tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post2277892589110742733..comments2024-03-22T06:22:08.010+00:00Comments on Stephen Law: Review of Bede Rundle's "Why there is Something rather than Nothing"Stephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comBlogger38125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-89720434311803761242012-02-16T17:05:36.419+00:002012-02-16T17:05:36.419+00:00Hi Stephen. I'm a postgraduate student at Hey...Hi Stephen. I'm a postgraduate student at Heythrop, and I've just finished writing my first book The Philosophy of a Mad Man. If you'd be interested in having a read, or even reviewing my book, let me know and I'll send you a copy. If you're interested to know where my philosophical persuasions lie, check out my newly launched philosophy blog at http://perfectchaos.org/. Cheers! StevenStevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14728202670781361558noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-65565813371697980952011-09-08T16:00:12.461+00:002011-09-08T16:00:12.461+00:00..comments following your article "Why is the.....comments following your article "Why is there anything at all?" sorry I think pasted my comments on the wrong post.awed by Godnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-12943160975415194272011-09-08T12:46:03.130+00:002011-09-08T12:46:03.130+00:00"it certainly wasn’t the ... all-good God of ..."it certainly wasn’t the ... all-good God of Judeo-Christian theology<br /><br />too much suffering,"<br /><br />The all-good God says rebellion in some of His creatures which affected His earthly creation (Adam and Eve) has resulted in the suffering which we have ("you will surely die").<br /><br />You could say you don't know why that should be but you can't say there can't be a God who is all powerful and all-good because there is suffering in the world, if He addresses it.awed by Godnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-81275204781837070852009-06-30T14:35:52.967+00:002009-06-30T14:35:52.967+00:00I hope it's not inappropriate to offer a few v...I hope it's not inappropriate to offer a few verses from ancient texts in the context of this discussion :<br /><br />"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.<br />The earth was a vast waste, darkness covered the deep, and the spirit of God hovered over the surface of the water. <br />God said, "Let there be light,' and there was light;<br />and God saw the light was good, and he separated light from darkness." (Genesis 1 : 1 - 4, circa 550 BCE)<br /><br /><br />"In the beginning the Word already was. The Word was in God's presence, and what God was, the Word was. He was with God at the beginning, and through him all things came to be; without him no created thing came into being. <br />In him was life, and that life was the light of mankind. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has never mastered it." (John's Gospel 1 : 1 - 5, circa 100 CE)Dickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14771751470931908022noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-18873769874513028452008-10-19T10:14:00.000+00:002008-10-19T10:14:00.000+00:00There seems to be some confusion as to what Nothin...There seems to be some confusion as to what Nothing is (or, rather, could be). Nothing is not something and thus cannot be discussed as if it were. Nothing has no properties, and to look for it in empty worlds is to not look for Nothing but to look for something.<BR/><BR/>Empty worlds are not Nothing and neither do they contain Nothing. Empty worlds are something. They cannot contain Nothing, for to do so would make them something. As soon as Nothing is enclosed, i.e. given somewhere to be, it is not Nothing.<BR/><BR/>Questioning why there is Something rather than Nothing is legitimate. The only problem is to define Nothing. Since we cannot conceive of everything NOT being, we can't get much further than saying that something exists "because it does" and we are here to prove it. If we weren't here, there would be Nothing, but we wouldn't know about it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-41854809905936374382007-08-28T16:03:00.000+00:002007-08-28T16:03:00.000+00:00Glad to read articles like this. Thanks to author!...Glad to read articles like this. Thanks to author!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-67133332024138067262007-08-18T08:18:00.000+00:002007-08-18T08:18:00.000+00:00Thanks for interesting article.Thanks for interesting article.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-13222565686993326842007-08-17T22:20:00.000+00:002007-08-17T22:20:00.000+00:00Thanks for article!Thanks for article!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-25851258955347876202007-07-16T11:55:00.000+00:002007-07-16T11:55:00.000+00:00Anticant:Why not?Anticant:<BR/><BR/>Why not?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-43253962950194375982007-07-15T16:43:00.000+00:002007-07-15T16:43:00.000+00:00Hi Stephen,A few questions: On what grounds can we...Hi Stephen,<BR/><BR/>A few questions: <BR/><BR/>On what grounds can we assume there is only one Nothing?