Hi Dara,
You certainly have some interesting line...Hi Dara,<br /><br />You certainly have some interesting lines of argument here. I appreciate the care with which you present them. I have a few replies to offer.<br /><br />(1) I am pretty confident that Plantinga would reject premise [3] in your argument. I, at least, would reject [3] for two reasons. First, I don't think science is in a position to verify or nullify a metaphysical proposition like naturalism. Naturalism is a monopolistic claim about all of reality (e.g. no supernatural entities exist; only physical entities exist). Science, however, works only within limited domains or paradigms. Edward Feser uses a good analogy on this point: he says science is like a metal detector--it is really good at detecting metal objects, but it cannot tell you whether metallic objects are the only things that exist. So, science can tell us whether certain things exist, but it cannot tell us if <i>only</i> certain kinds of things exist. Philosophy is the method that deals in universal claims, so I think naturalism is best affirmed or denied by philosophical analysis. Certainly, science can produce evidence in support of a philosophical argument for naturalism; but, naturalism cannot be the result of scientific investigation alone. (If you're interested, you can read more about this idea in my review of the book Naturalism: A Critical Analysis on my blog: <a rel="nofollow">http://ryansashton.blogspot.com/2013/11/review-of-naturalism-critical-analysis.html</a>)<br /><br />Second, I think there is scientific evidence that supports a denial of naturalism. For example, William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological argument. I won't press this point, though. I simply want to argue that one can embrace science without embracing naturalism, so [3] in your argument seems vulnerable.<br /><br />(2) Here you say, "No cognitive faculty is involved in production of R, so it is not a belief." I can't quite make out how this could be true under naturalism. I take R to simply be the proposition "human cognitive faculties are reliable." Under naturalism (which includes materialism about human beings), all mental states are products of chemical/electrical brain processes. This includes cognitive faculties. Insofar as a human mind has any propositional content (like R), that content got there through the chemical/electrical properties of the nervous system. Thus, R is indeed a consequence of cognitive faculties. I like to use an analogy of a calculator: however inputs are converted to outputs on a calculator depends on the electrical properties of its circuitry. The question is whether the calculator's circuitry was ever <i>calibrated</i> to match inputs to outputs according to true mathematical rules. It's certainly possible that a calculator that randomly matches inputs to outputs could give the output 5 to the input 2+2. The calculator is only reliable if it was somehow calibrated to follow mathematical rules. The human brain is in the same condition: under naturalism, the brain just matches inputs to outputs, so its reliability depends on whether it was calibrated to do so according to rules. The EAAN shows that, under naturalism, the brain was not calibrated to follow the rules of logic, so naturalism undermines our confidence in reliable cognitive functioning.<br /><br />continued...Ryan S Ashtonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03152076078903650949noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-66902234016971114532015-04-27T00:04:03.619+00:002015-04-27T00:04:03.619+00:00I can add to my argument that P(R) must be regarde...I can add to my argument that P(R) must be regarded very low in the first place. Who knows where we really are? We accept R only for continuing our thinking lives! So considering the Bayesian equation<br />P(N&E|R) = (P(R│N&E).P(N&E))/(P(R))<br />and giving very low probabilities to P(R) and P(R|N&E), we can infer<br />P(N&E|R) = P(N&E)<br />which means naturalism is not effected by R. If you think this is weird, you can think that we are talking about a conscious organism, not a human, which believes in N+E.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-71550183557370523262015-04-26T14:11:56.714+00:002015-04-26T14:11:56.714+00:00Ryan, Thanks for your patience and thoughtful poin...Ryan, Thanks for your patience and thoughtful points. I'm sorry for two things; first, that I cannot use technical language, and second, my English is not perfect. Therefore my words are hard to make sense.<br /><br />I think EAAN is valid argument, which asks a wrong question and does not pass so-what test. However, on some conditions that I will mention in the following, it can lose its validity.