tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post4160457650316255306..comments2024-03-22T06:22:08.010+00:00Comments on Stephen Law: Bertrand Russell: Names and descriptionsStephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-18546506586336824602012-12-14T22:24:31.885+00:002012-12-14T22:24:31.885+00:00we really enjoy your atheist blog
do a search on ...we really enjoy your atheist blog<br /><br />do a search on youtube for skepticality<br /><br />a little souvenir<br /><br />it is the video about the PIGSAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-12175947941996475482012-12-13T20:58:48.969+00:002012-12-13T20:58:48.969+00:00Correction: ...one would not have to count...Correction: ...one would not have to count...Daniel Polowetzky https://www.blogger.com/profile/04299950687312400826noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-54095892864790698142012-12-13T18:54:06.376+00:002012-12-13T18:54:06.376+00:00Richard Wein:
Thank you for your comment!
It is ...Richard Wein:<br /><br />Thank you for your comment!<br /><br />It is not that I am defending any semantic theory of Russell's so much as endorsing what seems to me to be his metaphysical position regarding assertions of non-existence.<br /><br />I do not have a strong opinion on the issue of whether terms refer/denote/mean/rigidly designate,etc....<br /><br />My view is simply, consistent with Russell, that if one counted the objects in the world and determined that there was no object such that it was uniquely King of France and bald, that one would have to count another "object", i.e. the non-existent bald King of France.<br /><br />Whether "the present King of France" does not "refer" to anything, in ordinary language, is another matter.<br /><br />If someone were casually speaking of the King of France, I would correct them by simply saying that France does not have a King. The speaker would understand me clearly without adding that his error was in using a non-referring expression, "the King of France". Agreed.<br /><br />However, I do think that if one were to translate the speaker's statement into Russell's notation, demonstrate that nothing satisfies the schema, (x)...., that the speaker would agree that nothing much more was intended by his statement.Daniel Polowetzky https://www.blogger.com/profile/04299950687312400826noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-80162204003929170992012-12-13T15:02:20.802+00:002012-12-13T15:02:20.802+00:00Dan,
Thanks for mentioning "On Denoting"...Dan,<br /><br />Thanks for mentioning "On Denoting", as that prompted me to find the paper (online) and read it.<br /><br />You wrote: "What perplexed me when I read this paper, and perplexes me to this day, is that there was any metaphysical problem needing addressing in the first place."<br /><br />Me too. But, as you seem to be defending Russell, I would suggest that Russell too sees the "problem of empty reference" as needing to be addressed. His purpose in that paper is not just to refute the solutions of others, but also to give a solution of his own. My view is that all the disputants (including Russell) are addressing a non-existent problem. My own goal is not to give a better solution, but to point out the misguided nature of the question. Alternatively, we might call it "deflating" the problem. At any rate, it's a very different sort of "solution".<br /><br />We usually talk about reference in the context of clarifying meanings. "Who are you referring to?" "I'm referring to him." Or, "What does 'Pegasus' refer to?". "It refers to a mythical flying horse." This sort of language is useful and reasonable. As I think you appreciate, given your comment, it makes no sense to say to the latter person, "Oh no it doesn't. It can't do, because no such horse exists." But similarly, if I was talking about a fictional present king of France, or mistakenly believed France had a king, I could reasonably explain what I was referring to. So it makes little sense in those cases to say that I'm not referring to anything. But nor is there any point in saying that I am referring to something, outside of a context like this one (a context of explaining meaning). The philosopher typically extracts the question from any context, asking the bare question, "Does this expression refer to anything?" Deprived of context, the question is meaningless, and that's why philosophers can't agree on an answer. There isn't a right answer. (And that includes Russell's answer that it doesn't denote anything.)<br /><br />These problems arise because our natural instinct is to treat language as something ideal, which can be interpreted free of any context. I think Russell largely retains such an idealised view of language. He does occasionally refer to a specific context, such as when he talks about what George IV meant by a certain sentence. But generally he ignores context. Looking at this another way, it's not abstract expressions that refer to things. It's people who refer to things when they use expressions. It's often convenient to talk about language in the abstract. But we will be misled if we don't keep thinking back to real contexts.<br /><br />Taking language so far outside its normal context of use that it loses any meaning is what Wittgenstein called "language going on holiday".