<BR/><BR/>If we know so little about Nothing, how can we assume anything about the comparative probabilities of Nothing(s) and one or more somethings?<BR/><BR/>Of your ref to Rundle's "vastly different things can be said of the mental and physical: one’s thoughts may be muddled, innovative, inspired… but none of this can be said of anything that is literally taking place in one’s head" - So what's the problem? Our thoughts may constitute, relatively speaking, a disorganised mess of a representation of what's going on in our heads. If I spill my dinner on the floor it would become a muddled, and according to some art critics innovative and inspired; but that wouldn't detract from the physics of the food on the floor.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11039815765507965606noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-72520702383341873452007-07-14T20:57:00.000+00:002007-07-14T20:57:00.000+00:00anonymous: your final paragraph - "does this make ...anonymous: your final paragraph - "does this make sense?"<BR/><BR/>No, it doesn't.anticanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18135207107619114891noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-76087709070480881572007-07-12T13:20:00.000+00:002007-07-12T13:20:00.000+00:00A little bit of rambling...Things exist. In order ...A little bit of rambling...<BR/><BR/>Things exist. <BR/><BR/>In order for there to be NOTHING then everything that does exist would have to not exist.<BR/><BR/>Possibilities, concepts etc. exist.<BR/><BR/>In order of there to be NOTHING, these must not exist.<BR/><BR/>Can nothing become something. Many religious folk have argued that God is required for this to happen.<BR/>But if God existed then there was something to begin with.<BR/><BR/>A couple of questions.<BR/><BR/>Whether or not we can concieve of absolute nothing really doesn't have any impact on it being a possible state. Does it?<BR/><BR/>Nothing is impossible of course. Because something exists now, there could never have been Nothing. That would imply the existance of time or the existance of the possiblity of change. Does this make sense?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-17419782736718440562007-07-11T21:49:00.000+00:002007-07-11T21:49:00.000+00:00Stephen,Thanks for your comments.Presumably, a sit...Stephen,<BR/><BR/>Thanks for your comments.<BR/><BR/><I>Presumably, a situation in which there is no physical universe, but in which there are truths about possibility, conditional truths, mathematical truths, etc. is not a situation in which we have ABSOLUTE "nothing". For there are still all these truths.</I><BR/><BR/>I think the viability of this response depends upon what you think about the metaphysics of entities like propositions. If you are a Platonist and contend that propositions are abstract objects which exist independently of us, then you will hold that in a world in which there are no physical objects there will still be abstract objects such as propositions. In that case, something still exists. However, just as there are a whole host of possible views one could have about worlds, there are a whole host of views one could have about propositions: you might be a fictionalist, or a nominalist, or a Meinongian, or perhaps something else. I mentioned to anticant that I am attracted to the view that worlds are a species of non-existent objects. Why not hold that all abstract objects -- including propositions -- are nonexistent objects? Then, empty worlds are just worlds in which every object is a nonexistent object.<BR/><BR/><I>once you insist you are using "something" differently, as the alternative to ABSOLUTE nothing, then you are begging the question that such a conception of "something" (ABSOLUTE something, if you like) is possible.</I><BR/><BR/>I think you've hit upon a real challenge. To be sure, when we ordinarily employ quantifiers, we only intend for those quantifiers to range over some "limited" collection of things. Thus, when we say "there's no beer left" when we are at a party, we do not mean that no beer exists anywhere in the world or universe -- we just mean there is no beer left at the party.<BR/><BR/>But, can't we go <I>further</I> and quantify over anything whatsoever? For example, if I assert that "there exist no unicorns", I mean that there are no unicorns <I>whatsoever</I>. I intend to speak about everything, unrestrictedly. If we can intelligibly do this, and I think we can, then we can identify a sense for "it is not the case that there exists anything": the quantifier in that sentence has the same sense as the quantifier in "there exist no unicorns". Looking to examples like this, I think, helps to answer your challenge and put "absolute" nothingness on better footing.Timmohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04095596090336782085noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-60475972021969001712007-07-10T09:51:00.000+00:002007-07-10T09:51:00.000+00:00Hi JeremyThanks for kind words about the DK book. ...Hi Jeremy<BR/><BR/>Thanks for kind words about the DK book. It looks nice. But it was a nightmare to do, frankly. And I am not entirely happy with it. I may explain why later....