<br /><br /><br />(1). I do not mean that scientific evidence should necessarily override EAAN. I argue that an EAAN believing scientist will have to quit either science (S) or EAAN when she finds strong scientific evidence in favor of N. She will face an argument like;<br /><br />1) EAAN [N --> ~S] (premise)<br />2) S (premise)<br />3) S --> N (premise)<br />4) S & ~S (conclusion)<br /><br />In order to resolve the contradiction, she must give up one of the three premises. If she believes in premise 2 she cannot give up premise 3 because you cannot both believe in scientific method and ignore its consequences. Therefore she must choose between 1 and 2.<br /><br /><br />(1,3) You argued, both in (1) and (3) that, Given EAAN, Naturalism compromises our reasoning power. I do not think this is true. I believe an organism still can have its deductive and inductive reasoning powers, because they are related to the connection between thoughts, not the relation between thoughts and stimuli.<br /><br />For example in the intuition pump I added to (3) in my first comment, (O) can still have the inductive belief "if I dance (A'), the tree will change to a cat (E')" which corresponds to the actual causative relationship between the action of attacking (A), and the effect (E) of prey eating. Or I can believe that if every human havs horns, and Dara is a human, then Dara has horns. I do not think Prof. Plantinga argues for this position either, for it may have disastrous outcomes.<br />Suppose a naturalist who<br />a) believes in N as a product of perception and induction<br />b) believes in "P(R|N+E) is low" as a product of perception and deduction<br />Now for the naturalist we have<br /><br />1) N (premise)<br />2) Q: P(R|N+E) is low (premise)<br />3) P(R) is low (conclusion) or ~R for simplicity.<br />If she extends R to all our cognitive faculties, then she will conclude:<br />4) ~N<br />5) ~Q <br /><br />She faces 2 equal beliefs, 1 and 2 which lead to contradiction if conjoined. Unless she thinks that logical reasoning is fundamental, the naturalist has no reason to prefer Q to N.<br /><br />(2) No I do not confuse rules of logic with axioms of a logical system like geometry, mathematics or theory of chess. In any given logical system we use rules of logic to infer theorems from axioms. One of the axioms of any logical system is its own consistency. No logical system can prove or refute its own axioms. Axioms are starting points of any argument and any process of thinking and not necessarily self evident. You cannot believe/disbelieve that majority your beliefs are true (R). This is a hypothesis without which you cannot even say a word. No cognitive faculty is involved in production of R, so it is not a belief. So no one can ask why her cognitive faculties are reliable, while she does not know whether her cognitive faculties are reliable. It is like asking why unicorns have 20 teeth in their mouth, while no one knows how many teeth they have. N does not explain R. EAAN argues that N is contradictory to R, because it does not explain it. And this is wrong. <br /><br />(4) On the other hand a theist cannot be relieved by the proposition "I'm created in God's image" about her own cognitive faculties. Who knows whether the belief "I'm created in God's image" is true in the first place?<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-61715229551642113712015-04-25T17:46:27.641+00:002015-04-25T17:46:27.641+00:00Hi Dara,
I see that you're not exactly arguin...Hi Dara,<br /><br />I see that you're not exactly arguing against the validity of the EAAN argument, but rather against its utility. That's a fair response to the argument; I really don't think anyone has successfully refuted the EAAN (nor do I think it is likely that someone will), so naturalists are forced to find a way to work around it. That said, I'm not confident that your claims against the EAAN's utliity are sound.<br /><br />(1) I think you want to say here that scientific evidence for natualism can overrule the force of the EAAN: although the EAAN exerts some force against naturalism, scientific evidence for naturalism exerts more. I think this line of argument falls short because it supposes that the rational faculties required for analysis of scientific evidence is unaffected by the EAAN. However, the EAAN shows that, on naturalism, the entire system of human reasoning is undermined, which includes the reasoning scientists have to use to do science. The EAAN shows that, by virtue of the metaphysical restrictions asserted by naturalism itself, humans are incapable of actually knowing anything. This means that one cannot consistently take the EAAN to be true <i>and</i> think that he knows anything by virtue of science. Further, the EAAN cannot be "anti-science," because the EAAN is not a position; it is instead an argument. The implication of the EAAN shows that it is ironically <i>naturalism</i> that is "anti-science," if anything is. Theism does not conflict with science in this way because it allows for the possibility that human rational faculties were calibrated for truth-detection.