Plantinga’s Latest EAAN Refuted In “Content and Natural Selection” (PPR forthcoming) Plantinga presents a version of his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) that he then bolsters to deal with a certain sort of objection. The EAAN itself runs as follows. Let N be the view that there’s no such person as God or anything at all like God (or if there is, then this being plays no causal role in the world’s transactions), and E be the view that our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes postulated by contemporary evolutionary theory. Then, argues Plantinga, the combination N&E is incoherent of self-defeating. This, he maintains, is because if N&E is true, then the probability that R – that we have cognitive faculties that are reliable (that is to say, produce a preponderance of true over false beliefs in nearby possible worlds) – is low. But anyone who sees that P(R/N&E) is low then has an undefeatable defeater for R. And if they have such a def
This is the website/blog of Philosopher Stephen Law. Stephen is retired, formerly Reader in philosophy at Heythrop College, University of London. He is editor of the Royal Institute of Philosophy journal THINK, and has published several books, including The Philosophy Gym, The Complete Philosophy Files, and Believing Bullshit. For school talks and media: stephenlaw4schools.blogspot.co.uk Email: think-AT-royalinstitutephilosophy.org