<br /><br />By the way, I'm not saying that Russell's analytic reductions are wrong. They may be reasonable approximations for typical contexts, just as "unmarried man" is a reasonable approximation to "bachelor", and (in my opinion) "justified true belief" is a reasonable approximation to "knowledge". But I don't think they solve any significant problems.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-35232728157899196082012-12-13T11:45:26.038+00:002012-12-13T11:45:26.038+00:00Thank you for sharing to us.Please one more post a...Thank you for sharing to us.Please one more post about that..<a href="http://www.personalinjurylawyerinmonroe.com" rel="nofollow">Personal injury lawyer</a><br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13409648723247216884noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-85787282995420241042012-12-13T05:02:22.058+00:002012-12-13T05:02:22.058+00:00One of my favorite philosophical papers is Russell...One of my favorite philosophical papers is Russell's 1905 paper, "On Denoting", which is where the gist of this discussion originates.<br /><br />Russell so clearly dispenses with any metaphysical problems alleged to result from assertions that "such and such does not exist".<br /><br />Whether seemingly referring terms mean what he says they mean or not, it seems reasonable that in demonstrating that "The present King of France is bald" is false (or not true), one need say no more than his analysis requires. <br /><br />Such a denial does not commit one to some realm of non-existent entities. That much seems obvious to me. Apparently, it was not obvious to those whom his paper was directed.<br /><br />What perplexed me when I read this paper, and perplexes me to this day, is that there was any metaphysical problem needing addressing in the first place.<br /><br />The semantics of these expressions is another matter. However, it never dawned on me that in saying that something did not exist, I was committed to such dubious entities.Daniel Polowetzky https://www.blogger.com/profile/04299950687312400826noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-79983439913511514142012-12-11T10:31:02.323+00:002012-12-11T10:31:02.323+00:00My definition proposal for "atheist", in...My definition proposal for "atheist", in Wiki Portal:<br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:AtheismJesús P. Zamora Bonillahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07054631110263426886noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-71753297405716861592012-12-08T11:30:21.304+00:002012-12-08T11:30:21.304+00:00I think there is indeed a fallacy when we say that...I think there is indeed a fallacy when we say that something does not exist. I don't think it can be possible to proof that logically coherent possibilities don't exist. When we say "a pink elephant does not exist" it's actual meaning is "to my knowledge there are no pink elephants", as in the case of Hume's black swans. We only prove positive statements. For when I say all that is in the room is air, it follows that no other thing exists in the room. I'm currently alone. To prove that there is nobody with me, it must be shown that all the other objects in the room is something else. 'Pegasus does not exist' is not true. It is an implicit statement of our ignorance. Joel Limhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09390365148871037848noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-29733839111767520992012-12-07T14:52:33.552+00:002012-12-07T14:52:33.552+00:00I'm with Wittgenstein.
Some of the things Rus...I'm with Wittgenstein.<br /><br />Some of the things Russell says here are reasonable. For example, there's nothing wrong <i>per se</i> with saying that words can refer to things. We meaningfully use such talk in ordinary language:<br />"Who are you referring to when you say 'John'?"<br />"I'm referring to that man over there."<br /><br />The fundamental problem lies in Russell's view that sentences have a true logical form. I think this leads him into over-rigid (and consequently sometimes misguided) analyses of what sentences must be doing.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-36240049994337698002012-12-07T08:12:48.035+00:002012-12-07T08:12:48.035+00:00To determine whether the tallest building is in Ku...To determine whether the tallest building is in Kuala Lumpur, I would search all of the objects that are of class building, run a method that chooses the object with the largest height field, then evaluate whether the country field is equivalent to Kuala Lumpur. If the set of objects in class building is empty, then it will return false. A similar process occurs when evaluating the other claims so I fail to see where the problem is. It would the same as if there were no buildings at all. I don't see where the problem is.<br /><br />Why do we need a physical thing to point at when we evaluate such claims using such a simple method that doesn't rely on the existence of said things? Is the problem that people are mistaking the output of the method to be a concrete reference point? As in, when evaluating the claim of the tallest building, people skip the step of actually finding the tallest building and simply check to see if X building is in Kuala Lumpur?Kevinnoreply@blogger.com