<br /><br />(2) Here I think you confuse two concepts: the laws of logic and human cognitive reasoning. On the one hand, you are right to say that there is no way to prove the fundamental axioms of logic. The axioms of logic (like the principle of non-contradiction) are epistemological primaries: there is no way to explain them by way of something more primary. So, they can be taken as givens for any metaphysical system. On the other hand, mechanisms that are supposed to <i>detect</i> those axioms of logic are not metaphysical or epistemological primaries, so they do require some kind of explanation. Whatever metaphysical system one proposes, mechanisms that detect the laws of logic must be explainable from within that system's own precepts. Human cognitive reasoning is the mechanism in question here, so a proposed metaphysical system must be able to account for that mechanism's origin, if it is to permit its existence at all. Naturalism, therefore, needs to explain the calibration of human reasoning; the fact that the laws of logic are epistemological primaries does not alleviate this burden.<br /><br />(3) You say, "if she quits R for a moment and EAAN works well, she has not yet any good reason to leave N." If I understand you correctly, your saying that if a person quits believing her rational faculties are reliable, she still has reason to believe naturalism is true. I think the problem here is identical to the one in (1) above: namely, the compromise of human rational faculties is global under the EAAN; as a result, on naturalism, no reasoning is reliable, so one no longer has reason to believe anything, including naturalism.<br /><br />(4) I think Plantinga is correct to assert that theism is immune to the EAAN because theism permits a force into its metaphysical structure that is capable of calibrating human cognitive faculties toward truth-detection. The fact that theism does not suffer from the EAAN lends weight to its credibility. Theism is not self-defeating the way naturalism is self-defeating; this seems to me quite clearly of advantage to theism. If we take naturalism and theism to be the only two available metaphysical alternatives, the EAAN would certainly give one strong reason (I would even say decisive reason) to prefer theism over naturalism. A view like naturalism that nullifies all reasoning quite literally drops one into intellectual oblivion.Ryan S Ashtonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03152076078903650949noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-21647817528136220832015-04-24T21:30:04.322+00:002015-04-24T21:30:04.322+00:00Dear Ryan
Thank you for your careful and critical...Dear Ryan<br /><br />Thank you for your careful and critical review. In fact I was looking for someone to criticize my views. I hope my responses are not trivial. Except the second objection, my words are not attempting to reject EAAN, but to show that it is not useful, at least in the way its composer hopes to be. <br /><br />(1) EAAN tries to show that "Naturalism shoots itself in leg". If you believe it, then it is probably wrong, because your beliefs are probably wrong. All the science including E is probably wrong, as well. Well I think this apparent paradox should be of no value if we had enough scientific evidence for N, otherwise EAAN itself would be anti science, because it will assert that "science" shoots itself in leg, by finding something against itself.<br /><br />(2) Here, I mean that the axiom of a logical or cognitive system is not and cannot be proven or refuted in it. "P(R) is high" (realism or R) [although it is probably not the case, The Matrix Reloaded!] is one of the axioms of Naturalism, Theism and any other system of thought. I do not like the term "Warranted belief", for this belief is not warranted at all. You cannot undermine Naturalism for not proving or giving an explanation for R. On the other side it is not an advantage for System X for providing any explanation for its own axiom, and giving a circular argument. Given (2), I'd like to answer your forth criticism here. (4) Yes there is no God in EAAN, but Prof. Plantinga uses it to prefer Theism over Naturalism. My forth objection is not relevant in case of EAAN, but it still shows that no one can prefer Theism on the basis of EAAN, even a little.<br /><br />(3) A naturalist, taking realism as an axiom, does not need to believe (3). I argue here that even if she quits R for a moment and EAAN works well, she has not yet any good reason to leave N. She must keep her beliefs and act according to them if she wants to survive more. On the other hand she must keep away from competing ideas, in order not to put herself in danger. Sad story, but true. <br /><br />Thank you again.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-1554793741082217542015-04-24T21:27:06.893+00:002015-04-24T21:27:06.893+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-75157721811674794182015-04-23T17:56:39.297+00:002015-04-23T17:56:39.297+00:00DG,