<BR/><BR/>Hi Timmo<BR/><BR/>Presumably, a situation in which there is no physical universe, but in which there are truths about possibility, conditional truths, mathematical truths, etc. is not a situation in which we have ABSOLUTE "nothing". For there are still all these truths.<BR/><BR/>It seems there is only one such ABSOLUTE nothing world/possibility.<BR/><BR/>However, raising the issue of possibilities etc. is interesting, because it does raise further difficulties for the thought that such an ABSOLUTE nothing world is conceivable.<BR/><BR/>After all, if such a world is possible, it is a world in which the existence of something was possible, but not actual. But then it's not a nothing world, for it contains this possibility!<BR/><BR/>You inconceivability argument is interesting, but I don't think it works. Obviously we can conceive of something existing (in this box, say). But is this particular example of "conceiving of something", conceiving of the alternative to ABSOLUTE nothing? Not obviously. It's conceiving of the alternative to there being something in the box, as we more commonly use "something", i.e. an empty tract of space. And that's not ABSOLUTE nothing.<BR/><BR/>So the conceivability of "something", as we ordinarily use "something", does not entail the conceivability of ABSOLUTE nothing. <BR/><BR/>And indeed, once you insist you are using "something" differently, as the alternative to ABSOLUTE nothing, then you are begging the question that such a conception of "something" (ABSOLUTE something, if you like) is possible.Stephen Lawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-8296452386451964502007-07-10T09:50:00.000+00:002007-07-10T09:50:00.000+00:00Hi JeremyThanks for kind words about the DK book. ...Hi Jeremy<BR/><BR/>Thanks for kind words about the DK book. It looks nice. But it was a nightmare to do, frankly. And I am not entirely happy with it. I may explain why later....<BR/><BR/>Hi Timmo<BR/><BR/>Presumably, a situation in which there is no physical universe, but in which there are truths about possibility, conditional truths, mathematical truths, etc. is not a situation in which we have ABSOLUTE "nothing". For there are still all these truths.<BR/><BR/>It seems there is only one such ABSOLUTE nothing world/possibility.<BR/><BR/>However, raising the issue of possibilities etc. is interesting, because it does raise further difficulties for the thought that such an ABSOLUTE nothing world is conceivable.<BR/><BR/>After all, if such a world is possible, it is a world in which the existence of something was possible, but not actual. But then it's not a nothing world, for it contains this possibility!<BR/><BR/>You inconceivability argument is interesting, but I don't think it works. Obviously we can conceive of something existing (in this box, say). But is this particular example of "conceiving of something", conceiving of the alternative to ABSOLUTE nothing? Not obviously. It's conceiving of the alternative to there being something in the box, as we more commonly use "something", i.e. an empty tract of space. And that's not ABSOLUTE nothing.<BR/><BR/>So the conceivability of "something", as we ordinarily use "something", does not entail the conceivability of ABSOLUTE nothing. <BR/><BR/>And indeed, once you insist you are using "something" differently, as the alternative to ABSOLUTE nothing, then you are begging the question that such a conception of "something" (ABSOLUTE something, if you like) is possible.Stephen Lawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-30043132646412504872007-07-10T09:20:00.000+00:002007-07-10T09:20:00.000+00:00Timmo, I believe Stephen was referring to the univ...Timmo, <BR/><BR/>I believe Stephen was referring to the universe. The universe either contains or perhaps is something or it is not. If something exists, there are many different configurations and forms something might take. If the universe contains nothing or essentially doesn't exist then there is only one form it can take - Nothing.<BR/>Consider nothing to be the absence of everything including thoughts, concepts, probabilities and possibilities.<BR/><BR/>Despite that, I disagree that because something can have more forms than nothing that it is therefore more probable. <BR/>Imagine Bob wants to grow a tree. The spot Bob has his heart set on for the tree is less than ideal. An expert friend of his examines the soil and location and informs Bob that there is a 50-50 chance that the tree will grow if he plants the seed in that spot. If the tree does grow, there are many ways in which it might grow. It might be tall or short or have fifty branches or only ten branches. If it doesn't grow, then it has only one form, a dead seed. Does the fact that it can have more shapes and sizes if it does grow make the probability of it growing in the first place greater?