tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post1961401475132132127..comments2024-02-26T03:25:06.471+00:00Comments on Stephen Law: Notes from my slides today - evil and suffering, Augustine, Irenaus, sceptical theismStephen Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02167317543994731177noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-76336804730385481342014-05-21T09:15:43.312+00:002014-05-21T09:15:43.312+00:00Anonymous...
You ask for "proof" for Ph...Anonymous...<br /><br />You ask for "proof" for Philolinguist's comments....<br /><br />Well, if you Google "Rubber-Hand Experiments" and look at the results of these experiments with your "philosopher-hat" then you will find that what Philolinguist posits concerning the "I" is valid.Philip Randhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09143527524267821692noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-60886398499813437712014-04-01T16:49:55.339+00:002014-04-01T16:49:55.339+00:00Can you actually prove anything you said? Can you actually prove anything you said? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1905686568472747305.post-55062333570764635332014-03-24T07:47:16.675+00:002014-03-24T07:47:16.675+00:00With regard to the Problem of Evil, it may help to...With regard to the Problem of Evil, it may help to distinguish between the intentional and non-intentional contents of suffering. E.g. when I envy someone, there is the intentional side of envy (which has conceptual content, and is directed at an object). Then there is the non-intentional sensation which accompanies envy (i.e., the generic 'psychic' pain or distress which accompanies intentional states such as envy,covetousness or lust; but the pain does not itself have conceptual content). <br /><br />Traditional moral psychology assigns a causal role to the non-intentional psychic pain, in motivating intentional action to end the distress. The view I'm proposing denies the traditional claim, because a generic pain with no conceptual content cannot be directed at an object, and hence cannot motivate intentional (as opposed to instinctive or reflex) action. So actions for which we can be held morally culpable cannot be caused by non-intentional states. <br /><br />In a comment on another post in this blog (on William Lane Craig's remarks about animal pain from 18 March 2014), I mentioned the view that God experiences the suffering of all his creatures. Presumably (on such a view) God only experiences the non-intentional generic pain; because He cannot have evil intentional states such as envy, lust, or unrighteous anger and hatred. <br /><br />On such a view, in what sense is there a traditional Problem of Evil? Some might reply "Even if God experiences my pain, surely I (as a person separate from God) also experience my own pain. Therefore, I can hold my pain against God, and blame Him for my suffering." <br /><br />Who is the 'I' in that reply? Presumably, it is the chain of conceptual reasoning that rationalizes the pain as 'belonging' to it. If God is experiencing pain in the first-person through 'my' body, then God is the 'I'(I1) who experiences the non-intentional generic pain, but not the 'I' (I2) who has evil intentions accompanying the pain. In what sense does I2 have a claim to also be I1 alongside God? If I2 has no such claim, then there is no Problem of Evil, because God would be the only Self (as I1) who experiences pain, as a result of our evil intentions(as I2).<br /><br />How can a chain of conceptual reasoning (that rationalizes itself to be a 'person') feel pain? Pain is not just a concept, but arguably 'personhood' is conceptual through-and-through. Some may reply "I am my body, and my body feels the pain", but most philosophers will say that's a literally false statement (or at least highly misleading). The more accurate description is "I feel pain THROUGH my body", so it follows that 'I' am not my body. A bundle of concepts held together by inferences cannot feel pain; though it can hate, envy, lust or covet (as conceptual content directed at an object). So whatever feels pain through our bodies has to be something other than a chain of reasoning, and is not itself a physical body. In so far as we are just one or both of those things, we are left out. Philolinguisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622819518795177507noreply@blogger.com