I don't think any of your four objections...DG,<br /><br />I don't think any of your four objections hold against the EAAN.<br /><br />(1) The EAAN does not aim to show that naturalism is false. It instead attempts to show that naturalism (which includes materialism about human beings and Darwinian evolution) entails that human beliefs are unreliably true. Put another way, it shows that naturalism does not have any resources to calibrate human rational faculties for truth-detection. On naturalism, beliefs are irrelevant to behavior; on naturalism, behavior is just a product of determinate forces of physics within a nervous system. You basically say as much in your objection (3). The consequence of this argument, though, is not that naturalism is false; instead, the consequence of this argument is that, on naturalism, we simply cannot know whether naturalism is true (or anything else, for that matter) because naturalism compromises our entire network of rational faculties. This argument has nothing to do with science, so it is neither pro- nor anti-science.<br /><br />(2) If by "realism" you mean to include the claim that human rational faculties are reliable, then your objection here is question-begging. I believe this is in fact the kind of argument Law attempts to make here: he wants to assert that beliefs are somehow semantically linked to their neuro-physiological properties. However, since the EAAN is challenging precisely this kind of linkage, one cannot just build it into naturalism for "free" without justification and call the problem solved. The naturalist needs to produce a mechanism that explains how human rational faculties got calibrated to track true propositions at all. Natural selection is no good here because natural selection is blind to propositional content--natural selection can only winnow physical behaviors.<br /><br />(3) What you call pragmatic reliability here is of no consequence to the EAAN: the EAAN is perfectly compatible with one-to-one correspondence between beliefs and behaviors. The issue for the EAAN is precisely whether the beliefs one has are mostly true, not whether they correspond to adaptive behaviors. Suppose every time a person drank water, he had the belief "the earth is flat," and no other behavior ever produced that belief. This behavior and belief would correspond one-to-one, but the belief is still false. The truth/falsity of beliefs is all the EAAN deals with, so your objection here is irrelevant.<br /><br />(4) God is nowhere a part of the EAAN (neither in a premise nor the conclusion) so your objection here is again of no consequence. The EAAN assumes naturalism is true at the outset (which entails atheism) to show how it leads to conflict with the reliability of human beliefs. Whatever Plantinga has to say about God beyond the EAAN has no impact on the EAAN itself.Ryan S Ashtonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03152076078903650949noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-24000334961702404992015-04-13T08:32:14.270+00:002015-04-13T08:32:14.270+00:00cont'd
3. Even if we accept EAAN, we will see ...cont'd<br />3. Even if we accept EAAN, we will see that, given naturalism, there will be a one-one relationship between real stimuli (facts and acts) and the contents of beliefs. This ensures a progmatic reliability of our beliefs.<br /><br />Suppose an intelligent organism (O), which is, by natural selection, well adapted to its environment. Consider a stimulus (S) in the actual world (a prey in my scenario). This stimulus will cause some neurophysiologic activity in O's brain (NP-s). NP-s will produce a content (S') which is possibly not corresponding to the actuality (there is a tree not a prey). There is another neurophysiologic activity (NP-d) which is responsible for O's actual desire (D) to eat the prey, which will represent itself in a noncorresponding mode (D': I want to change the tree to a cat). While O in actual world is looking for a way to hunt the prey, it will believe that he is looking for a way to satisfy his pseudo-desire to make a cat. Ultimately it finds that "if he dances (A'), the tree will change to a cat (E')" which corresponds to the actual causative relationship between the action of attacking (A), and the effect (E) of prey eating. The point here is that the right<br />action will itself invoke other neurophysiologic activities which will again have a noncorresponding content property. If naturalism is true then if NP1 causes C1 at time T1 then it will cause C1 at time T2. And it is not probable that two different NPs will cause same Cs.<br />What O experiences is totally different from what is going on in real world. There is no single test by which O can find a way toward actuality. But.... But the big point is that **If and only if O pseudoacts according to pseudobeliefs it has in its mind, its body will act appropriately in response to the outside world**<br />In other words, while, given N+E as a fact, it is possible that our beliefs are not metaphysically true, they remain pragmatically reliable, and one must as before act upon her evidence based beliefs ( she must accept either naturalism or supernaturalism based on evidence not on the consequences).