<BR/><BR/>It could be argued that despite its different possible growth configurations it is still just a tree. It could not, for example, grow into a rock. This is true of course but in terms of the universe we can make the same argument. Everything in the universe is composed of energy in one form or another, it may take different shapes but it is still essentially energy.<BR/><BR/>This may be over simplifying things a little but I think that without more than one single test (our universe), it is difficult to gauge which is more probable, something or nothing.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-31252849188686104142007-07-10T07:02:00.000+00:002007-07-10T07:02:00.000+00:00Not being a philosopher, my interest in it is limi...Not being a philosopher, my interest in it is limited to practical issues, such as how to improve the rational and logical content of everyday thinking and behaviour, and discourage belief in nonsense.<BR/><BR/>I can see the attraction of more abstract speculations, but as you say one has to have a taste for them and to philistine me they smack of mental wanking, if you'll excuse the vulgarity.anticanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18135207107619114891noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-5206978027924916032007-07-10T03:32:00.000+00:002007-07-10T03:32:00.000+00:00Anticant,Modal metaphysics gets abstract and techn...Anticant,<BR/><BR/>Modal metaphysics gets abstract and technical <I>fast</I>! I suppose one has to cultivate a taste for it, like one would for fine wine or cigars. I personally find it exciting, but there are plenty of other exhilarating topics in philosophy...Timmohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04095596090336782085noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-57881681452402585272007-07-10T01:05:00.000+00:002007-07-10T01:05:00.000+00:00Thanks for the references. I must confess that for...Thanks for the references. I must confess that for me this is the point at which such abstract philosophising recalls the denizens of Laputa and my attention wanders elsewhere....anticanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18135207107619114891noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-13728762725372069772007-07-09T21:55:00.000+00:002007-07-09T21:55:00.000+00:00Anticant,An "empty world" [with or without a flyin...Anticant,<BR/><BR/><I>An "empty world" [with or without a flying Paris Hilton - who is presumably nothing anyway] would surely be something, not nothing.</I><BR/><BR/>Surely? There are a whole host of possible views you could have about possible worlds: realism, <A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-modal/" REL="nofollow">modal fictionalism</A>, <A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/" REL="nofollow">Platonism</A>, <A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/" REL="nofollow">Meinongianism</A>, nominalism, and many other possible views. An adherent to each of these views would have something different to say in response to your comment. Myself, I am very attracted to Priest's view, advanced in <I>Toward Non-Being</I>, that possible worlds are a species of non-existent objects. So, worlds do not exist, and they certainly do not exist at empty worlds!<BR/><BR/>My point about Paris Hilton is this. While Paris Hilton does not exist at an empty world -- nothing, after all, exists at an empty world -- there will be empty worlds in which it is true that <I>it is possible that Paris Hilton can fly</I> and empty worlds in which it is false that <I>it is possible that Paris Hilton can fly</I>. Accordingly, those two worlds have to be <I>different</I>.Timmohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04095596090336782085noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-24853993774020061262007-07-09T18:28:00.000+00:002007-07-09T18:28:00.000+00:00An "empty world" [with or without a flying Paris H...An "empty world" [with or without a flying Paris Hilton - who is presumably nothing anyway] would surely be something, not nothing.<BR/><BR/>As Stephen says in his original post, it is extremely difficult to conceive pure nothingness. Mind-bogglingly so, in fact.<BR/><BR/>I fear I won't get around to reading Rundle's book - parts of which would almost certainly be beyond my mental capacity - but the whole subject, and the discussion on this thread, is very absorbing. Thanks, everyone.anticanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18135207107619114891noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-68673526349800754782007-07-09T14:18:00.000+00:002007-07-09T14:18:00.000+00:00Stephen,You write, After all, there are many ways ...Stephen,<BR/><BR/>You write, <I>After all, there are many ways there could have been something, but only one in which there is nothing, so (even if we acknowledge that nothing is more probable than any particular something) something is more probable.