<br /><br /><br />4. EAAN is circular. This gets more obvious when Professor Plantinga asserts that any one who "believes" that she is created in God's image (G), has a guarantee for R. But it is clear that prior to "believing" to be created in God's image, the believer should take her R, for granted. G does not add any confidence to R.<br />now take this:<br /><br />I believe John is always right.<br />John says all my beliefs are false.<br />Or<br />I believe Mathew is always right.<br />Mathew says all my beliefs are true.<br />While the second pair of sentences do not seem paradoxical, they are not logically valuable either.<br />This goes with EAAN, too. Plantinga argues that if we N+E is true then it will crush itself, but if Christianity is true it won't. This the matter of John and Mathew!Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-78146955021370740222015-04-13T08:31:18.369+00:002015-04-13T08:31:18.369+00:00Hi, actually I did not get the gist of your argume...Hi, actually I did not get the gist of your argument Mr Law, but personally think that EAAN has 4 major problems.<br />1. EAAN is anti-scientific. Because it tries to reject naturalism even if there is (might be) enough scientific evidence supporting it.<br />Suppose billions of miles away, there exists a planet that contains life. One day we, humans, discover that planet and land on it. Surprisingly we encounter organisms that look and behave exactly like us but are less civilized. We find out then that they call themselves Viewmans. They let us to start studying life on their planet – vearth. Unlike earth – as Plantinga thinks – we (who are created in God's image in plantinga's view) find strong evidence in support of the fact that Viewmans are evolved by natural selection and nothing else. When we tell this to viewmans, one of them stands up and shouts: "If I were evolved by natural processes (E+N), then my cognitive abilities would probably be unreliable and adaptive. And since I cannot doubt on my cognitive abilities (I should take it as a priori), you, dirty humans, are liars! We are not result of naturalistic processes.<br />This shows that even if Plantinga's argument were sound, it would only prove that any rational (sorta rational) being can never believe that her beliefs are false, even if they are actually false.<br /><br />2. EAAN simply overlooks the fact that "realism" is an ontologic axiom in naturalism. Although its methaphysical probability is very low ( living in real world is not more probable than living in matrix),it is progmatically accepted, and is applied every where, including the relation between content and reality. Occam's Razor also favors this idea<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09175692824574235181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-21890132721170320582015-03-30T07:02:55.514+00:002015-03-30T07:02:55.514+00:00"if Plantinga is on target, theism remains th..."if Plantinga is on target, theism remains the best option if one wishes to avoid undercutting his belief that he is properly rational"<br /><br />Er, if you wish to avoid undercutting your belief that you are properly rational, you can simply refuse to believe otherwise, regardless of the evidence or logic. That's how theists do it.<br /><br />For a naturalist, your statement is much like saying that, if the latest study published in High Times is on target, the best way to think clearly is to go on a massive binge of alcohol and drugs. One doesn't even need to read the article to know that that would be the wrong path to follow.jqbhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07510836914645398165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-30229951735402056492015-03-30T06:45:54.506+00:002015-03-30T06:45:54.506+00:00"So Providence (atheists would call it 'l..."So Providence (atheists would call it 'luck') seems to play a role in whether we have the right beliefs about things that ultimately matter. None of us knows who's ultimately right or wrong (or at least we don't know if we know), so we can only hope that we're right (and that our faculties are reliable enough for the purpose)."<br /><br />Well, that may be all *you* can do, but other people have the scientific method and inference to the best explanation. <br /><br />"But what would it be more rational to hope in, a material universe with arbitrary laws in which out cognitive faculties could be unreliable, or a universe governed by a sentient law-giver who wants us to have the right beliefs?""<br /><br />It isn't at all rational to base one's beliefs on *hope*. As for what you apparently hope for, I find it utterly irrational because it flies in the face of the evidence we have for the sort of universe we live in, because it posits a entity that is non-corporeal while being sentient and has wants, and because it is coincident with myths created by ancient nomads for which we already have excellent sociological explanations both of the myths and of why people believe in them. Beyond that, I personally find it emotionally repellent. For one thing, this is a mysterious unexaminable end-of-the-line "cause", impenetrable to science ... it's a copout as an "explanation"; it in fact explains nothing, it merely asserts. Second, I don't want the universe to be run by an authoritarian "law-giver" who is forever spying on me and judging me and demanding that I worship it and threatening to torture me forever if I don't abandon my reason and succumb to its foul agents on Earth. jqbhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07510836914645398165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-70940924701992169332015-03-30T06:30:11.007+00:002015-03-30T06:30:11.007+00:00"Briefly, Plantinga's EAAN holds that nat..."Briefly, Plantinga's EAAN holds that naturalism entails that a non-rational cause produced a rational entity."<br /><br /><br />No. This is something true by definition of naturalism and is not something specific to EAAN.<br /><br />"Theism, by contrast, entails that a rational cause produced a rational entity."<br /><br />No. While actual theistic dogmas hold that, it isn't entailed ... gods could possibly co-exist with material things without having produced them.<br /> <br />"The relevant question for the naturalist, then, is whether it is plausible to hold that a non-rational (or a-rational) cause could reliably produce a rational entity?"<br /><br />No. Naturalists are aware that this is an established fact. Many theists, too, are aware that this is an established fact. In any case, it has nothing to do with EAAN.<br /><br />"Could undirected, purposeless molecules in motion give rise to a creature who can have beliefs about certain propositions and filter those beliefs through some kind of truth-preserving mechanism?"<br /><br />Yes, certainly.<br /><br />"Can the non-rational produce the rational?"<br /><br />Yes, certainly.<br /><br />"Plantinga's EAAN argues that it cannot"<br /><br />No it doesn't.<br /><br />"which, if correct, does pose a problem unique to naturalism"<br /><br />Er, certainly a valid refutation of naturalism poses a problem for naturalism, but not one unique to it.<br /><br />"The theist, who does not propose that non-rational processes produced rational creatures, is in no such dilemma."<br /><br />First, even if the plausibility of rational entities being produced by a-rational causes were a problem for naturalists, which it isn't, it wouldn't be a "dilemma". Second, the theist faces much more serious problems ... like how a non-physical, non-corporeal entity can possess physical traits like intelligence, intentions, plans, and the ability to construct physical worlds, and where this entity came from ... and if there is no necessity for it to come from anywhere, then the naturalist is free of this burden too.<br /><br />"The theist is rather in the position of explaining a calculator's reliability in producing true computations by reference to the mathematician who himself is capable of computation and who programmed the calculator purposefully."<br /><br />This is cheating ... mathematicians are physical entities constrained by the laws of physics. God is not anything like that.<br /><br />"The naturalist is in the position of explaining the calculator's reliability by reference to the random, chance-like collision of particles, none of which comprehend the mathematics themselves."<br /><br />Yeah, it's been done ... it's called the theory of evolution. And it's not "random" or "chance-like" ... that claim displays a near complete absence of understanding of evolution. This is an extremely naive and uninformed apologetics that's several orders of magnitude less sophisticated than Plantinga's argument. Please familiarize with *any* of the literature on evolution and the many many rebuttals that have been given (even by theistic evolutionists) of this very uninformed attempt at an argument.jqbhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07510836914645398165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-21462872059568080982014-09-28T04:16:24.771+00:002014-09-28T04:16:24.771+00:00Stephen, I was having a bit of difficulty understa...Stephen, I was having a bit of difficulty understanding your illustration of how cognitive constraints might operate, until I considered a possible typo:<br /><br />"Then, other things being equal, natural selection will tend to favour subjects holding beliefs with content BC1 over those holding beliefs with content BC2."