</I><BR/><BR/>Actually, there is more than one way there could have been nothing. Possible worlds are, at least partly, individuated by what is true at them. Propositions true at a possible world are not always propositions about the way that world <I>actually</I> is, but also about how that world <I>might</I> have been or the way that world <I>must</I> be. So, ◊p may true at some empty worlds and untrue at other empty worlds. For example, there will be some empty worlds at which it is possible for Paris Hilton to fly and other empty worlds at which it is not possible for Paris Hilton to fly. <BR/><BR/>This idea can be made precise. Consider an axiomatization of first-order K. (See Hughs & Cresswell). A variable-domain model M for K is a quintuple [W, R, D, Q, V], where W is a set of worlds, R, the "accessibility" relation, is a relation on W, D is a set of objects, Q is a function from members of W to subsets of D, and V is a function which maps world-predicate pairs [w, P] to Q(w) (or the n-th Cartesian power of Q(w) if P is an n-ary relation sign). D is supposed to be the set of all possible objects, where the value Q(w) intuitively represents the objects which exist at w. If we allow for Q(w) = ∅ at some worlds, then we have empty worlds in our model M. <BR/><BR/>Now, it is easy to see that having multiple empty worlds in a model is not "redundant" because of the accessibility relation R. Some empty worlds will "see" certain other worlds, and some empty worlds will be "seen" by other worlds. Thus, given some formula α in which there is at least one occurrence of a modal operator, it will sometimes turn out that α will be true at one empty world but false in another: two empty worlds, despite the fact that they are both empty, can access different worlds.<BR/><BR/>Ultimately, then, I do not see why there should not be infinitely many empty worlds -- indeed, non-denumerably many empty worlds!Timmohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04095596090336782085noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-2698723560030466632007-07-09T09:14:00.000+00:002007-07-09T09:14:00.000+00:00Is the existance of something more or less probabl...Is the existance of something more or less probable than the absence of anything - How can we guage the probability of an event(or state) we know to have occured/been only once? <BR/><BR/>Probablilty by its nature requires multiple examples of an event to guage how often it is likely to occur.<BR/> <BR/>If there is a God who created everything, where was he located before the he created the universe? <BR/>If the universe contains everything that is and God existed, he by default existed in the universe. <BR/>If he existed in the universe, then how could he be responsible for its creation?<BR/>Is there some distinction being drawn between the physical universe and some mystical other universe in which God existed before the physical one did?<BR/><BR/>I know there are many questions here and it is a bit rambling. Sorry. I'm being a bold boy at work.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-86633153006167643022007-07-09T02:03:00.000+00:002007-07-09T02:03:00.000+00:00Stephen,I am glad you like the argument. Perhaps ...Stephen,<BR/><BR/>I am glad you like the argument. Perhaps you will like it even more if I can persuade you that it is sound. ;-) <BR/><BR/>What do you think is wrong with (3)? <BR/><BR/>I think (3) in can be argued for in much the same way as (1):<BR/><BR/><B>(1*)</B> If it is conceivable that A(c), then it is conceivable that (∃x)A(x). [Premise]<BR/><BR/><B>(2*)</B> It is conceivable that <I>c exists</I>. [Premise]<BR/><BR/><B>(3)</B> It is conceivable that (∃x)(x exists), <I>i.e.</I> it is conceivable that something exists. [from 1*, 2*]<BR/><BR/>It does not matter, of course, how you understand 'x exists'. That is, you can employ traditional rendition of 'x exists' by the formula '(∃y)(y = x)' or employ an existence predicate 'E!x', like you would in free logic.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps you are hinting that you have scruples with wholly unrestricted quantification.Timmohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04095596090336782085noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-63798397550368889872007-07-08T20:55:00.000+00:002007-07-08T20:55:00.000+00:00Frankly, I don't see the analogy. It's possible - ...Frankly, I don't see the analogy. It's possible - though not highly likely - that the firing squad's poor aim was the result of identifiable causes, such as bribery by your wife or your captors' instructions. And while we can - and do - ponder the improbability of the universe, this does not necessarily postulate the existence of a First Cause - supernatural or otherwise.anticanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18135207107619114891noreply@blogger.com