<br /><br />Might the correct terms for BC1 and BC2 be MC1 and MC2, respectively?Binary Slimhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05840999348503712379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-75204182616523241802014-03-10T04:01:48.101+00:002014-03-10T04:01:48.101+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Philolinguisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622819518795177507noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-80428661360678553072014-03-09T16:58:32.307+00:002014-03-09T16:58:32.307+00:00Part 2. This kind of distortion is suggested by Wi...Part 2. This kind of distortion is suggested by Wittgenstein's 'private language argument'. The private-language user is the sole arbiter of what the words in his language mean, but that entails that the words don't have a determinate meaning (and hence no meaning at all). As Wittgenstein put it, "Whatever seems right to him [the private-language user] is right, so here we can't talk about 'right'?" This mirrors the situation in a 'top-down' discipline, where the 'thought-leaders' are the sole arbiters of whether anyone is making sufficient sense to be worth listening to. In such a discipline, the possibility arises that the thought-leaders are speaking a collective 'private language' (even if they're using words from a known language like English). Certain 'ivory-tower' disciplines (which shall remain nameless) have raises suspicions of distorting language in precisely this way (e.g. google 'Sokal affair'). <br /><br />Of course, it's also possible to be a one-man 'thought-leader', if you're in the habit of dismissing someone else's views if they simply disagree with yours on certain topics (e.g. your religion, or for that matter, your atheism). In which case, you could end up not making sense when thinking or talking about those topics (and not be aware of it). So language has a built-in structure that dictates we, individually and collectively, adopt certain norms and attitudes if we want to make sense, in both thought and speech. Some of these norms are covered in Habermas's 'Ideal Speech Situation', though I'm not knowledgeable enough to comment on how complete or accurate Habermas's description is in all its detail. So our general aversion to cults and ivory towers isn't a non-rational instinctive rejection of authority or attempts to discipline our thoughts, it's actually a rational desire to preserve the norms that make language work. Having said that, I don't think all religious thought necessarily falls in the 'cult' or 'ivory tower' categories. After all, 'religion' is a broad concept with vague boundaries.Philolinguisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622819518795177507noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-70984799798925951942014-03-09T16:57:37.405+00:002014-03-09T16:57:37.405+00:00PL said: "Because as long as we are relying s...PL said: "Because as long as we are relying solely on the assumptions integral to language-use, we have a universal and necessary set of norms by which to regulate our individual and collective reasoning. But if you're allowed to bring your favorite deity into the equation, then you're giving yourself a free pass to violate those norms whenever it suits you (e.g. if your deity 'reveals' to you that you shouldn't listen to people who disagree with you, but should get as far away as possible)."<br /><br />I think I should elaborate a little more on this point, because it's an important one and quite vague as it stands. I'll have to do it in 2 parts, because of the word-limit. <br /><br />Part 1. The discourses of science and technical (or 'how-to') disciplines generally have a 'building block' configuration. What I mean by that is, the knowledge-base of the discipline consists of predictions that can be tested by persons who are not experts in that discipline. E.g. I'm no chemist, but I can test if a solution is alkaline or acidic by dipping litmus paper in it (though I'd need a chemist to explain the significance of the result). So if the chemist predicts the paper will turn red in solution X, a layperson like me can test that prediction. A discipline has a 'building block' configuration if it consists mainly of predictions like that, with deductive and inductive linkages between them (forming theories). Laypersons like me lack the expertise to evaluate scientific theories in detail, but we can (collectively) test the many little predictions that support or falsify the theory. <br /><br />This 'building block' configuration allows for a 'division of labor' in scientific and technical disciplines. A bunch of experts in different disciplines, along with non-experts in any discipline, can work together to build theories and test them; without any one person knowing what the others know. Why is this important? Because this building block configuration mirrors the way language works. You could even say language is structured to facilitate this kind of conceptual division of labor. Imagine a discipline that doesn't have a 'building block' configuration. Instead, the discipline has a 'top down' configuration. To have your opinions considered even remotely relevant within the discipline, you have to be 'approved' by the discipline's thought-leaders. Such a 'top down' configuration is characteristic of cults and 'ivory tower' disciplines. But there is also a sense in which such a configuration distorts and undermines language itself.Philolinguisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622819518795177507noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-5485911563437716272014-03-07T15:07:00.321+00:002014-03-07T15:07:00.321+00:00PL,
Yes, the EAAN only has force against metaphys...PL,<br /><br />Yes, the EAAN only has force against metaphysical naturalism. Plantinga explicitly takes metaphysical naturalism to include materialism about human beings. The argument seems to be neutral over whether naturalism permits abstract entities like numbers into its ontology. Methodological naturalism by itself seems to be unaffected by the EAAN as well.<br /><br />Furthermore, I should be careful to point out that I'm not suggesting that the EAAN is an argument <i>for</i> theism; it is rather an argument <i>against naturalism</i>, as its name implies. My claim that theism is preferable to naturalism in light of the conflict illustrated by the EAAN is a further inference added on to the EAAN, not an assertion in the EAAN itself. It is probably accurate to say, though, that Plantinga's overall argument in <i>Where the Conflict Really Lies</i> (wherein the EAAN takes up only the final chapter) is that theism is preferable to naturalism. But this argument admittedly extends beyond the scope of the EAAN, so I agree with your observation that the EAAN does not by itself rule out sitting on the fence.Ryan S Ashtonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03152076078903650949noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-12823433646789846292014-03-07T14:45:50.046+00:002014-03-07T14:45:50.046+00:00PL still doesn't seem to realise that on his w...PL still doesn't seem to realise that on his worldview, there is no justification for taking anything he says seriously, as he is unable to show that he is not a sockpuppet for a demon.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09267356610062260128noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-77933619959114746712014-03-07T14:35:56.183+00:002014-03-07T14:35:56.183+00:00Ryan Ashton said: "I think the advantage that...Ryan Ashton said: "I think the advantage that the theist has is that his or her view is in concord with the assumption that human rational faculties are generally reliable, whereas the naturalist's view is in conflict with human rational faculties being generally reliable."<br /><br />That depends on which kind of naturalist you're talking about. The metaphysical naturalist would seem to be in trouble. However, it is possible to be a methodological naturalist who is careful to limit himself to hypotheses that are non-circular and make no claim to veracity (but only predictive efficacy). <br /><br />Such a naturalist could be agnostic about both metaphysical naturalism and theism (unless he subscribes to a theory about either that he believes is non-circular and non-empirical). I think quite a lot of people fall in that category. I may be one of them, though I'm a theist (for reasons that I believe are non-circular and non-empirical, namely that I was brought up that way and can't think of good reasons to stop believing, empirical or otherwise). <br /><br />To someone like that, EAAN would presumably not seem a good argument for theism, since it presents an either/or choice between metaphysical naturalism and theism. Someone who believes he could be agnostic about both would not see a need to commit to either. <br /><br />He could simply say "I don't know where we came from or where we're going. Because of the problem of veracity, I can't draw metaphysical conclusions from evolutionary biology, cosmology or atomic physics. I'm a methodological naturalist because that's integral to being a language-user. I believe in the efficacy of applied science." So in order for EAAN to be a valid argument for theism, it would have to force an either/or choice, one that rules out sitting on the fence. I'm not sure if it does that.Philolinguisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622819518795177507noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-48696278605530258212014-03-07T13:16:16.490+00:002014-03-07T13:16:16.490+00:00ASHTON
it shows that the theist at least does not ...ASHTON<br />it shows that the theist at least does not have a defeater for his belief that his faculties are reliable<br /><br />CARR<br />You haven't been paying attention to what Plantinga says.<br /><br />He claims demons exist.<br /><br />Demons are perfectly capable of attacking your senses and reasoning.<br /><br />So if your belief system is true, you have no idea if your thoughts are being manipulated by outside agents.<br /><br />And, of course, Plantinga still has to show that his belief that there is a god is reliable.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09267356610062260128noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-42919484144488191572014-03-07T13:16:02.428+00:002014-03-07T13:16:02.428+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09267356610062260128noreply@blogger.com